Sinn v. Board of Selectmen of Acton

• Decision Date: 09 June 1970
• Citation: 259 N.E.2d 557,357 Mass. 606
• Parties: Leroy G. SINN et al. v. BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF ACTION et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 557

259 N.E.2d 557

357 Mass. 606

Leroy G. SINN et al. v. BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF ACTION et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued April 8, 1970.

Decided June 9, 1970.

Harold M. Willcox, Boston (John C. Wyman, Boston, with him), for Paul E. Manchester and others.

Herbert P. Wilkins, Boston, Town Counsel (Jon S. Richardson, Acton, with him), for respondents.

Eugene L. Tougas, Waltham, for Leroy G. Sinn and others.

Before SPALDING, CUTTER, REARDON, and QUIRICO, JJ.

SPALDING, Justice.

This petition for a writ of mandamus challenges a provision in the zoning by-law of the town of Acton (town) which exempts all municipal uses from the use restrictions of its zoning by-law. The case was heard on two stipulations of facts which incorporated numerous exhibits. On the basis of these stipulations the judge made findings of fact and ordered the petition dismissed. The petitioners appealed from judgment of Dismissal. G.L. c. 213, § 1D.

The litigation arises out of steps taken by the town to increase its dumping area and construct public works buildings, offices, and a parking lot in an area zoned for residential and agricultural uses. The existing refuse area, although located in a residential zone, was developed prior to the town's adoption of a zoning by-law in 1953, and thus is not subject to its restrictions. The 1969 town meeting authorized acquisition of a tract of land owned by one Linda Bursaw. The Bursaw tract is located in a residential zone. It abuts Route 2, on the opposite side of which is land zoned for light industrial uses. The town, acting through its selectmen, thereafter acquired the Bursaw land. It now proposes to use a portion of the tract for refuse, and a portion for the construction and use of buildings to house and accommodate facilities and offices for various town departments. The petitioners, all owner-occupants of land abutting the Bursaw tract, brought this petition to compel the selectment to expunge from the town's by-law the provision exempting municipal uses and to enforce the by-law accordingly.

The current zoning by-law of the town provides in § II F: 'Nothing in the by-law shall prohibit the development of any land in any district for Municipal, educational, religious, historical or conservation use. Such use shall not be exempt from the general or specific regulations of this bylaw other than the Use Regulations' (emphasis supplied). The petitioners argue that the town, solely on the basis of this provision, cannot extend the dump area and construct nonresidential uses in a residential area. They insist that this can be done only by rezoning. The case thus presents the question whether a town may exempt all municipal uses from the use restrictions of its zoning by-law.

1. The petitioners contend that the exemption from use regulations for the 'development of * * * land for municipal * * * use' does not encompass the construction of the buildings proposed here. The meaning of 'development,' it is argued, does not include 'construction,' but extends only to those acts done to land that prepare it for construction. In customary usage, 'development' includes the construction of homes or other buildings. The § II F exemptions applies only to use regulations. The so called 'intensity regulations' contained in § V involving setback, height, area and frontage requirements are fully applicable to all municipal uses. The limitation of the exemption granted in § II F to 'use' regulations and the resulting applicability of the 'intensity regulations' imply that 'development' was intended to include the construction of buildings.

2. The principal issue is whether a by-law which exempts all municipal uses from use regulations conflicts with G.L. c. 40A, the zoning enabling act. We know of no cases addressed specifically to this issue. In Sellors v. Town of Concord, 329 Mass. 259, 262--263, 107 N.E.2d 784, there are intimations that exemptions for municipal uses might be proper in certain circumstances, but the precise question now before us was not then squarely presented.

A zoning by-law is valid if there is a substantial relation between it and the furtherance of any of the general objectives of G.L. c. 40A. Lundy v. Town of Wayland, 328 Mass. 581, 583, 105 N.E.2d 378, and cases cited. Cohen v. City of Lynn, 333 Mass. 699, 132 N.E.2d 664. A town may enact zoning restrictions for the purpose of 'promoting the health, safety, convenience, morals or welfare of its inhabitants.' G.L. c. 40A, § 2 (as amended through St.1959, c. 607, § 1). These regulations and restrictions 'shall be designed among other purposes to lessen congestion in the streets; to conserve health; to secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers, * * * to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements * * *.' G.L. c. 40A, § 3. Here, the purposes of the town's by-law were those of §§ 2 and 3, 'to lessen the dangers from fire, congestion and confusion, and to encourage the most appropriate use of land in the town.' 'Every presumption is to be made in favor of the * * * (by-law) unless it is shown beyond reasonable doubt that it conflicts with the enabling act.' Lanner v. Board of Appeal of Tewksbury, 348 Mass. 220, 228, 202 N.E.2d 777. Applying this test, we cannot say that a broad exemption from use requirements for all municipal uses bears no substantial relation to the above mentioned purposes. Clearly, municipal uses per se are substantially related to the general and specific purposes of zoning. Discretion in the town authorities to locate such uses in any district also serves those purposes, for it enables a town conveniently to locate municipal uses in the district most suited to them when the need arises.

The petitioners argue, however, that the indefiniteness...