Singletary v. Dist. Of D.C.

• Decision Date: 18 February 2010
• Docket Number: Civil No. 09-752(CKK).
• Parties: Charles SINGLETARY, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

685 F.Supp.2d 81

Charles SINGLETARY, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil No. 09-752(CKK).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Decided: Feb. 18, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Edward Charles Sussman, Steven Roy Kiersh, Washington, DC, Neal Andrew Goldfarb, Butzel Long Tighe Patton PLLC, Washington, DC, Stephen C. Leckar, Shanis & Peltzman, Washington, DC for Plaintiff.

Heather R. Skeeles-Shiner, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY,

District Judge.

Plaintiff, Charles Singletary, filed the above-captioned matter against Defendant District of Columbia (the "District" or "D.C."), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). Singletary alleges that the District of Columbia Board of Parole (the "Board") wrongly revoked his parole based on insufficient hearsay evidence in violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights and seeks to hold the District liable under Section 1983. Presently pending before the Court is the District's [6] Motion to Dismiss. In addition, the District has filed a[12] Motion for Leave to File a Response to Plaintiffs' Surreply. Both motions are now fully briefed and ripe for the Court's resolution. Upon thorough consideration of the District's pending motions and the parties' related briefing, the applicable case law and statutory authority, and the record of this case as a whole, the Court shall GRANT the District's [12] Motion for Leave to File a Response to Plaintiffs' Surreply, but shall DENY the District's [6] Motion to Dismiss, for the reasons that follow.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. Singletary's Arrest and Subsequent Revocation of Parole

In 1990, after having served more than seven years on a sentence for robbery armed robbery and assault, Singletary was released on parole. Complaint, Docket No. [1], ¶ 8.¹ Approximately five years later, in June of 1995, Singletary was arrested for the murder of Leroy Houtman a.k.a., Vaughn Stokes. Id. ¶ 10. Singletary alleges that he was not involved with or responsible for the murder. Id. ¶ 11. The case against him was ultimately dismissed at a preliminary hearing before the District of Columbia Superior Court, and the charges against Singletary were never brought before a grand jury. Id. ¶ 10.

In July of 1996, a little over a year after he had been arrested for Houtman's murder, the Board held a joint hearing to consider whether to revoke Singletary's parole and that of Gary Barnes, Singletary's alleged accomplice in the Houtman murder, based upon their alleged involvement in that crime. Id. ¶ 12. At the hearing, Singletary denied any involve- merit with or responsibility for the murder. Id. ¶ 13. The only evidence presented against him was (1) a narrative given by the prosecutor and (2) testimony by a police detective. Id. ¶ 15. Neither the prosecutor or the police detective who testified had first-hand knowledge of the facts. Id. Rather, most of the information described by the prosecutor and the police detective was based upon statements made by two individuals not present at the hearing; although these individuals were not identified by name at the hearing, they were later identified as Verdez Smith and Terri Washington. Id. ¶ 16.

Smith and Washington both claimed to have learned about Houtman's murder from another individual—Carmelita Metts. Id. ¶ 17. Both Smith and Washington however, had given the police inconsistent and conflicting statements. Id. ¶ 18. For example, Smith was originally identified by the police when Houtman's truck was discovered in his possession after the murder. Id. Smith initially claimed that someone named "Tony" had given it to him, but later admitted to having received the truck from Metts. Id. The police subsequently arrested Smith for Houtman's murder, at which point Smith again changed his story, claiming that Metts, his former girlfriend, had asked him to help her kill Houtman, but that he had refused. Id. Smith also told the police that Metts had later given him Houtman's truck to sell, as Smith had previous experience as a car thief. Id. Similarly, Washington initially denied any knowledge of the murder, but later claimed that Metts had confessed to her that she had helped Singletary and Barnes murder Houtman. Id. ¶ 18.

