Singleton v. Sw. R.R.

• Decision Date: 28 February 1883
• Citation: 70 Ga. 464
• Parties: Singleton. vs. Southwestern Railroad.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

70 Ga. 464

Singleton. vs. Southwestern Railroad.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

FEBRUARY TERM, 1883.

Railroads. Corporations. Leases. Contracts. Dam-ages. Negligence. Before Judge Simmons. Talbot Superior Court. September Term, 1882.

In addition to the report contained in the decision, it is only necessary to state that the motion for new trial contained five grounds. The order granting the new trial was as follows: " Upon hearing and considering the foregoing motion, it is ordered by the court, that the verdict be set aside and a new trial granted, on the ground that the jury found contrary to the evidence and charge of the court on special plea which is the second plea."

Blandford & Garrard, for plaintiff in error.

W. S. Wallace; Peabody & Brannon, for defendant.

Crawford, Justice.

This was an action on the case brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error, and in which it was alleged that he purchased a ticket from said defendant to ride upon its road from Howard to Geneva and return; that by the carelessness of the said defendant, and the negligence of its agents in putting him off its train, he was caused to break his leg and suffer other injuries to his great damage, amounting to twenty thousand dollars.

The defendant pleaded the general issue, and at the trial term of the case filed a special plea alleging that, before and at the time of the accident, the road and cars had been leased by the Southwestern Railroad Company to the Central Railroad & Banking Company of Georgia, and that the same were at that time being operated by the latter, and not by the former company. Upon the trial of the issues formed, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, assessing his damages at six thousand dollars. The defendant moved for a new trial, which the court granted alone upon the ground that the jury found contrary to the evidence and charge on the special plea. Upon this decision the plaintiff below assigned error, and asks that the same may be reviewed and reversed.

1, 2, 3. The special plea and the evidence thereunder present the question whether a railroad company which has leased its road, cars and engines, and allowed the lessee company to operate the same in the name of the lessor company, is liable to third persons or the public for the carelessness and negligence of the lessee company.

It is now a well settled principle that a corporation, being the creature of the law, has only the powers conferred upon it by its charter, and that all others not necessarily implied therefrom are withheld. Its grants, whether of powers or exemptions, are always to be strictly construed, and its obligations are to be strictly performed, whether they may be due to the state or to individuals. It seems also to be well settled that a railroad corporation, and it is with such that we are dealing in this case, cannot, without special authority of statute, alienate its franchise or property acquired under the right of eminent domain, or essential to the performance of its duty to the public, whether by sale, mortgage or lease. 101 U. S. 71; 17 How., 30; 21 How., 441; 4 Biss., 35; 10 Allen, 448.

It is not questioned that the Southwestern Railroad Company, if it had been operating its road, would have been liable to respond to the plaintiff in error for any damages sustained by him through the negligence of its officers or agents. If, then, it would be so liable when operated by itself, does a lease made to another company discharge it under the law from such liability?

No case involving this precise question has ever been before this court, but in the case of the Macon and Augusta Railroad vs. Mayes, 49 Ga., 355, it was held: " Where a railroad company permits other companies or persons to exercise the franchise of running cars drawn by steam over its road, the company owning the road, and to which the law has entrusted the franchise, is liable for any injury done, as though the company owning the road were itself running the cars."

This liability is put upon the ground, that " if a railroad company to which the legislature has granted this franchise permit others to use it, the company is responsible to the public for the negligence of such persons."

This, then, being a fixed obligation upon a railroad corporation, is there any way by which it may allow others to exercise its franchise, and absolve itself from such obligation? This can undoubtedly be done by the consent and authority of the legislature granted to that end. Pierce, in his works on American Railroad Law 244, and on Railroads 283, lays down the rule as follows: " The company cannot divest itself of responsibility for the torts of persons operating its road, by transferring its corporate powers to other parties, or by leasing its road to them, in the absence of special statute authority and exemption. It cannot by its own act absolve itself from its obligations, without the consent of the legislature. The lessees may, however, also be responsible for the injury."

In support of this principle he cites 26 Vermont, 721, which says: " The company owning a railroad will be liable for the acts of their lessees who run the road. As to the liability of the defendants for the acts of their lessees, who were running the defendant's road under a long lease, we think there can be no doubt. Unless we can hold the defendants thus liable, they might put their road into the hands of corporations or individuals of no responsibility. It was upon this ground that the English courts denied the legality of one road leasing itself to another or to private persons, and the consequent loss of security to the public without the consent of parliament. * * * The public, can only look to that corporation to whom they have delegated this portion of the public service. Certainly they are not bound to look beyond them, although they doubtless may do so." See also 17 How., 39; 1 Simon (N. S.) 550; 13 L & E., 506; 17 Wallace, 445; 10 Gray 103; 22 I11., 109; 4 Gushing 400; 5 Wallace 104.

In Railroad Company vs. Brown, 17 Wallace, 450 and 451. the opinion of Judge Davis is as follows: "The second assignment of error denies the liability of the cor-poration for anything done while the road is operated by the lessees and receiver.

" It is the accepted doctrine in this country, that a railroad corporation cannot escape the performance of any duty or obligation imposed by its charter or the general laws of the state, by a voluntary surrender of its road into the hands of lessees. The operation of the road by the lessees does not change the relations of the original company to the public, * * * * for the servants under such an employment, in legal contemplation, are as much the servants of the company as of the lessees and receiver. Apart from this view of the subject, the ticket on which the plaintiff rode, was issued in the name of the Washington, Georgetown and Alexandria R. R. Company, as were all the tickets sold at both ends of the route. The holder of such a ticket contracts for carriage with the company, not with the lessees and receiver. Indeed, there is nothing to show that Catherine Brown knew of the difficulties into which the original company had fallen, nor of the part performed by the lessees and receiver in operating the road. She was not required to look beyond the ticket, which conveyed the information that this road was run as railroads generally are, by a chartered company. Besides, the company having permitted the lessees and receiver to conduct the business of the road in this particular as if there were no change of possession, is not in a position to raise any question as to its liability for their acts."

But it is said that the Southwestern Railroad Company had the consent of the legislature to lease its road, and having entered into a contract with the Central Railroad and Banking Company, under that consent, it is absolved from its obligations to the public under its original charter. Authorities are cited to sustain this doctrine; indeed, some of those hereinbefore referred to are relied upon. The view which we take of the...