Singleton v. Cuttino

• Decision Date: 28 June 1917
• Docket Number: 9699.
• Parties: SINGLETON v. CUTTINO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

92 S.E. 1046

107 S.C. 465

SINGLETON v. CUTTINO.

No. 9699.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 28, 1917

On Application for Rehearing, July 13, 1917.

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Sumter County; Geo. E Prince Judge.

Action by Anna H. Singleton against D. W. Cuttino. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Judgment modified as to interest, and affirmed in all other respects.

von Kolnitz & Farrow, of Charleston, and Marion W. Seabrook, of Sumter, for appellant.

L. D Jennings, of Sumter, for respondent.

GARY C.J.

This is the second appeal herein. See 104 S.C. 565, 89 S.E. 385. The first question for consideration is whether there was error on the part of his honor the circuit judge in refusing to allow the defendant to amend his answer on the ground that the judgment heretofore rendered by this court is conclusive of all questions relative to the right of the plaintiff to specific performance of the contract. The following appears at the conclusion of the former opinion:

"These conclusions practically dispose of all questions presented by the exceptions.

Judgment reversed."

The exceptions brought before this court, every question raised by the pleadings, and every issue then involved was determined. It will be observed that the judgment did not provide that the case should be remanded for further proceedings; nor is there a single expression indicating that the judgment was not to be final. Our construction of the judgment is, that it was the intention of the court that it should be conclusive of all questions involving the right of the plaintiff to specific performance of the contract. In Jennings v. Parr, 54 S.C. 109 32 S.E. 73, the rule is thus stated:

"An examination of the former opinion of this court will show that none of the defenses allowed by the circuit judge were considered by this court, and the order refusing the petition for a rehearing shows that the * * * court did not intend to decide all questions involved in the case, and that its judgment was only final upon the questions considered by it. When the Supreme Court does not make a final disposition of the case, but remands it for further proceedings, it then becomes subject to * * * section 194 of the Code, as fully as if there had not been an appeal, except as to those questions upon which this court has rendered its decision, which, of course, cannot again be put in issue, either by amendment or in any other manner."

Every case is dependent upon the question whether it was the intention of the Supreme Court that its judgment should be conclusive, not only as to all rights then involved, but as to those that the parties thereafter might attempt to assert. The exceptions raising this question are overruled.

While this defendant cannot amend his answer, so as to interpose other defenses, involving the right of the plaintiff to specific performance of the contract, he is, however, not precluded from appealing from so much of the decree of the circuit court as is administrative in its nature or inconsistent with those rights that have already been adjudicated by this court. The exceptions we will proceed to consider are of that class.

The next question that will be determined is whether there was error in adjudging that the plaintiff was entitled to interest on the amount due by the defendant.

" Before conveyance, and while there is a contract of sale merely, the vendor has the legal estate in the land, and the vendee has the equitable interest; the former being a trustee of the beneficial interest in the land for the latter, the latter being the trustee of the purchase money for the

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