Sington v. Chrysler Corporation

• Decision Date: 31 July 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 119291, Calendar No. 7.
• Citation: 467 Mich. 144,648 N.W.2d 624
• Parties: Charles SINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, also known as Daimlerchrysler Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

648 N.W.2d 624

467 Mich. 144

Charles SINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, also known as Daimlerchrysler Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 119291, Calendar No. 7.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 10, 2002.

Decided July 31, 2002.

Zamler, Mellen & Shiffman, P.C. (by Paul S. Rosen) Southfield, MI, (Daryl Royal, of counsel), Dearborn, MI, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Lacey & Jones (by Gerald M. Marcinkoski and Michael T. Reinholm), Birmingham, MI, for the defendant-appellant. Martin L. Critchell, Detroit, MI, for amicus curiae, the Michigan Self-Insurers' Association.

Evans, Pletkovic & Rhodes, P.C. (by William Nole Evans), Huntington Woods, MI, for amici curiae, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the Detroit Regional Chamber.

Glotta, Skutt & Associates, P.C. (by Richard M. Skutt), Detroit, MI, for, amicus curiae, the Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.

Libner, VanLeuven, Evans, Portenga & Slater, P.C. (by John A. Braden), Muskegon, MI, amicus curiae, in support of the plaintiff.

OPINION

TAYLOR, J.

This case concerns eligibility for worker's compensation benefits pursuant to the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA) definition of disability at M.C.L. § 418.301(4) and the reasonable employment provisions, M.C.L. § 418.301(5), of that act. The Court of Appeals effectively concluded that under § 301(4)'s definition of disability as interpreted in Haske v. Transport Leasing, Inc., 455 Mich. 628, 566 N.W.2d 896 (1997), plaintiff was disabled and entitled to wage loss benefits. We conclude that the Haske definition of disability is erroneous and should be overruled. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the WCAC for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

A

A review of the relationship in the worker's compensation statute between "disability" and "favored work" (or as it is now formally called in the WDCA, "reasonable employment") is helpful in understanding what is at issue in this case.

There are circumstances in which a work-related injury might prevent an employee from continuing to perform one or even more of the complex of tasks in the job he was performing at the time of the injury, but in which, even with such a limitation, that employee may still be able to perform the job sufficiently so that his wage earning capacity is not affected in that job. For example, such an injury might render an employee unable to perform a job that requires continuous standing, but nevertheless leaves the employee able to perform a job suitable to his qualifications and training in which the employee can sit while performing most or all his job duties to the degree that his ability to earn equivalent wages is not different than before the injury.

Historically, such a situation posed a dilemma for the worker's compensation system. As the courts dealt with difficult cases in which an employee could suffer a work-related injury and be limited, to one degree or another, in his ability to perform work, but not rendered altogether unable to work, judges developed the common-law mitigation doctrine of "favored work." Under the favored-work doctrine, an employer could generally require an injured employee, eligible for worker's compensation benefits, to do other work that the employee was reasonably capable of performing. The wages earned in the "easier" job could be used by the employer as a setoff, or mitigation, against the employer's worker's compensation liability. If the employee unreasonably refused to participate in the favored work, i.e., the "easier job," the penalty was loss of worker's compensation benefits.¹ There were also common-law protections that the courts developed to protect the employee from being exploited during the period he was engaged in favored work.² This approach to favored work, with its emphasis on mitigation, was felt to advance the interests of the employee by encouraging his reentry into the workplace, as well as the interests of the employer in limiting its ongoing worker's compensation liability.

In 1982, the Legislature effectively displaced the common-law doctrine with the enactment of a statutory approach that drew heavily upon the favored-work doctrine³ (now called "reasonable employment"⁴). Importantly, the legislation stated that, as a prerequisite to being considered a participant in reasonable employment (M.C.L. § 418.301[5])⁵ an employee must first suffer a "disability," as defined in M.C.L. § 418.301(4).⁶ Because an employee engaged in reasonable employment is afforded significant statutory protections ⁷ once the reasonable employment commences, it is critical to employers and employees alike that it be clear which workers are considered disabled under § 301(4). It is this condition precedent to "reasonable employment" — disability — that is the central issue in this case.

