Singleton v. State

• Decision Date: 26 March 1894
• Citation: 16 So. 295,71 Miss. 782
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: HENRY SINGLETON v. THE STATE

16 So. 295

71 Miss. 782

HENRY SINGLETON v. THE STATE

Supreme Court of Mississippi

March 26, 1894

FROM the circuit court of the first district of Hinds county. HON J. B. CHRISMAN, Judge.

Appellant a negro, was convicted of murder, and imprisoned in the penitentiary for life. While serving such sentence within the prison walls, he killed one Lulu Payne, colored, also a penitentiary convict, and was indicted for her murder. To this indictment he pleaded in abatement the fact of his former conviction and sentence, and that he was undergoing life imprisonment, wherefore it was averred that the court had no jurisdiction to try him for the second offense. A demurrer to this plea was sustained, and the defendant was tried upon plea of not guilty.

The evidence showed that criminal intimacy existed between defendant and the deceased, and that he became jealous of one Taylor, another convict, whom he suspected of intimacy with the woman. At the time of the killing, the deceased and other female convicts were at the cistern in the prison yard. Defendant had armed himself with a long dirk, and, coming from the shop, he walked rapidly to the cistern, and catching the woman with one hand stabbed her to death. At this juncture he was seized by others, when he threwdown the knife, and, taking a razor from his pocket, cut his own throat, evidently intending suicide, but, under surgical treatment, his life was saved.

Several weeks prior to the killing it was observed that he was somewhat moody and morose. He had a violent temper, and was difficult to control. At the time of the tragedy he made no remark to the deceased, but his actions indicated that he was frenzied with rage. A few minutes afterwards there was found on the ground, near the scene of the killing, and at a place by which the defendant was taken when being removed to prison, a letter without signature or date, but in the handwriting of the accused, addressed to the warden of the penitentiary, as follows:

"Capt M. L. Jenkins:

"SIR--You will please write to my cousin and tell him of my death and he has got fifty-one dollars and thirty-five cents of my money, please collect it or get it from him & burrie Lula Payne and me deacon. I had rather not live any longer. My cousin has got my money & he wont send it to me. I think that he has swindled me out of it. I have no friends to ever get me out of here, I am working turning a crank with a saw on it the work will kill any man that live, I know it will kill me. I got sick and unable last Saturday week to work. Mr. Lary fastened me up in my sell all day Saturday & Sunday because I was unable to work, he dont like me in the shop and Mr. McGee is trying to work me to death for spite, thats why I had rather die. I have been giving Lula every thing she wanted for six months and now she is flirting with the cook Taylor &amp her & I quarreled about it & she called the seargent to have me locked up & had rather die than to be locked up. I will send her off first then I will go after her, I will send her to hell shure then I will go. I rather be in hell than to be locked up or worked to death, come to the shop and try the crank saw that I am turning and you will see that I am working unreasonable I cant stand and no other man can, writ to my sister at Natchez & inform her of my death. Her name is Mary Singleton and you will oblige me, tell her that Poke has robbed me of my money that was left by my poor old father. Lula will never eat any more stake Taylor give you or write any notes."

This letter was introduced in evidence over the objection of defendant's counsel.

There seems to have been no fresh quarrel between accused and deceased, and no motive for the killing was shown other than jealousy. He testified that he was jealous, and, further that about three months before the homicide an agreement was made between deceased and himself to the effect that if either was untrue to the other, the guilty party was to be killed and the survivor was to commit suicide; that the woman had been untrue, and, carrying out the agreement, he had killed her and tried to kill himself; that at the time of the killing he was "all to pieces," and "did not know what got into his head." Asked if he knew it was wrong to kill the woman, he said he did not think at the time; that he was sorry afterwards, but at the time did not know what possessed him.

Among other things, counsel for defendant asked the court to instruct that the jury should be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant's sanity before convicting him; that if the evidence failed to satisfy the mind beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew right from wrong, or that he was committing a crime, he should be acquitted; that the burden of proof was on the state, and never shifted, and that defendant's soundness of mind was a material fact, to be established beyond a reasonable doubt; that if a reasonable doubt of his sanity arose out of the evidence on either side, the jury should acquit. These instructions were refused.

Defendant was convicted, and received sentence of capital punishment. Motion for a new trial overruled; hence this appeal.

Affirmed.

M. M. McLeod, for appellant, by appointment of the court.

1. Did the court have jurisdiction? The accused was already a convict under life sentence, and was civilly dead. Constitution 1890, § 241; Code 1892, § § 212, 1076, 1078, 1455, 1562, 2218, 2747; 36 Miss. 72.

The second indictment of one already dead in law is a vain thing. 2 Hawkins' P. C., p. 524.

After conviction, a prisoner cannot be indicted as long as he remains unpardoned, Ib., p. 253. In 67 N.Y. 218, and 49 Mo. 282, the contrary was held, but under special statutes cited in the opinions. There is no statute giving such authority in this state, and, under the common law, it is submitted that this prosecution cannot be maintained. 4 Blackstone's Com., 336.

2. It was error to admit the letter in evidence. This paper was not shown the defendant, and it was never proved there was no sufficient evidence to prove that it expressed the defendant's intention to kill deceased. This letter was prejudicial to the accused, and was calculated to impress the jury with the idea that the defendant had malice or a motive to kill.

3. Under the four instructions asked by the defendant, the theory of the defense which was sought to be submitted to the jury was that the accused, at the time of the killing, was laboring under a fit of transitory frenzy; that he was not sane, and did not know what he was doing. The only question is, whether the principles stated in the instructions were applicable under the evidence. Did the testimony engender a doubt of the sanity of the accused sufficient to justify the application of these principles? It is submitted that there was sufficient evidence, at least to raise a doubt as to the sanity of the accused. This being true, it is well settled that it devolves on the state to remove such doubt. 56 Miss 269. The state did not do this, but ignored all the evidence on the question of sanity. I respectfully urge that this was error requiring a reversal. As to this matter, the court passed on a question that should have been submitted to the jury. There are many authorities on the question of...