Singleton v. U.S., No. 99-14867
Decision Date | 08 August 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 99-14867 |
Citation | 260 F.3d 1295 |
Parties | (11th Cir. 2001) DONNA SINGLETON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.
Before CARNES and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and PROPST*, District Judge.
Donna Singleton (appellant) was indicted on three counts of making false statements to a federally-insured credit union (Title 18 U.S.C. §1014). The jury convicted her on June 30, 1999 of all three counts. She raises two issues on appeal. She contends: (1) that the district court erred by refusing to apply the marital communications privilege to a conversation between the appellant and her then-husband Cedric Singleton (Cedric); and (2) that the district court erred by allowing the jury to consider the testimony of witness Sonya White concerning alleged statements of the appellant, when White was ambivalent as to whether she had heard the statements directly from the appellant or whether she heard other(s) quote the appellant.
The appellant and Cedric began living together in 1992 and were married in January 1995. The marriage was a rocky one involving, during the marriage, allegations of adultery by both partners and physical altercations. Prior to December 1996, appellant filed charges of domestic abuse against Cedric, which resulted in his being jailed. The parties separated in December 1996 after another physical altercation involving appellant's boyfriend, Earl Davis. A petition for divorce was filed by appellant in September 1997. The divorce became final in May 1998.
In December 1997, Cedric was visiting his daughter at appellant's residence. While there, he searched for papers related to a prior divorce from another woman, and found documents that indicated that appellant had filed the false loan applications for which she was eventually convicted. In January 1998, he took the documents to the FBI. He agreed with the FBI to wear a recording device and to tape a conversation with appellant. Cedric met the appellant at a restaurant on January 29, 1998. During the taped conversation, appellant made incriminating statements. After the taped conversation, the FBI questioned appellant and obtained her consent to search her residence, where other incriminating evidence was found.
Over the appellant's objection, the taped conversation with Cedric and testimony concerning it were admitted at trial. The prosecution also called Sonya White as a witness. White testified that appellant told her that appellant had obtained loans based upon false documents. She also stated, however, that she may have heard about the loans from other co-worker(s). In her own testimony at the trial, the appellant first denied that she had falsified the loan documents, but, on cross-examination, recanted and acknowledged that she had forged, altered, and submitted inaccurate loan applications, supporting documents, and income statements.
Appellant's first issue is one of first impression in this circuit. It arises out of the admission into evidence of the conversation taped while the Singletons were married, but separated, and testimony concerning it. There are two recognized types of marital privilege: the marital confidential communications privilege and the spousal testimonial privilege. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1980). The marital privilege asserted by the appellant is marital communications privilege, which has been recognized by this court. United States v. Entrekin, 624 F.2d 597, 598 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1379 (5th Cir. 1978).2 The threshold issue in this case is whether the marital communications privilege applies to communications made while the spouses, although still technically married, are living separate lives with no reasonable expectation of reconciliation (in other words, the couple is "permanently separated"). The appellant, while recognizing that no circuit court has so held, argues that this court, in a case of first impression, should "adopt a bright-line rule that the marital privilege lasts until the marriage formally ends" with a divorce decree. The appellant's justification for this argument is that, "[t]his standard would avoid the intrusive inquiries that were posed to the appellant and her estranged husband in this case." Appellant also argues that such a rule would "create predictability around the duration of the privilege" and would avoid discouraging "communication between couples exploring reconciliation."
The appellant's "bright-line" argument has not been accepted by any circuit court that has considered the availability of the marital communications privilege for a conversation taking place when the spouses are permanently separated. Further, contrary to the appellant's argument, other courts of appeal do not appear to "have struggled to fashion solutions to the problem of determining whether the marital privilege survives through separation." In United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 591-94 (7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh Circuit stated:
In United States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1018-19 (6th Cir. 1993), the court stated:
In United States v. Frank, 869 F.2d 1177, 1179 (8th Cir. 1989), the court stated:
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... ... In response, the state urges us not to recognize the marital communications privilege because "the cost of recognizing the common ... Singleton, 260 F.3d 1295, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 2001) ; United States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1018-19 ... ...
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§ 39.03 SPOUSAL COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGE
...privilege], it does not terminate the privilege for confidential marital communications.").[45] See United States v. Singleton, 260 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[S]ociety's interest in protecting the confidentiality of the relationships of permanently separated spouses is outweighed b......
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§ 39.03 Spousal Communication Privilege
...privilege], it does not terminate the privilege for confidential marital communications.").[45] See United States v. Singleton, 260 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[S]ociety's interest in protecting the confidentiality of the relationships of permanently separated spouses is outweighed b......
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§39.01 INTRODUCTION
...may assert to prevent the other from testifying to confidential communications made during marriage."); United States v. Singleton, 260 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001) ("There are two recognized types of marital privilege: the marital confidential communications privilege and the spousal t......
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§ 39.01 Introduction
...may assert to prevent the other from testifying to confidential communications made during marriage."); United States v. Singleton, 260 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001) ("There are two recognized types of marital privilege: the marital confidential communications privilege and the spousal t......