B

Plaintiff, Charles Sington, was employed by defendant, Chrysler Corporation, from July 1971 until March 1997. During his last fifteen years, he performed various production-related jobs as a "floater." Until he was injured, plaintiff's physical activities in the course of his employment included reaching and stretching out above head level, and bending and picking up parts weighing up to thirty pounds.

In June 1994, plaintiff slipped and fell at work, injuring his left shoulder. It is undisputed that the 1994 injury arose in the course of his employment and that defendant voluntarily paid wage loss benefits following that injury. Plaintiff underwent surgery on his left shoulder. Upon returning to work in January 1995, he was restricted from performing work requiring him to reach above the left shoulder. He continued working as a floater with this work restriction until his right shoulder was injured outside his employment. Plaintiff underwent surgery on his right shoulder in August 1996 for a non-work-related injury and was off work until November 1996 when he returned to work as a floater. Defendant then honored plaintiff's expanded work restrictions that precluded him from lifting, pushing, or pulling over twenty pounds. It is uncontested that plaintiff's average weekly wage was the same before and after both the shoulder injuries.

Plaintiff continued as a floater until March 1997 when he suffered a non-work-related stroke. After the stroke, plaintiff received sickness and accident benefits and was then granted a permanent and total disability pension by defendant.

Thereafter, plaintiff sought worker's compensation benefits related to his inability to work. Plaintiff asserted that he was working in "reasonable employment" under the WDCA when he performed his job with a work restriction after the left shoulder injury, and that he became entitled to worker's compensation benefits when he lost this reasonable employment because of the stroke. This claim is grounded in the interaction between § 301(4) and § 301(5). As mentioned earlier, note 5, if an employee is disabled under § 301(4) and then is afforded reasonable employment under § 301(5), should that employment be terminated before one hundred weeks pass, the employee receives worker's compensation benefits on the basis of the wage at the date of injury under § 301(5)(e). If, on the other hand, one hundred or more weeks have passed and the worker loses the employment through no fault of his own, eligibility for benefits is determined under § 301(5)(d).

While, in this case, no one disagrees with the rules of reasonable employment, there is dispute over whether plaintiff was "disabled" under § 301(4). Plaintiff asserts he was disabled because his left shoulder injury precluded him from performing all the tasks he performed as a "floater" before that injury. Defendant's position is that, before the stroke, plaintiff was not disabled because the left shoulder injury had not reduced his "wage earning capacity" as that is understood in § 301(4), and, thus, once returned to work, plaintiff was not engaged in reasonable employment, with all its attendant benefits, at the time of the stroke. Accordingly, defendant asserts that, as with any other employee who became unable to work because of a non-job-related injury, plaintiff has no remedy in the worker's compensation system.

Faced with the question whether plaintiff was disabled under § 301(4), the worker's compensation magistrate ruled that plaintiff was not engaged in reasonable employment under § 301(5). The magistrate opined that plaintiff had been "performing a regular plant job" after his left shoulder injury and that he was convinced that plaintiff "did not experience any wage loss, whatsoever" because of that injury. The magistrate further concluded that plaintiff was disabled because of his non-work-related stroke and that, but for the stroke, plaintiff "would have continued at his regular job, a job which was conveniently within his recommended restrictions." Because plaintiff's wage loss was attributable to his stroke rather than his shoulder injury, "his partial disability, based on his ... workplace injury, [was] not compensable...."

The WCAC affirmed the magistrate's decision. It concluded that the factual record supported the magistrate's determination that plaintiff was performing his "regular job" when he returned to work after the left shoulder injury. Thus, the WCAC stated, the job "did not constitute an accommodation of [plaintiff's] injury, so as to be `reasonable employment' under Section 301(5)." Accordingly, the WCAC further stated that plaintiff did not have a compensable disability when he continued to "perform his regular job" for defendant after his left shoulder injury because "it was the stroke which clearly and directly was the reason for his subsequent wage loss."

The Court of Appeals reversed the WCAC. 245 Mich.App. 535, 630 N.W.2d 337 (2001). The panel held "as a matter of law that defendant offered plaintiff `reasonable employment' within the meaning of" M.C.L. §...