Singleton v. Durham Laundry Co.

• Citation: 195 S.E. 34,213 N.C. 32
• Decision Date: 02 February 1938
• Docket Number: 743.
• Parties: SINGLETON v. DURHAM LAUNDRY CO. et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

195 S.E. 34

213 N.C. 32

SINGLETON v. DURHAM LAUNDRY CO. et al.

No. 743.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

February 2, 1938

Appeal from Superior Court, Durham County; Clauson L. Williams Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by W. B. Singleton against the Durham Laundry Company and the Travelers Insurance Company. The claim was allowed by the Industrial Commission, and from a judgment of the superior court affirming the award, defendants appeal.

Error and remanded.

This is a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Pub. Laws 1929, c. 120, as amended, filed by the plaintiff employee against Durham Laundry Company, employer and the Travelers Insurance Company, carrier. The claim was allowed by the Industrial Commission, and the defendants appealed. The court below entered judgment affirming the award and the defendants excepted and appealed.

Sapp & Sapp, of Greensboro, for appellants.

J. L Morehead, of Durham, for appellee.

BARNHILL Justice.

The plaintiff filed claim on February 25, 1936, with the North Carolina Industrial Commission, seeking an award for injuries alleged to have been received by him while engaged in the course of his employment by the defendant Durham Laundry Company on March 15, 1935.

At the hearing before commissioner Dorsett the defendants admitted that plaintiff was employed at the time of the alleged accident at a wage of less than $11 per week; that the Travelers Insurance Company was the carrier; and that the employer had more than five employees at the time of the alleged accident. The record further shows that at the same time the defendants denied liability, for that the matter was never reported, the employer had no knowledge that the accident existed until the notice was received from the Industrial Commission, and that all other matters at issue, except as then admitted, were denied.

Commissioner Dorsett, after hearing the evidence, concluded that he was unable to find that the plaintiff suffered an injury by accident causing the trouble complained of and denied the claim for compensation. The plaintiff appealed to the full commission and upon hearing before the full commission an award was entered as follows: "The full commission directs that the findings of fact, conclusions of law and the award of J. Dewey Dorsett be vacated and set aside, and in lieu thereof finds that the plaintiff during the month of March, 1935, sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, in consequence of which he was totally disabled for a period of six weeks, and that plaintiff's average weekly wage was $11.00; wherefore, the full Commission directs that the defendant pay plaintiff compensation for six weeks at the rate of $7.00 a week." (Immaterial recitals omitted.)

This leaves the record in such condition as to make it impossible for us to determine the rights of the parties. The full commission set aside such findings of fact as were made by commissioner Dorsett and at the same time failed to find the material facts at issue.

Code 1935, § 8081(nnn), requires the commission not only to make an award, but to likewise file with the award a statement of the findings of fact, rulings of law, and other matters pertinent to the question at issue. This requirement has not been complied with. The finding "that plaintiff during the month of March, 1935, sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment" is a conclusion and involves a mixed question of law and fact. Apparently the Workmen's Compensation Act treats it as a conclusion of law. The commission is required to find the facts and conclusions of law. Ordinarily, the only question of law arising in a compensation case is as to whether the alleged injury, if any, was sustained by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The award is the judgment of the commission.

In respect to the facts involved in the claim for compensation it is clearly apparent from the statute that the Legislature intended that the Industrial Commission should proceed more as a referee than as a jury, the difference being that the findings of fact by the commission are conclusive if there is any evidence to support them, whereas the...