Sinkler v. Terry

• Decision Date: 11 January 1888
• Citation: 108 N.Y. 1,14 N.E. 815
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. SINKLER v. TERRY, Superintendent of Onondago County Penitentiary.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

108 N.Y. 1

14 N.E. 815

PEOPLE ex rel. SINKLER

v.TERRY, Superintendent of Onondago County Penitentiary.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

January 11, 1888.

Appeal from general term, supreme court, First department.

Relator, Hiram Sinkler, was convicted by a justice of the peace of the village of Canton of assault in the third degree, of which he pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to imprisonment in the Onondago county penitentiary, whence he was brought before the supreme court on a writ of habeas corpus directed to Irving C. Terry, superintendent of the Onondago county penitentiary, by which court he was ordered discharged. From this order an appeal was taken to this court.

Ledyard P. Hale, for the People.

John C. Keeler, for respondent.

PECKHAM, J.

The relator claims that the section of the act providing for the election of a judicial officer in the village of Canton is unconstitutional, because (1) the section does not confine the jurisdiction of the officer to the village of Canton; and, (2) if it did so confine it, there is no power in the legislature to provide for the election of a justice of the peace in villages.

1. As to the first ground. The village of Canton was originally incorporated by chapter 192, Laws 1845. In 1859 the charter was amended by the passage of chapter 70 of the Laws of that year. The second section of this latter act provided that ‘the officers of said village shall be five trustees, * * * one justice of the peace, with powers hereinafter mentioned. * * * The said justice of the peace shall have all the powers of justices of the peace elected by towns at town meetings in relation to crimes and misdemeanors and to oaths and acknowledgments, and also in civil actions in which all the parties shall be residents or inhabitants of said village; and shall hold such office for the term of four years from the first day of January next after his election.’ By chapter 263, Laws 1870, the section above cited was amended by reducing the term of office of the justice, and, as to his powers, providing that he should have ‘the usual powers of justices of the peace of towns in relation to crimes and misdemeanors, and to oaths and acknowledgments, and also in civil actions in which all the parties shall be residents or inhabitants of said village.’ Under the constitution of of 1846, it was provided by article 6, § 14, that ‘inferior local courts, of civil and criminal jurisdiction, may be established by the legislature in cities; and such courts, except for the cities of New York and Buffalo, shall have an uniform organization and jurisdiction in such cities.’ While this provision was in force, the village of Corning (which was incorporated under the provisions of the general act to provide for the incorporation of villages, being chapter 426, Laws 1847) prosecuted one Sill before the police justice of that village for selling liquor contrary to a by-law of the village, and recovered the amount of the penalty provided for therein. Sill sued out a certiorari to the supreme court, where the judgment was affirmed, and he then appealed here. He contended that the legislature had no power, under the constitution, to provide for the appointment of a police justice in a village with jurisdiction to try and determine civil actions; and it was argued that the article above quoted only allowed of such a provision by the legislature in regard to cities. But this court held, DENIO, C. J., writing the opinion, that the legislature was not prohibited from providing for the organization of an inferior local court in a village. Sill v. Village of Corning, 15 N. Y. 297. This decision was reaffirmed in Brandon v. Avery, 22 N. Y. 469, where it it was again stated that the only limitation under the constitution of 1846 as to the jurisdiction of new magistrates to be cleated by the legislature in cities and villages is that it be local and inferior. The first case above cited was decided in June, 1857, and the second in December, 1860.

It may be assumed, therefore, that in 1859 it was known to the legislature that inferior local courts could be established in villages; and it was also known that justices of the peace, with like power and authority through the whole town as any other justice of the peace, but to be elected by a portion only of the electors of the town, could not constitutionally be provided for. With such knowledge on the part of the legislature, the question in whether the language used by it in the section of the act under consideration, fairly and reasonably construed, imports that the jurisdiction of the officer elected by the electors of the village of Canton was to be co-extensive with that of the justices of the peace of the town of Canton, elected under the provisions of the constitution, in which case the statute would be void; or whether such language did not mean that the jurisdiction thus described and provided for was to be exercised, and process to be served, only in the village of Canton. In construing a statute which is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it valid and the other void, and both are equally reasonable, it is familiar that courts incline to and will adopt that construction which renders the act valid, rather than the one which avoids it. A statute, to be held unconstitutional, must plainly be at war with the fundamental law. We think that a construction of this statute which confines the jurisdiction of the officer and the service of process to the limits of the village is not unreasonable nor erroneous. The legislature clearly did not intend to pass an unconstitutional act, or, which is the same thing, provide for the creation of an officer with jurisdiction prohibited by the constitution. In the section of the act under consideration, it states who the officers of the village shall be, and names a justice of the peace as among them, and then proceeds to define his jurisdiction. As this legislation is designed exclusively for the village of Canton, and the officers named in the act are named as officers of the village, and as the powers and duties of all the other officers whose election is therein provided for are to be exercised within the village, we think it highly reasonable to suppose that the duties of the justice were also to be thus exercised. The jurisdiction conferred upon him by the language used was meant to be confined to the village, instead of the town, of Canton. When the statute said that he should have all the powers of justices of the peace elected by towns, etc., it was descriptive of the character of that jurisdiction which was to be exercised within the village. This reasoning has added force under the statute of 1870. The second of the two cases above cited had then been reported some years, and the presumption of knowledge of both of them by the legislature is still stronger. The language used in the act of 1870 is substantially similar to the act of 1859, and should receive the same construction. The act, we think, when properly and reasonably construed, confines the jurisdiction of the justice to the village of Canton; and within that village, as to crimes and misdemeanors, he has the same jurisdiction that justices of the peace have in towns. This makes the court a local one. The jurisdiction which the justice exercises is inferior to that of a justice of the peace of towns, because it is more limited in area and also in kind in civil cases, for in those he is so limited in the exercise of his jurisdiction that both parties must be residents or inhabitants of the village. The statute thus providing for the creation of both an inferior and a local court is not open to the first ground of objection.

2. As to the second ground, we think the constitution does permit of the election in villages of of a judicial officer with inferior local jurisdiction, even though he be named a justie of the peace. The argument against the constitutionality of such a law is this: The constitution (article 6, § 18) provides for the election of justices of the peace in towns, and also in cities, but does not mention villages, and hence no justice of the peace can be elected for them; and as this act does provide for the the election of a justice of the peace in a village it is therefore void. But we think the officer named in the act, although called a justice of the peace, is not the officer named in the constitution, and whose election is therein provided for. He is not an officer with the same jurisdiction as a town justice of the peace, because, as already shown, he is limited in the discharge of his duties to the village, and, in civil cases to those where both parties are residents or inhabitants thereof; and of course he is not a justice of the peace of a city. In a city a justice of the may be elected with such powers and for such a term as shall be prescribed by law. Although the constitution does provide for electing justices of the peace in towns and cities, it does not prohibit their election in villages, so long as the officer thus elected by a reduced constituency is not in reality a justice of the peace of the town, and exercising in all respects the same jurisdiction. As was said by DENIO, C. J., in Sill v. Village of Corning, supra: ‘The state, as to subjects of a domestic nature, is...