Medina v. Dist. Of D.C., Civil Action No. 97-594 (JMF).

• Decision Date: 18 June 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 97-594 (JMF).
• Parties: Angel MEDINA, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

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Angel MEDINA, Plaintiff,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 97-594 (JMF).

United States District Court,District of Columbia.

June 18, 2010.

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H. Vincent McKnight, Jr., Ashcraft & Gerel, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

David A. Jackson, Office of the Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION JOHN M. FACCIOLA, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case is before me for all purposes including trial. Currently pending and ready for resolution is Defendant's Notice of Refiling its Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or in the Alternative for New Trial, for Remittitur with References [sic] to the Trial Record [# 153]. For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion will be denied.

BACKGROUND

In 1997, plaintiff, a Hispanic police officer with the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”), sued the District of Columbia for employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., ¹ and the D.C. Human Rights Act, D.C.Code § 2-1401.01 et seq. On July 29, 2008, following a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff and he was awarded $180,000.00. Specifically, the jury found that plaintiff was not discriminated against either in 1994 when he was transferred out of the Office of Internal Affairs (“OIA”) upon his promotion from sergeant to lieutenant or in 1998 when the MPD denied his application to return to the OIA. The jury did find, however, that plaintiff was retaliated against when the MPD failed to return him to full duty status following the dismissal of his criminal indictment and when he was not transferred to the OIA upon his request. The jury also concluded that the MPD's denial of his application to return to the OIA in 1998 constituted an adverse employment action.

DISCUSSION I. Defendant's Motion for Judgement as a Matter of Law

A. Legal Standard

Defendant moves for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for a post-trial finding by the court that a reasonable jury did not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for its findings. See 9B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2521 (3d ed.2009). “Judgement as a matter of law should only be granted ‘if viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [non-moving party] and giving him the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference that the evidence may permit, there can be but one reasonable conclusion drawn.’ ” Fox v. District of Columbia, 990 F.Supp. 13, 19 (D.D.C.1997) (quoting Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 827 (D.C.Cir.1988)). Finally, a Rule 50(b) motion is only permitted if the movant sought relief on the same grounds under Rule 50(a), before the case was sent to the jury. See id. at § 2537; Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 2617 n. 5, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008).

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B. Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claim of Retaliation

1. The Parties' Positions

Defendant contends that the District is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to plaintiff's Section 1983 claim because there was insufficient evidence of a custom and policy within the MPD of retaliating against individuals who complained of discrimination on the basis of their national origin. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial or Remittitur (“Defs. Mem.”) at 8. First, defendant argues that plaintiff's own testimony was insufficient in that he failed to provide any examples of other Hispanic officers who complained of national origin discrimination and were subsequently retaliated against. Id. at 10. Second, defendant argues that the testimony of Officer Hiram Rosario also lacked specificity in that even though Officer Rosario testified that, as President of the Hispanic Police Association, he had occasion to meet with all of the MPD Chiefs of Police to discuss the concerns of the Hispanic officers, he, like plaintiff, failed to provide any concrete examples of complaints made by other Hispanic officers. Id. Third, defendant argues that Judge Hennessy's testimony was even more generalized than Officer Rosario's. Id. at 11. According to defendant, while Judge Hennessy testified that officers who complained were not viewed as team players and were given less favorable assignments, he made no mention of Hispanic officers in this context. Id. Finally, defendant argues that plaintiff's introduction into evidence of only three pages of a one hundred and three page document, the MPD Affirmative Action Plan, was misleading because the Plan was created five years prior to the alleged retaliatory behavior in this case and because, while the data table plaintiff introduced contains the transfer rates of Blacks, Whites, and Hispanics, it gives no explanation for why the various groups received transfers. Id. In other words, defendant argues that the table does not show that Hispanics were denied transfers in retaliation for complaining of discrimination based on their national origin. Id.

Plaintiff offers two arguments in opposition. First, plaintiff notes that, although not common, “a municipality can be held liable under Section 1983 for a single bad act if the act was ordered or sanctioned by a municipal official with final policymaking authority.” Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial, or for Remittitur (“Plains. Opp.”) at 5. Plaintiff then argues that the case at bar is just such a case because the individual directly responsible for the illegal discrimination was the Chief of Police, the official with final policymaking authority for the MPD and the official who denied plaintiff's request to transfer back to the OIA in 1998. Id.

Second, plaintiff argues that even if the Chief of Police was not the final policymaker, the evidence amply supported the jury's conclusion that there was a custom and practice of retaliation against Hispanic officers at the MPD who complained of discrimination. Plains. Opp. at 6-7. In support of his contention, plaintiff cites the following evidence: 1) Officer Rosario's testimony that he was demoted and subjected to adverse employment actions after he filed a claim of discrimination, 2) Judge Hennessy's testimony that Hispanic officers who challenged authority lost out on promotional opportunities, 3) Judge Hennessy's testimony that the MPD fostered a culture that negatively targeted those who were not team players, such as Hispanic officers who filed EEO claims, 4) Officer Cheryl Peacock's testimony that she was asked to apply for various positions and

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only spent seven days at the rank of Captain before she was promoted to Inspector, two ranks higher, and 5) the lack of evidence of any records describing the decision making or promotion process as further proof that the MPD discriminated and retaliated against Hispanic officers. Id. at 7-8.

2. Analysis

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code states the following:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In the seminal case of Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Supreme Court held that in order for liability to attach to a municipality for civil rights violations under section 1983, the municipality must have acted in accordance with a “government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. The Court emphasized that the imposition of liability under section 1983 was not based on a theory of respondeat superior, but rather was imposed only where there was proof of a policy which itself violated the statute. Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Accord Moonblatt v. District of Columbia, 572 F.Supp.2d 15, 20 (D.D.C.2008). In other words, a plaintiff must “show a course deliberately pursued by the city, ‘as opposed to an action taken unilaterally by a nonpolicymaking municipal employee.’ ” Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 123 (D.C.Cir.1986) (quoting Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 829, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985)).

a. Plaintiff Presented Sufficient Evidence that the Chief of Police, the Final Policymaker with Regard to Transfers, Acted in a Retaliatory Fashion When He Denied Plaintiff's Request to Transfer Back to OIA in 1998

In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a single decision by a policymaker may be the basis for the imposition of section 1983 municipal liability. Id. at 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292. The Court noted however that “municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered” and that “[t]he fact that a particular official-even a policymaking official-has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion.” Id. at 481-82, 106 S.Ct. 1292. “With this understanding, it is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal...