Singleton v. State
| Decision Date | 15 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. SC93035.,SC93035. |
| Citation | 783 So.2d 970 |
| Parties | Lawrence SINGLETON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Paul C. Helm, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, FL, for Appellant.
Robert A Butterworth, Attorney General, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Appellee.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing a death sentence upon Lawrence Singleton. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and death sentence.
Singleton was convicted of first-degree murder for the February 19, 1997, stabbing death of Roxanne Hayes. The evidence at trial revealed that Hayes was stabbed seven times, the fatal wound penetrating the right ventricle of her heart, causing her to bleed to death.
At trial the State presented the testimony of Paul Hitson, an eyewitness. Hitson, who had been hired to paint Singleton's house, testified that after knocking on Singleton's door and calling his name, he walked into Singleton's house and heard a muffled, gurgling sound for help. Hitson stated that as he was walking through the house he heard another cry for help and, upon entering the doorway of the family room, saw Singleton hunched over a body on the couch. Hitson left the house through the carport door and told his uncle, who was waiting outside, what he had seen. Hitson then ran to the front of the house and looked through the window on the front door. Hitson kicked the door and in response heard another weak cry for help. Hitson saw Hayes lying on the couch, not moving, with Singleton standing over her with his hand around her neck. Hitson testified that he then saw Singleton make three downward pounding motions on Hayes chest and neck area, accompanied by bone-crushing sounds. Hitson then went with his uncle to telephone for help.
Dr. Miller, an associate medical examiner of Hillsborough County, also testified for the State. Miller, who had examined Hayes's body, testified that Hayes had six stab wounds on her trunk and a seventh on her face, which were consistent with the attacker being face to face, bent over the victim. Miller also testified that Hayes had several very deep defensive wounds on her hands, including one that almost severed the index and middle fingers on her left hand. Miller estimated that Hayes would have been conscious at least four or five minutes after sustaining the fatal wound to her heart.
Singleton testified in his own defense. Singleton testified that on the day of the murder, after consuming prescription medication, antihistamines and alcohol, he picked Hayes up and drove her to his house to perform oral sex. Singleton stated that, after Hayes had eaten and they had engaged in sex, Hayes grabbed his wallet as he was attempting to give her money for cab fare home. Singleton stated that a struggle ensued, and after he took the wallet back from Hayes, she picked up a knife Singleton kept by the couch and swung it at him. Singleton then testified that during the altercation, in which he attempted to disarm Hayes, she sustained the seven stab wounds that ultimately caused her death.
The jury returned a guilty verdict for first-degree murder. After the penalty phase of the trial, the jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of ten to two. The trial court agreed and sentenced Singleton to death.
The trial court found the existence of two aggravators: (1) Singleton had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use of violence to the person;1 and (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).2 The trial court found the following statutory mitigators: (1) the murder was committed while Singleton was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;3 (2) Singleton's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired;4 and (3) Singleton's age at the time of the offense was sixty-nine.5 The court found nonstatutory mitigation as follows: (1) the prior violent crime was committed in 1978, when Singleton was fifty-one years old; (2) the intent to kill was formed during an argument or disagreement with the victim; (3) since his release on parole in 1987, Singleton had never been accused of or arrested for any offense except petit theft; (4) Singleton was under the influence of alcohol and other possible medication at the time of the offense; (5) Singleton suffered from alcoholism; (6) Singleton suffered from mild dementia; (7) Singleton had previously attempted suicide; (8) Singleton had served honorably in the armed forces; and (9) Singleton was a model prisoner in California from 1979 to 1987.
In this appeal, Singleton raises a total of eight claims.6 Singleton first claims that the trial court denied Singleton his right to an impartial jury by denying cause challenges to three jurors who had knowledge of Singleton's prior offenses and one other juror who stated that he did not believe that alcohol was an excuse for any crime.
A juror should be excused for cause if there is any reasonable doubt about the juror's ability to render an impartial verdict. See Turner v. State, 645 So.2d 444, 447 (Fla.1994)
. On appeal, a trial court's ruling on a cause challenge will be sustained absent an abuse of discretion. See Castro v. State, 644 So.2d 987, 990 (Fla.1994). Discretion is abused "only where no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Fla.1990). Our review of the record indicates that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying cause challenges for these jurors.
To ensure that the jury was fair and impartial in this highly publicized case, the trial judge, in accord with our decision in Boggs v. State, 667 So.2d 765 (Fla.1996), conducted individual voir dire to determine each juror's exposure to pretrial publicity and their knowledge of Singleton's prior crimes and any resulting bias.7 Although this Court has not held that a juror's knowledge of a case or of a defendant's prior crimes necessarily requires that juror to be excused for cause, the trial judge in this case excused over seventy jurors who indicated that they knew the specific facts about Singleton's prior offenses, regardless of whether those jurors stated that they could disregard that knowledge and reach a verdict that was based solely on the evidence at trial. Singleton argues that prospective jurors Crawford, Meyer, and Crumpton should have been excused for cause as well, based on their knowledge of Singleton's prior crimes. The trial judge, however, did not abuse his discretion in refusing to do so.
In response to questions concerning a newscast he viewed almost a year before the voir dire, prospective juror Crawford indicated that he remembered that Singleton "was being held possibly for having committed this murder" and "some statement to the effect that he had a crime in his past basically." Crawford stated he could not remember any details of the crime, including whether or not Singleton had been convicted of the prior crime or had just been accused. Crawford stated that he could base his verdict solely on the evidence presented and that Singleton was presumed innocent.
Prospective juror Meyer indicated that he had seen four or five news reports about the story five or six months prior to the voir dire. Meyer indicated that he remembered something about the dismemberment of the arms of a minor girl but did not know whether that was something in Singleton's past or part of the current case and did not know if Singleton had committed the act or had just been accused of doing it. Meyer also stated that he could base his verdict solely on the evidence presented, that he had no fixed opinion as to Singleton's guilt or innocence, and that Singleton was presumed innocent.
Prospective juror Crumpton stated that a month before the voir dire he read a newspaper article that stated that Singleton had "killed somebody and chopped off her arms or something." Although Crumpton first indicated that those were the facts of another case, later in the voir dire he indicated that he was referring to the facts of this case. Crumpton also stated that he could put aside any information he may have heard and decide this case based solely on the evidence presented.
The record reflects that these jurors had not formed any opinion about Singleton's case. All three indicated that they could base their verdicts solely on the evidence presented and stated that Singleton was presumed innocent. Although Meyer and Crumpton recalled some vague details of Singleton's prior crime, considering the remoteness in time that the jurors saw the news reports, their unequivocal responses to the Court that they would disregard anything they may have heard and the fact that their recollection of the details of the news reports was so vague, there was no error in denying Singleton's cause challenge for these three jurors. As this Court recently reiterated in Kearse v. State, 770 So.2d 1119 (Fla.2000):
In reviewing a claim of error such as this, we have recognized that the trial court has a unique vantage point in the determination of juror bias. The trial court is able to see the jurors' voir dire responses and make observations which simply cannot be discerned from an appellate record.
Id. at 1128 (quoting Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 635-36 (Fla.1997)). Here we cannot say, based on our review of the record, that the trial judge abused his discretion with regards to these jurors.
Singleton also argues that prospective juror Belcher should have been excused for cause because he stated during voir dire that he did not "feel that alcohol is an excuse in any kind of crime." Singleton argues that...
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