Singleton v. St. Louis Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1877
• Citation: 66 Mo. 63
• Parties: SINGLETON v. ST. LOUIS MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. et al., Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

66 Mo. 63

SINGLETON

v.ST. LOUIS MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1877.

Appeal from Audrain Circuit Court.--HON. G. PORTER, Judge.

This was an action on a policy of insurance on the life of John T. Anderson, deceased, payable to the plaintiff on the death of Anderson. The policy was issued on the 12th of December, 1872, and Anderson died on the 20th of April following. The defense was fraud on the part of the plaintiff in procuring the certificate of the medical examiner and the policy, and false representations as to the health of Anderson. The application, on which the policy was issued, contained among others, the following questions and answers: 12. Has the party had, since childhood, consumption, bronchitis, spitting of blood, * * and if so, which? Answer, No. 15. Has the party now, or has he had an habitual cough, or any pulmonary disease, or is any suspected? Answer, No. 18. Is the party now in good health, and free from any symptoms of disease? Answer, Yes. It was one of the conditions of the policy that unless all the answers in the application were true, the policy should be void. The policy was by its terms, payable to John S. Singleton (the plaintiff) creditor, uncle of said John T. Anderson. At the trial Dr. Adams, a witness for defendant, testified that he saw Anderson in the summer of 1872, but did not observe his condition. Defendant's counsel asked what Anderson said to him at that time about his condition, to which plaintiff objected on the ground that it was hearsay, and that witness did not observe his condition. The court sustained the objection. The witness was further asked what statements Anderson made to him at the time he examined him in the spring of 1872, as to his condition and symptoms prior to that time, and as to his having in the past, had spitting of blood or an habitual cough; but the court refused to permit the questions to be asked, ruling that the witness could detail the statements made to him by Anderson as to his condition and symptoms at the time he saw and examined him, but not as to his condition at any previous time. Similar questions were also asked of one Hutton, who was not a physician, with like result.

Doctors Ford, Hill, Lee and French, witnesses for the plaintiff, were permitted by the court, against the objections of the defendant, to testify that “spitting of blood” is a medical term, and means spitting of blood from the lungs; and that spitting of blood from the mouth, throat, stomach or nose, is not called by that name by doctors, or in medical books.

The following, among other instructions, asked by defendant, were refused by the court: 10th. To entitle the plaintiff to recover in this action he must show some insurable interest in the life of Anderson, and in the absence of any evidence showing, or tending to show such insurable interest, the jury must find for defendants. 13th. If the jury believe from the evidence that Anderson had at the date of the application, or had had at any time previous thereto since childhood, spitting of blood, from whatever source it originated, they will find for defendants. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Henry Flanagan for appellant.

The question of insurable interest has been before this court several times, and while the decisions seem to differ as to degree or kind of interest necessary to support a policy on the life of another, they are all agreed that unless the beneficiary has some interest in the life of the assured, the policy is void, being a mere wagering contract. McKee v. Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 383; Charter Oak Ins. Co. v. Brant, 47 id. 419; Gambs v. Ins. Co., 50 id. 44; Chisholm v. Ins. Co., 52 id. 213; Evers v. Life Association, 59 id. 429.

The Federal decisions and the decisions of our sister States, with the exception of New Jersey ( Trenton Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 4 Zab. R. 577,) are uniform, that no person can procure a valid insurance on the life of another unless he has an interest in such life. Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. 115; Loomis v. Eagle Life and Health Ins. Co., 6 Gray 396; Mitchell v. Union Life Ins. Co., 45 Me. 104; Lewis v. Phœnix M. Ins. Co., 39 Conn. 100; Mowry v. Home Life Ins. Co., 9 R. I. 346; Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116; Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35.

While the reciprocal relations of parent and child, and brother and sister have been held, under special circumstances, sufficient to support the contract, there is no decision to be found, in which the mere relation of uncle and nephew has been held sufficient, without other interest in the life of the assured. A man has not an insurable interest in the life of his brother, merely as such, nor has a nephew in the life of his uncle. If a nephew has not an insurable interest in the life of his uncle, a fortiori an uncle has not in the life of his nephew. The relationship which implies interest is such only as creates a claim upon the person whose life is insured. An uncle has no claim upon his nephew by reason of their consanguinity.

