Singleton v. State
| Decision Date | 11 May 1948 |
| Docket Number | 1 Div. 562. |
| Citation | 35 So.2d 375,33 Ala.App. 536 |
| Parties | SINGLETON v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Appeals |
C B. Gillmore and T. Watrous Garrett, both of Grove Hill, for appellant.
A. A. Carmichael, Atty. Gen., and L. E. Barton Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The appellant was indicted for murder in the first degree. Her jury trial resulted in a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, her punishment being fixed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of twenty years.
No motion for a new trial was filed.
The prosecution below revolved around the discovery of the body of a new born baby.
On a Monday morning in January, 1946, the body of a new born Negro male infant was found in or near the white cemetery in Jackson, Alabama. The child had been born within the previous twenty-four hours. Adhering to the body was a section of newspaper, The Mobile Press Register, in which the body had been wrapped. Dogs had nosed the body and dragged it around and the feet and part of the legs had been roughly amputated apparently through the action of dogs or other animals. There was also a severe gash in the abdomen resulting probably when the body was thrown across a wire fence, but according to the medical testimony of the State all of the wounds on the body were post mortem except a few very superficial wounds on the head which in no way contributed to the death of the infant. Actually, therefore, the wounds on the body contribute nothing toward directing a conclusion in this case.
On the Wednesday following the Monday on which the infant's body was found two officers, after first securing a search warrant, searched the appellant's home, which was in a settlement about a quarter of a mile from where the body had been found. In appellant's home they found a part of the Mobile Press Register of the same date as the portion of the newspaper found adhering to the infant's body. Both officers had however misplaced their notes concerning this piece of evidence and the record is not clear as to whether the newspaper found in the house was a part or section of paper with which the body was wrapped.
There officers also found that a mattress on one of the beds had a damp area which appeared to have been made by blood, and that this fluid had soaked completely through the mattress.
On the Wednesday that the officers searched the appellant's home she was contacted by them and told to report to the City Hall in Jackson at 2 o'clock that afternoon for a physical examination.
The appellant did report and voluntarily submitted to being physically examined by Dr. Leiland Chapman, a qualified physician of some eighteen years of practice.
Dr. Chapman testified that the appellant stated to him that she had not recently had a baby.
His manual pelvic examination of appellant disclosed that her uterus was enlarged an estimated ten per cent, and that there was a mucous discharge present, but with absolutely no bleeding. He further found that her abdominal muscles were flaccid, a condition usually found after delivery of a baby.
It was Dr. Chapman's opinion that the appellant had given birth to a child within three or four days preceding his examination.
On cross examination Dr. Chapman testified that other than the pelvic examination he did not further examine the appellant; that is he did not examine her breasts for enlargement or tenderness, did not take her temperature, and had no laboratory tests made. That while normally there is post natal bleeding or discharge for nine or ten days, it is possible for a woman to give birth to a child without such post natal discharge.
Dr. Chapman had also examined the body of the infant. We have already set forth the condition of the body and see no reason for further discussion of this phase of Dr. Chapman's testimony other than to add that Dr. Chapman stated the baby's umbilical cord was 8 to 10 inches long and appeared to have been twisted off.
On direct examination Dr. Chapman stated he did not know what had caused the baby's death. However, on re-direct examination Dr. Chapman stated he did not think the baby had died from exposure, and then stated, 'If that umbilical cord was not ligated it would have died from hemorrhage, and it was not ligated.' In answer to the court's inquiry Dr. Chapman said that by stating the cord had not been ligated he meant it had not been tied.
Dr. Chapman further testified that it was possible for a woman to give birth to a child one night and report for and carry on her work the next morning.
Mr. Nelson Grubbs, a State Toxicologist, testified that he had performed a post mortem examination on the body of the infant. The significant portion of Mr. Grubb's testimony is that he removed the lungs from the body and placed them in water, a procedure known as a hydrostatic test, and by this means determined that the child had breathed.
On cross examination Mr. Grubbs testified that it is possible for a baby to take air into the lungs during the process of birth and before its delivery is complete, and further that a baby might inhale air into its lungs upon delivery and die almost immediately. He had no idea as to how long this infant had lived, nor did he know the cause of its death.
