Sinks v. State
| Decision Date | 03 November 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. CACR92-1314,CACR92-1314 |
| Parties | Freddie SINKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Court of Appeals |
W. Scott Davidson, Jonesboro, for appellant.
Cathy Derden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
The appellant was convicted in a bench trial of possession of cocaine. He was placed on three years supervised probation, fined $500.00 and assessed court costs. For reversal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and affirm if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. LaRue v. State, 34 Ark.App. 131, 806 S.W.2d 35 (1991). Substantial evidence is evidence which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other without resort to speculation or conjecture. Kendrick v. State, 37 Ark.App. 95, 823 S.W.2d 931 (1992).
The record reveals that on July 18, 1991, police officers entered a residence in Jonesboro, Arkansas, pursuant to a search warrant. The appellant, who was the only person present in the residence when the warrant was executed, was found lying on a bed in a robe and underwear. The officers testified that a plate with .024 grams of cocaine on it was on the bed within arm's reach of the appellant. This was seized, as were numerous items of drug paraphernalia including hemostats, scales, rolling papers, marijuana seeds, razor blades, a vial, a syringe, and $219.00. One officer testified that the serial numbers on two $20.00 bills found matched those of the bills used in a controlled buy made earlier at this residence.
Nancy Davis testified that the house belonged to her and that the room in which the appellant was found was her bedroom. She stated that she lived in the house with her son and that, although the appellant spent the night at the house occasionally, he was not living there, did not keep clothes there, did not help pay the bills, and did not have a key to the house. She testified that she and the appellant had an argument on the night of the appellant's arrest, that she left the house around midnight, the appellant was the only person in the house when she left, and that there was not a plate on the bed. Finally, she testified that she did not use drugs and that she had never seen the appellant with drugs.
The appellant argues that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he exercised care, control and management over the contraband and that he knew the matter possessed was contraband. His argument focuses on the fact that this was not his residence and that he had no ownership or possessory interest in the house. However, the appellant's argument is misplaced.
It is not necessary to prove actual or physical possession in order to prove a defendant is in possession of a controlled substance. Ramey v. State, 42 Ark.App. 242, 857 S.W.2d 828 (1993). Instead, a showing of constructive possession, which is the control or right to control contraband, is sufficient. Cerda v. State, 303 Ark. 241, 795 S.W.2d 358 (1990). Constructive possession can be implied where the contraband is found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his control. Cerda, supra.
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that the controlled substance was retrieved from an area which was immediately and exclusively accessible to the appellant at the time of his arrest. See Crossley v. State, 304 Ark. 378, 802 S.W.2d 459 (1991); Sanchez v. State, 288 Ark. 513, 707 S.W.2d 310 (1986). The contraband was in plain view, in the appellant's immediate proximity, and the appellant was the only person in the residence at the time of the search. We think these circumstances are enough to permit the trial court to find the appellant guilty of possession of a controlled substance.
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Jones v. State
...as the Arkansas Court of Appeals, have interpreted the usable-amount standard to include weight-based standards. See Sinks v. State, 44 Ark.App. 1, 864 S.W.2d 879 (1993) (holding that 0.024 grams of cocaine was usable because the cocaine was capable of quantitative analysis, could be seen w......
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Costes v. State
...drug, determining it to weigh 4.3 milligrams. While not much, it was usable and, obviously, was measurable. See also Sinks v. State, 44 Ark.App. 1, 864 S.W.2d 879 (1993) (holding that 0.024 grams of cocaine was usable because the cocaine was capable of quantitative analysis, could be seen w......
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Mayo v. State, CA CR 99-268.
...inferred from the circumstances, the evidence was insufficient to permit that inference. We affirmed a conviction in Sinks v. State, 44 Ark.App. 1, 864 S.W.2d 879 (1993). In Sinks, the defendant was the only person in the residence when a search warrant was executed. He was found lying on a......
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Kolb v. State
...a pipe was sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to infer that pieces of that size constituted a usable amount. In Sinks v. State , 44 Ark. App. 1, 864 S.W.2d 879 (1993), we held that 0.024 grams of cocaine was usable because the cocaine was: (1) capable of quantitative analysis, (2) could ......