Sintim v. Larson

• Decision Date: 10 March 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 14–14–00896–CV,14–14–00896–CV
• Citation: 489 S.W.3d 551
• Parties: Quincy K.A. Sintim and Shirley H. Mills n/k/a Shirley H. Sintim, Appellants v. Michele Larson and Brian Larson, Appellees
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

489 S.W.3d 551

Quincy K.A. Sintim and Shirley H. Mills n/k/a Shirley H. Sintim, Appellants

v.Michele Larson and Brian Larson, Appellees

NO. 14–14–00896–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinion filed March 10, 2016

James Okoro Okorafor, Houston, TX, for Appellants.

David W. Showalter, Richmond, TX, for Appellees.

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Busby, and Brown.

OPINION

William J. Boyce, Justice

This appeal arises from efforts to collect on a 2002 default judgment in favor of Michele Larson and Brian Larson, and against Quincy K.A. Sintim and Shirley H. Mills n/k/a Shirley H. Sintim. The Sintims contend on appeal that (1) the underlying default judgment is void or voidable as a matter of law; (2) the default judgment is dormant and the trial court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the post-judgment discovery proceedings; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Sintims to respond to post-judgment discovery and to pay attorney's fees to the Larsons as a sanction. We dismiss for want of jurisdiction the portions of the Sintims' appeal challenging the validity of the default judgment and the trial court's order concerning post-judgment discovery. We affirm the trial court's award of attorney's fees as a sanction.

Background

The Larsons purchased a house from the Sintims in 2001. After the sale, the Larsons allegedly discovered mold in the house and filed suit against the Sintims and various other parties. The Sintims did not file an answer to the lawsuit. After a hearing on damages, the trial court signed a default judgment against the Sintims on December 20, 2002.

The Larsons' claims against the Sintims were severed in January 2003, making the judgment final. Shortly thereafter, the Sintims answered and filed a motion to set aside the judgment or, alternatively, for new trial. The trial court did not rule on the motion, and it was overruled by operation of law. The Sintims did not seek appellate review of the default judgment, nor did they attack the default judgment by bill of review.

The Larsons conducted post-judgment discovery in 2004 and 2010. Just before the 10–year anniversary of the default judgment, the Larsons secured the issuance of a writ of execution and delivered the writ to the constable on November 29, 2012.

The Larsons attempted to conduct additional post-judgment discovery in 2014. After the Larsons filed a motion to compel, the trial court ordered the Sintims to answer the Larsons' post-judgment discovery. The Sintims responded with a motion to quash the discovery in which they contended: the Larsons' 2012 writ of execution was defective; the 2002 default judgment was dormant; and the trial court no longer had subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

The trial court denied the Sintims' motion to quash on October 9, 2014. In a separate order signed October 15, 2014, the trial court again ordered the Sintims to respond to the Larsons' discovery, ordered that any failure to respond would result in contempt proceedings, and ordered the Sintims to pay $3,500 in attorney's fees to the Larsons as a sanction.

The Sintims filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial court's October 9, 2014 and October 15, 2014 orders.

Analysis

On appeal, the Sintims contend that (1) the underlying default judgment is void or voidable as a matter of law; (2) the default judgment is dormant and the trial court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over post-trial discovery proceedings; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Sintims to respond to post-judgment discovery and to pay the Larsons their attorney's fees as a sanction.

I. Validity of 2002 Default Judgment

The Sintims contend that the default judgment is voidable as a matter of law because “[t]he amounts awarded in the judgment were without evidentiary support and remain so at this moment.”¹

The default judgment was signed on December 20, 2002. The Sintims filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, or, alternatively, motion for new trial on January 17, 2003. The trial court did not rule on the motion for new trial, and it was overruled by operation of law 75 days later.

See Tex.R. Civ. P. 329b(c). By their own admission, the Sintims did not appeal the default judgment.² See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1 (if a motion for new trial is timely filed, then the notice of appeal must be filed within 90 days after the judgment is signed). Nor did the Sintims seek to set aside the default judgment by bill of review. See Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 537–38 (Tex.1998) (“A bill of review is an equitable proceeding brought by a party seeking to set aside a prior judgment that is no longer subject to challenge by a motion for new trial or appeal,” and must be filed within four years of the default judgment's rendition.).

