Singleton v. Greymar Associates
Decision Date | 15 September 2004 |
Docket Number | No. SC03-936.,SC03-936. |
Citation | 882 So.2d 1004 |
Parties | Gwendolyn SINGLETON, et vir., Petitioners, v. GREYMAR ASSOCIATES, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
William Chennault of Chennault Attorneys and Counsellors at Law, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Petitioner.
Mark Evans Kass, Miami, FL, for Respondent.
We have for review Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 840 So.2d 356 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), which expressly and directly conflicts with the decision in Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc., 150 So.2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons set out below we approve the decision in Singleton and hold that a dismissal with prejudice in a mortgage foreclosure action does not necessarily bar a subsequent foreclosure action on the same mortgage.
Greymar Associates brought two consecutive foreclosure actions against Gwendolyn Singleton alleging default on a mortgage and note between the parties. Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 840 So.2d 356, 356 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The first action was predicated on an alleged default that the mortgagors had failed to make payments due from September 1, 1999 to February 1, 2000. Id. After the mortgagee, Greymar, failed to appear at a case management conference, the circuit court dismissed the foreclosure action with prejudice.1 Id. Subsequently, a second foreclosure action was brought alleging a default that the mortgagors had failed to make payments from April 1, 2000, onward. Id. The circuit court eventually entered a summary final judgment of foreclosure for the mortgagee in the second suit, rejecting the defense that the prior dismissal barred relief in the second action. Id.
On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the circuit court's decision, finding that Id. To support its decision, the Fourth District quoted its holding in a similar previous case, which stated: "`[A] final adjudication in a foreclosure action that also prays for a deficiency judgment on the underlying debt may, but does not necessarily, bar a subsequent action on the debt.'" Id. (quoting Capital Bank v. Needle, 596 So.2d 1134, 1138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)). Singleton petitioned this Court for jurisdiction, citing express and direct conflict between the Fourth District's decision and the Second District's decision in Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc., 150 So.2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963).
Stadler also involved two successive foreclosure actions. Id. at 469. In the first action, the circuit court dismissed the complaint with prejudice upon the defendants' motion because the plaintiffs did not take testimony within the time period provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a second action alleging that the mortgagor had again defaulted on the note. Id. at 469-70. ("Their complaint was essentially identical to that in the first suit except a default of payment due in August, 1960, rather than the May default was alleged."). The Second District reversed a judgment of foreclosure and held that res judicata prohibited the bringing of the second action. Id. at 472-73. The Second District discussed the fact that the existence of the acceleration clause was key to their analysis:
Id. at 472-73. We have accepted jurisdiction to review the conflict between the holdings in these cases.
The Fourth District has consistently taken the position that res judicata does not prevent mortgagees from foreclosing on a mortgage in successive foreclosure cases when the alleged dates of default are different. See Singleton, 840 So.2d at 356
; Capital Bank v. Needle, 596 So.2d at 1138; see also Olympia Mortgage Corp. v. Pugh, 774 So.2d 863, 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Badra, 765 So.2d 251, 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ().
In contrast, the Second District's holding in Stadler shows that it takes a stricter and more technical view of mortgage acceleration elections. See 150 So.2d at 472 ().
We agree with the position of the Fourth District that when a second and separate action for foreclosure is sought for a default that involves a separate period of default from the one alleged in the first action, the case is not necessarily barred by res judicata. See Capital Bank, 596 So.2d at 1138
(). In Capital Bank, after reviewing the case law on the issue, the court concluded:
Id. at 1134; see also Frumkes v. Mortgage Guarantee Corp., 173 So.2d 738, 740-41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
()
While it is true that a foreclosure action and an acceleration of the balance due based upon the same default may bar a subsequent...
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...cases stems from 'pure' dicta in Conner." U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Bartram, 140 So. 3d at 1010 (citing Singleton v. Greymar Associates, 882 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2004)). The Fifth District was presumably pointing out that in Conner there was no acceleration at all, as the mortgage did not even c......
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