Singleton v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
Decision Date | 02 November 1932 |
Docket Number | 290. |
Citation | 166 S.E. 305,203 N.C. 462 |
Parties | SINGLETON v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Robison County; Barnhill, Judge.
Action by J. E. Singleton against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. From the judgment granting insufficient relief to plaintiff, he appeals.
No error.
Lease of railroad's premises to cotton buyer for storing cotton thereon, exempting railroad from liability for loss resulting from railroad's negligence, held bar to buyer's action for loss of such cotton so destroyed.
The evidence tended to show that the defendant is the owner of a platform in the town of Red Springs, N. C., and that the plaintiff is a cotton raiser and cotton buyer. Various people placed cotton on said platform. "This platform was the general weighing place for Robeson people bringing their cotton in and weighing it." The agent for the defendant said:
On the 17th day of October, 1924, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a contract as follows: "In consideration of this revocable and non-transferable license granted the undersigned to assemble and handle baled cotton on the premises of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, at Red Springs, N. C., in the state of N.C. from date of the execution of this instrument until its cancellation, said cotton not having been tendered or accepted for shipment and bill of lading not having been issued therefor but ultimately for movement via. said railroad, the undersigned licensee recognizing the great danger and hazard to said cotton due to its being so situated hereby agrees to indemnify and save harmless the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company from any and all liability for loss or damage to said cotton while so placed on said railroad company's premises, due to any cause or causes whatsoever, whether occasioned by the negligence of said railroad company, its agents or employees or otherwise, and against any and all claims, demands, suits judgment and costs based thereon."
On Saturday afternoon, February 13, 1926, the plaintiff had sixty bales of cotton upon said platform, and an engine of the defendant negligently put out fire, igniting the cotton and destroying it, together with certain hay. The value of the cotton destroyed by fire was $3,422.86, and the damage to the hay was $320.50. The plaintiff instituted an action to recover the value of the cotton and the hay, and the defendant relied upon the contract as a bar to recovery of the value of the cotton.
The following issues were submitted to the jury:
The jury answered the first issue "Yes;" the second issue "$3,422.86, with interest to date;" the third issue "$320.50, with interest to date"; the fourth issue "Yes"; the fifth issue "No."
Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff for the sum of $320.50, from which judgment the plaintiff appealed.
Varser, Lawrence, McIntyre & Henry, of Lumberton, for appellant.
Dickson McLean and H. E. Stacy, both of Lumberton, for appellee.
The primary question of law may be stated as follows: Was the contract or lease valid and enforceable as a bar to recovery for the value of cotton negligently destroyed by fire?
The plaintiff insists that the contract or lease entered into by the parties in October 1924, was contrary to public policy and void, for the reason that said contract permitted the defendant to relieve itself from the consequence of its own negligence. It is well settled here and elsewhere that a common carrier, while performing its duties to the public, cannot contract against its negligence. J. M. Pace Mule Co. v. Railroad, 160 N.C. 215, 76 S.E. 513; Cooper v. R. R., 161 N.C. 400, 77 S.E. 339. The defendant insists that the rule of law forbidding common carriers to relieve themselves of liability for negligence applies only to transactions in which the carrier is discharging his duty to the public and not to transactions involving no public duty or obligation. This distinction is pointed out and applied in Slocumb v. R. R., 165 N.C. 338, 81 S.E. 335, 336. In that case the...
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