As indicated above, neither Smith or Washington testified at the parole revocation hearing nor were they identified at the hearing as the source of the statements against Singletary. Id. ¶¶20-21. Indeed, no one with first-hand knowledge of the murder testified at the hearing. Id. ¶ 14. According to the Complaint, the testimony provided at the hearing summarizing Smith and Washington's testimony misstated some of the alleged details provided in their statements to the police. Id. ¶ 22. In addition, many details about Singletary's alleged involvement in the murder were never explained, including why he would participate in the murder and whether he even knew Houtman. Id. Nonetheless, on August 6, 1996, the Board revoked Singletary's parole based on the evidence provided at the July hearing and Singletary was re-incarcerated, spending the next ten years in prison. Id. ¶ 23-24. 2. Post-Revocation Legal Proceedings

Singletary filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the District of Columbia Superior Court in 1997, challenging the Board's decision to revoke his parole. Id. ¶35. That petition was denied by the Superior Court, which denial was affirmed on appeal by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. In 2000, Singletary again sought habeas relief before the District of Columbia Superior Court, but his request was again denied and the decision was again affirmed on appeal by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. ¶ 36.

Singletary then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in a civil action captioned Singletary v. D.C. Board of Parole, No. 00-1263. Id. ¶37. The District Court denied his petition. Id. Singletary appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (the "D.C. Circuit") in an appeal captioned Singletary v. Reilly, No. 04-713. Id. ¶ 38. On July 7, 2006, the D.C. Circuit reversed the District Court's denial, concluding that Singletary was entitled to a new parole revocation hearing. Id. ¶39-40; see also Singletary v. Reilly, 452 F.3d 868 (D.C.Cir.2006). The D.C. Circuit found "that the hearsay presented at the hearing was not demonstrated to be reliable and that the Board's decision to revoke Singletary's parole was therefore 'totally lacking in evidentiary support'" in violation of his due process rights. Singletary, 452 F.3d at 874.

3. Singletary's New Parole Revocation Hearing

Singletary's new parole revocation hearing was held on October 30, 2006. Compl. ¶42. The hearing was held before the United States Parole Commission, to which the functions of the District of Columbia Parole Board had been previously transferred. Id. ¶43.² At that hearing, the government presented testimony from Smith and Detective Tom Amis. Id. ¶44. Smith testified that shortly after Houtman's murder, a person named "Charlie" was pointed out to him as having participated in the crime. Id. When asked whether that individual identified as "Charlie" was then-present in the hearing room, however, Smith did not identify Singletary as that individual. Id.

The hearing officer concluded that there was insufficient evidence to permit a finding of a parole violation, concluding that "[t]he testimony provided by Detective Amis and Mr. Smith at today's hearing would indicate that Mr. Singletary was never identified as Charlie. It should also be noted that the information supported in the file would indicate that there is no direct link from Mr. Singletary to the victim." Id. ¶ 45. Based on the hearing officer's report and recommendation, the Parole Commission determined that there was no finding of a violation and reinstated

Singletary to supervised release. Id. ¶ 47. The Parole Commission's order was issued on or about November 17, 2006, and Plaintiff was released shortly thereafter. Id. ¶48.

B. Procedural Background

Singletary filed the above-captioned lawsuit against the District on April 23, 2009. See generally id. Singletary seeks to hold D.C. liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "for having revoked his parole and imprisoning him for ten years based on unreliable multiple hearsay in violation of [his] Fifth Amendment right to due process." Id. ¶ 1. The District subsequently filed the nowpending Motion to Dismiss. See Def.'s MTD, Docket No. [6]. Singletary timely filed an Opposition, see PL's Opp'n, Docket No. [7], and the District its Reply, see Def.'s Reply, Docket No. [9]. After the motion was fully briefed, Singletary filed an unopposed motion for leave to file a surreply to address arguments raised for the first time by the District in its Reply which the Court granted; accordingly, the Court considers the arguments raised in Singletary's Surreply as well. See PL's Surreply, Docket No. [11].

Shortly thereafter, the District filed a motion for leave to file a response to Singletary's Surreply, with its proposed Response to Plaintiff's Surreply ("Response") attached. See Def.'s Mot. for Leave Docket No. [12]. The District contends that Singletary's Surreply addresses not only those arguments that the District admittedly raised for the first time in its Reply, but also revisits arguments that Singletary had previously had an opportunity to address in his Opposition; the Dis- trict contends that, as the moving party, it is entitled to a final opportunity to respond to Singletary's arguments. See id. In response to the District's motion for leave to file, Singletary filed an opposition in which he initially asserts that the District "has not shown good cause for filing a response to plaintiff Singletary's surreply memorandum," such that the motion should "ordinarily"...