On the afternoon that the appellant was examined by Dr. Chapman she was later placed in jail. There she was questioned by the two officers who had searched her home. Mr. Joe Graham, one of these officers, testified as follows concerning certain statements made to him and the other officer by the appellant:
Concerning these statements by the appellant, Mr. Sid McVay, the other officer, testified as follows:
'Q. Go ahead, what did she say? A. That was in jail.
'Q. Yes, sir. A. Joe Graham and I went in there and asked her about it and she said that she had this child and she had two other children and said she put them in the other room on the bed that night away from her.
* * *
* * *
'Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. McVay, she made several conflicting statements to you about this thing after you put her in jail? A. She did.
'Q. The one you testified about is that the one she first made? A. No, sir, the first one she made was when we put her in jail. She made the statement, she said, Then we called Jackson. They were still searching for evidence. We called Jackson and told them what she said.
* * *
* * *
The State also introduced as witnesses two Negro women, mother and daughter, who lived close to appellant and often observed her as she went to and from her work. These two witnesses stated that for some time prior to the finding of the body of the infant the appellant showed physical signs of being pregnant, and that when seen by them after the body of the infant had been found the appellant's body and figure had resumed its normal shape and form.
For the defense evidence was introduced directed toward showing that the appellant had operated a small cafe for a long number of months prior to the discovery of the dead body of the infant.
Some thirteen witnesses, acquaintances of the appellant and patrons of her cafe, testified that at no time during the months preceding the finding of the dead infant did the appellant have any indicia of pregnancy. Many of these witnesses were frequently in her cafe, or otherwise regularly associated with her. Appellant usually wore slacks while at work in her cafe, and was seen by several of these witnesses as late as the Saturday night before the finding of the infant's body the following Monday.
As a witness in her own behalf the appellant, Irene Singleton, testified that she was the mother of two children, born of a union with a man named Miller with whom she had lived for a number of years prior to their separation about four years ago. The appellant strenuously denied that she had been pregnant or had given birth to a child since the birth of her youngest child several years ago.
She further testified that she had worked in her cafe daily during the months that the State witnesses alleged she was pregnant, and had in fact worked in the cafe all day Sunday preceding the Monday on which the infant's body was discovered, and until late that night, and the following Monday. Several other defense witnesses corroborated the appellant in this phase of her testimony.
The appellant further stated that she was not asked by Dr. Chapman at the time she was examined by him if she had given birth to a baby.
As to the statements made by her to the officers the appellant contended that she had never been in jail before, and that she was distraught over this and the separation from her children to the extent that she does not remember what she may have said during this time.
She alleged that the two women who had testified for the State that they had observed ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Shephard
...and many have been reversed on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence. State v. Osmus, 73 Wyo, 183, 276 P.2d 469; Singleton v. State, 33 Ala.App. 536, 35 So.2d 375; Joseph v. State, 34 Tex.Cr.R. 446, 30 S.W. 1067; Denham v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 771, 40 S.W.2d 384; State v. Johnson, 9......
-
Commonwealth v. Pugh
...level of culpable negligence, implicitly refusing to recognize duty to obtain medical assistance during childbirth); Singleton v. State, 33 Ala.App. 536, 35 So.2d 375 (1948) (reversing murder conviction of unattended mother where “the sum total of the evidence presented by the State as to [......
-
Keeler v. Superior Court
...v. Ryan (1956) 9 Ill.2d 467, 138 N.E.2d 516, 518--520; People v. Hayner (1949) 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23, 24; Singleton v. State (1948) 33 Ala.App. 536, 35 So.2d 375, 378; Montgomery v. State (1947) 202 Ga. 678, 44 S.E.2d 242, 243--244; cf. Watson v. State (1955) 208 Md. 210, 117 A.2d 549,......
-
People v. Wang
...life as a viable being, so that a child in the process of being born may be considered a "live" human being (Singleton v. State, 33 Ala.App. 536, 35 So.2d 375; People v. Chavez, supra). The second theory is that "life" is not present until the child has been completely expelled from the mot......