Singleton v. Lavan
Decision Date | 22 October 2003 |
Citation | 834 A.2d 672 |
Parties | Timothy SINGLETON, Petitioner, v. Thomas LAVAN, Superintendent; Jeffrey Beard, Commissioner; Mike Fisher, Attorney General; Paul J. Evanko, Commissioner of State Police; et al, Respondents. |
Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Timothy Singleton, petitioner, pro se.
Timothy A. Holmes, Camp Hill, for respondents.
BEFORE: COLINS, President Judge, and McGINLEY, Judge, and FLAHERTY, Senior Judge.
Before this Court are the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Department) to the petition for review filed pro se by Timothy Singleton (Singleton) in this Court's original jurisdiction. We sustain the Department's preliminary objections and dismiss Singleton's complaint with prejudice for the reasons set forth below.
In his petition, Singleton alleges that he is currently an inmate at SCI-Dallas and that, on February 20, 2003, he received a notice asking him to volunteer to give a sample of his DNA. In this notice, he was informed that he would be disciplined if he refused to provide a DNA sample. He also alleges that his custody level and visitation status were changed as a result of his failure to provide a DNA sample. Thereafter, Singleton filed this petition for review challenging the constitutionality of the DNA Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 4701-4741, and the Department's DNA collection policy. In addition, Singleton requests a preliminary injunction enjoining the Department from using force to obtain a DNA sample from him or using other methods to persuade him to submit a DNA sample.1 In response, the Department filed preliminary objections to Singleton's petition, which is the matter currently before this Court.
Success Against All Odds v. Department of Public Welfare, 700 A.2d 1340, 1347 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997).
Initially, we note that Singleton is, in actuality, seeking a permanent injunction to stop the Department from extracting a DNA sample rather than a preliminary injunction. The requirements for a permanent injunction are:
... in order to establish a claim for a permanent injunction, the party must establish his or her clear right to relief. See Boyle v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association, Inc., 676 A.2d 695, 699 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996). However, unlike a claim for a preliminary injunction, the party need not establish either irreparable harm or immediate relief and a court "may issue a final injunction if such relief is necessary to prevent a legal wrong for which there is no adequate redress at law." Soja v. Factoryville Sportsmen's Club, 361 Pa.Super. 473, 522 A.2d 1129, 1131 (1987). Additionally, when reviewing the grant or denial of a final or permanent injunction, an appellate court's review is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law.
Buffalo Township v. Jones, 571 Pa. 637, 644, 813 A.2d 659, 663-664 (2002) (emphasis added). Additionally, in Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc., 806 A.2d 936 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), this Court stated that:
In order to prevail on a petition for a permanent injunction, the party seeking the injunction must establish that the [1] right to relief is clear, [2] that there is an urgent necessity to avoid an injury which cannot be compensated for by damages, and [3] the greater injury will result from refusing rather than granting the relief requested. P.J.S. v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 669 A.2d 1105 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996). Injunctive relief is not available where there is an adequate remedy at law. Id.
Id. at 946 (emphasis added).
In its preliminary objections, the Department contends that Singleton has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that his petition lacks specificity.2 Recently, in Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 829 A.2d 788 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2003), this Court had the opportunity to address the constitutionality of the DNA Act. In that case, an inmate filed a petition for review in this Court's original jurisdiction contending, among other things, that the DNA Act was unconstitutional. The Department filed preliminary objections. We sustained the Department's preliminary objections and explained that:
In Commonwealth v. Petroll, 558 Pa. 565, 738 A.2d 993 (1999), our Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that "[t]o appreciate the reasonableness of a general search, courts must balance the individual's expectation in privacy against the government's compelling interests, such as public safety." Id. at 583, 738 A.2d at 1003 (citation omitted). When the balancing test is applied in the present controversy, the Commonwealth's interest outweighs Smith's privacy rights. Maintaining a DNA data base serves an important governmental purpose of providing information to those who investigate and solve crimes. To the extent Smith contends that Respondent violated his rights under Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, his argument is meritless. Smith has failed to establish that the extraction of his DNA violated any federal or state Constitutional right.
Based on our holding in Smith, it is clear that the DNA Act is not unconstitutional. Therefore, even accepting the allegations in Singleton's petition as true, it is clear that he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and would therefore not be entitled to a permanent injunction to stop the Department from obtaining a DNA sample.
In its preliminary objections, the Department also contends that how Department employees withdraw DNA samples from inmates is a matter of prison management. With regard to the use of force to obtain DNA samples, the DNA Act provides, in relevant part, that:
(c) Reasonable use of force. Duly authorized law enforcement and corrections personnel may employ reasonable force in cases where an individual refuses to submit to DNA testing authorized under this chapter, and no such employee shall be criminally or civilly liable for the use of reasonable...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Clark v. Beard
...where a prisoner should be housed and that principles of due process impose few restrictions on the use of that authority. Singleton v. Lavan, 834 A.2d 672, 675 (Pa.Cmwlth. In Singleton, an inmate was placed into a restricted housing unit (RHU) after he refused to provide a DNA sample. Alth......
-
Tindell v. Dep't of Corr.
...compensated in damages, and that the greater injury will result from refusing rather than granting the relief requested. Id.;Singleton v. Lavan, 834 A.2d 672, 674 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003). Petitioners also request incidental damages pursuant to Section 8303 of the Judicial Code.542 Pa.C.S. § 8303.I......
-
Horan v. Wetzel
...707 A.2d 569, 571 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). Prison officials have the authority to determine where a prisoner should be housed. Singleton v. Lavan, 834 A.2d 672, 675 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Administrative prisoner transfers are presumed to further legitimate penological objectives unless a prisoner p......
-
Garber v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS SECRETARY
...be compensated for by damages, and (3) the greater injury will result from refusing rather than granting the relief requested. Singleton v. Lavan, 834 A.2d 672 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003). Similarly, mandamus is an extraordinary writ, designed to compel a public official's performance of a mandatory d......