Singletary v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 11 July 1939 |
| Docket Number | 14914. |
| Citation | 3 S.E.2d 802,191 S.C. 153 |
| Parties | SINGLETARY v. WILSON, Superintendent of Penitentiary. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
C S. Bowen, of Greenville, for appellant.
John M. Daniel, Atty. Gen., and J. Ivey Humphrey and M. J. Hough Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.
Appellant Singletary, was convicted in Anderson County on an indictment charging forgery under Section 1211, 1932 Code, which provides that one found guilty of forgery "shall be sentenced to be imprisoned not less than one year nor more than seven years, and also to pay such fine as may be judged expedient, at the discretion of the judge who may try the case: Provided, That if the amount obtained or sought to be obtained upon the forged instrument be less than twenty ($20.00) dollars, the punishment shall be within the discretion of the judge."
The amount involved in the forgery exceeded twenty dollars, and Singletary was sentenced to serve a term of six years in the penitentiary, and to pay a fine of $300. The judgment was affirmed by this Court in State v. Singletary, 187 S.C. 19 196 S.E. 527, and the appellant was regularly committed to the State Penitentiary.
Respondent is the Superintendent of the South Carolina State Penitentiary at Columbia, and the relator or appellant, being in his custody, applied for a writ of habeas corpus which was made returnable before the Circuit Court of Richland County. After a full hearing was had in that Court before Honorable A. L. Gaston, an order was filed denying the writ, discharging the rule, and remanding the plaintiff to the penitentiary for the service of his sentence.
The substantial question involved in this appeal is whether the quoted portion of Section 1211 is constitutional. Appellant asserts that this section of the Code under which he was indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced, is unconstitutional and void because there is no limit to that part of the sentence which provides for the imposition of a fine. The punishment provided for a violation of Section 1211, as will be observed, limits the imprisonment to seven years, and leaves to the discretion of the trial Judge the amount of the fine to be imposed.
There is no express constitutional requirement that the Legislature shall in enacting penal statutes fix the maximum penalty. No doubt can be entertained of the power of the Legislature to define what acts shall constitute criminal offenses, and what penalties shall be inflicted on offenders, and generally to enact all laws deemed expedient for the protection of public and private rights and the prevention and punishment of public wrongs; the expediency of passing such laws being a matter of which the Legislature is the proper judge, when not restrained by the organic law of the state or by the Federal Government. Its power must be exercised within the bounds of the Constitution. When so exercised its will is absolute.
[2, 3] It is generally the case that in enacting penal statutes the Legislature fixes and designates a maximum penalty, but when it is not done, the power to impose a fine is limited by the constitutional provision that excessive fines shall not be imposed. Article I, Section 19, South Carolina Constitution, 1895. It is also true that many penal statutes have been enacted and are in force in this state which allow the exercise of discretion by the Court within prescribed limits, and that such statutes fix the minimum and the maximum penalty.
But this must not be taken to mean that the General Assembly may not constitutionally vest the Courts with discretionary power in determining the amount of a fine as a penalty for crime where the Act itself prescribes no limit. In our opinion, this may be done by the Legislature without its being open to the charge of delegating power unconstitutionally, and without doing violence to our constitutional system of government which keeps separate and apart the legislative, the executive, and the judicial departments.
By analogy it might be argued that a statute is unconstitutional as invading the pardoning power of the Governor, because it confers upon a Court the power to suspend a sentence in the discretion of the Court.
In State v. Abbott, 87 S.C. 466, 70 S.E. 6, 33 L.R.A.,N.S., 112, Ann.Cas.1912B, 1189, the Court, in holding a suspended sentence during good behavior to be invalid stated in substance that it was within the power of the Legislature to give a wide discretion to a trial Court in imposing a sentence, and to grant authority to a trial Court to impose a conditional sentence, but that the Legislature had not granted to the trial Court such discretion or authority. This case was relied on as an authority in a later case sustaining the validity of a suspension of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Taylor
...97 (1895); Mannon v. State, 788 S.W.2d 315 (Mo.Ct.App.1990); State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273 (1948); Singletary v. Wilson, 191 S.C. 153, 3 S.E.2d 802 (1939); Southern Express Co. v. Walker, 92 Va. 59, 22 S.E. 809 (1895); State v. Constantino, 76 Vt. 192, 56 A. 1101 (Vermont ......
-
State v. Kimbrough
...Judge. The Legislature having fixed no maximum penalty in the case of a recommendation to mercy, it is clear from the case of Singletary v. Wilson, infra, that question before us is whether the circumstances of this case show a manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial Judge. Th......
-
Moore v. Patterson
... ... and the payment of certain sums of money for the support of ... the child ... In the ... case of Singletary v. Wilson, 191 S.C. 153, 3 S.E.2d ... 802, the Teal case was referred to as one sustaining the ... validity of the suspension of a sentence on a ... ...