The declarations offered to be proved were made in May, in the summer, in October and in November of the year 1872. The policy was issued on the 12th of December following. The declarations related to the health of Anderson, and tended to explain his physical condition at the time they were made. The real issue was the state of Anderson's health, at and prior to the time the assurance was applied for, and whether he had ever had certain diseases or affections. Under this issue the defendant had the right to show the condition of Anderson's health at any time during his life, since childhood. Therefore, any fact tending to prove that he had ever had any of the specified diseases, or that he was not in good health, or free from symptoms of disease at the date of the application, was relevant. Aveson v. Kinnaird, 6 East 188; Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 8 Wall. 397; Harriman v. Stowe, 57 Mo. 93; Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Haney, 10 Kan. 525; Nat. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Applegate, 7 Ohio St. 392; Evers v. Life Association, 59 Mo. 429; Swift v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 186; Kelsey v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 35 Conn. 225; May on Ins., § 214, p. 226.

The term “spitting of blood” requires no interpretation. The words are plain and familiar, and in no sense technical. The applicant having answered falsely, and thus violated his contract, it was error to allow the plaintiff to introduce evidence restraining or limiting the scope of the question. ( Geach v. Ingall, 14 M. & W. 95.) No matter what organ the blood came from, the defendant was entitled to a truthful answer. Campbell v. N. E. M. L. Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 381; 1 Green. Ev. §§ 277, 278; 1 Chitty Contracts (11 Am. Ed.) 113; Broom's Leg. Max. 890.

Admitting that the term may have the technical meaning contended for by the respondent, when used by physicians, it does not follow that such was the sense in which it was used by the parties. If extrinsic evidence became necessary to interpret any phrase in the contract, or any term employed there, it ought to have been directed to the intention of the parties, and to the sense attached by them to the language of the contract. The meaning of the particular words, as understood by medical men, was insufficient without some proof that the parties attached the same meaning to them, or that they were usually employed in insurance contracts in that particular sense. Kirchner v. Venus, 12 Moore, P. C. R. 361; Robertson v. French, 4 East 135; Pohalaski v. Ins. Co. 45 How. Pr. 504; S. C., 56 N. Y. 640.

McFarlane, Jones & Carkener for respondent.

I. No interest in the life of Anderson in favor of plaintiff was necessary as a matter of law, to validate the policy. Life Insurance is not a contract of indemnity, but a mere contract to pay a certain sum of money on the death of a person, in consideration of the due payment of certain annual premiums during life. The contract of life insurance is essentially a wager contract, and the wager is lawful at common law. Dalby v. The India and L. Life I. Co., 15 Com. Bench 365; British Ins. Co. v. Magee, Cook & Alcock, Repts. (Irish) 182; Scott v. Roose, Long. & Town. (Irish) 54; Shannon v. Nugent, 1 Hays R. 536-539; Bunyan on Life Insurance, p. 11; Law v. London Indisputable L. P. Co., 1 Kay & Johnson, 223; Rawls v. Ins. Co., 3 American Law Reg. (N. S.) see note of Judge Dwight at page 179, par. 2, et seq.; Bliss on Life Insurance, sec. 3; Trenton Mutual L. I. Co. v. Johnson, 4 Zab. (N. Jersey) 576; Chisholm v. Nat. Cap. L. I. Co., 52 Mo. 213.

2d. The position that public policy would avoid such contract was taken in the cases cited above--especially the Irish cases, also in the English cases prior to the statute requiring an interest, and was rejected. See cases cited above, and Crawford v. Hunter, 8 Term R. 13; Buchanan v. Ocean Ins. Co., 6 Cow. 318.

This argument, if good at all, would cut up life insurance by the roots; for the temptation where there is an interest, especially a pecuniary one, would be perhaps quite as strong to bring about the event insured against, as where none existed. See note Judge Dwight par. 2, p. 180-81, American Law Register (N. S.) vol 3. But this is a theoretical question in this case, as far as the fact of an “interest is concerned,” since the policy itself recites that plaintiff was a creditor, and also an uncle of the assured.

3d. But if it be held that plaintiff must have an interest in the life assured, in order to validate the policy, it would seem plain that generally, and especially in this case, where the issuing of the policy stands admitted by defendants, and upon its face the policy expressly affirms that plaintiff had an interest--was a creditor, and was the uncle of the assured, the want of such interest would be, upon every principle of logic and good pleading, a matter of defense.

As settled in the Chisholm case, the absence of...