Because the Sintims did not timely pursue available means of challenging the default judgment based on sufficiency of the evidence, we lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider their challenge to that judgment in this appeal. See, e.g., Carmona v. Stahely, No. 14–07–00448–CV, 2008 WL 450369, at *1 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 21, 2008, no pet.) (per curiam) (dismissing challenge to default judgment for lack of jurisdiction where no appeal was perfected and a subsequent bill of review proceeding was dismissed for want of prosecution). Accordingly, we dismiss the portion of this appeal challenging the validity of the 2002 default judgment.

II. Trial Court's Post–Judgment Discovery and Sanctions Order

In their remaining issues, the Sintims challenge the trial court's post-judgment jurisdiction and the validity of the trial court's post-judgment discovery order. Specifically, in their second issue the Sintims contend that, even assuming the validity of the default judgment, the Larsons' 2012 writ of execution was defective; as a result, the Sintims contend the default judgment is now dormant³ and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the post-judgment discovery proceedings.⁴ In their third issue, the Sintims contend that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the Larsons their attorney's fees as a sanction “without first determining whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over the issues at hand,” and that, even if the trial court had jurisdiction over the post-judgment discovery proceedings, the trial court's discovery and sanctions orders constituted an abuse of discretion because the discovery ordered was abusive and the attorney's fees awarded were not properly supported by evidence.

Generally, appeals may only be taken from final judgments. Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.2001). Orders made for the purpose of enforcing or carrying into effect an already-rendered judgment generally are not final judgments or decrees, and therefore cannot be appealed. See, e.g., Wagner v. Warnasch, 156 Tex. 334, 295 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1956) ; Walter v. Marathon Oil Corp., 422 S.W.3d 848, 855 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ; Kennedy v. Hudnall, 249 S.W.3d 520, 523 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.). “Even if a trial court signs an interlocutory order that is void for lack of jurisdiction, this court still has no jurisdiction to entertain an interlocutory appeal from that order absent statutory authority.” Young v. Villegas, 231 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).

The interlocutory orders at issue here are not orders for which an interlocutory appeal is authorized.⁵ Accordingly, the Sintims' remedy to challenge both the trial court's continuing jurisdiction to issue post-judgment discovery orders and the terms of the orders themselves ordinarily would be by petition for writ of mandamus. See In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co ., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex.2000) (orig.proceeding) (“Mandamus is proper if a trial court issues an order beyond its jurisdiction.”); In re Thomas, No. 14–10–00001–CV, 2010 WL 183519, at *1 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 21, 2010, orig. proceeding) (mem.op.) (“Some post-judgment orders are final and appealable.... Post-judgment discovery orders may be reviewed by mandamus, however.”); In re Amaya, 34 S.W.3d 354, 356 (Tex.App.—Waco 2001, orig. proceeding) (“[M]andamus is the proper form to obtain a review of a trial court's post judgment discovery order.”).

The Sintims have not filed a petition for writ of mandamus, and they have not requested that we treat their appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 452–54 (Tex.2011) (where party “specifically request[ed] that its appeal be treated as a mandamus petition,” court of appeals instructed to consider appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus); Jones v. Brelsford, 390 S.W.3d 486, 497 n. 7 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (“[I]n an appropriate case, we may treat an appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus, and an appellant who specifically requests that her appeal be treated as a mandamus petition invokes this Court's original jurisdiction. Dianna, however, did not invoke our original jurisdiction because she did not request ... that her issue ... be construed as a request for mandamus relief should this Court determine that the issue is outside the scope of our jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal.”) (citations omitted); In re Estate of Aguilar, 435 S.W.3d 831, 833–34 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (“We also recognize that, in certain circumstances, we may treat an appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. However, to do so, the party seeking appellate review must specifically request that its appeal be treated as a mandamus petition to invoke this court's original jurisdiction.”) (citations omitted). Insofar as review of the challenged orders must occur via mandamus, we cannot entertain the Sintims' contentions.

However, when an order of monetary sanctions is issued as part of post-judgment discovery proceedings, a challenge to the monetary sanctions properly may be...