Sipple v. State
| Decision Date | 09 June 1885 |
| Parties | SIPPLE v. STATE. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
For majority opinion see 1 N.E. 892.
The claim of the respondent arises under the provisions of section 1, c. 321, Laws 1870, which section reads as follows:
‘Jurisdiction is hereby granted to and conferred upon the canal appraisers to hear and determine all claims against the state of any and all personal and corporations for damages alleged to have been sustained by them from the canals of the state, or from their use and management, or resulting or arising from the negligence or conduct of any officer of the state having charge thereof, or resulting or arising from any accident or other matter or thing connected with the canals; but no award shall be made unless the facts proved shall make out a case which would create a legal liability against the state were the same established in a court of justice against an individual or corporation. * * *’
By section 13 of chapter 205 of the Laws of 1883, the board of claims have the same authority to determine claims against the state as the canal appraisers formerly had under the act of 1870. Section 1 of the act of 1870, already cited, embraces damages sustained by reason of the improper use and management of the canals, or from the negligence or conduct of any officer of the state having charge thereof, or resulting or arising from any matter connected with the canals. Negligence is evidently the foundation upon which the claim must be predicated, and, without such negligence, it is difficult to see how any such claim can be maintained before the board of claims. That such was the intention of the legislature is apparent from the succeeding clause in the section cited, which requires that a case should be established of legal liability against the state the same as against an individual or corporation. Without proof of negligence, no remedy exists against the state under the act cited, and the only relief which can properly be claimed is with the legislature. It would seem to follow that the negligence upon which the claim necessarily arises should be the act of some officer, person, or party having the care and management of the canals, and exercising a control over the same or some portion thereof.
The damages for which the award in this case was made arose on the night of the fifth of December, 1882, by reason of a break in the canal caused by the paddle-gates at lock No. 65 not being securely fastended so as to prevent the flow of water into the level between lock 65 and lock 64, and also by the gates at lock 64 not being opened so as to allow the water to be discharged without injuring the banks of the canal.
The first question which arises is whether any negligence is shown on the part of the state for which it is legally liable. The court found ‘that the aforesaid break in said canal was the result of the neglect and want of proper care on the part of the lock-tenders in charge of said lock No. 65, and in leaving said lock without any one in charge thereof.’ The proof upon the trial showed that it was the duty of the lock-tenders to open and close the gates at proper times, and to regulate the height of the water in the adjacent level for the purpose of facilitating the passage of boats. The regulations in regard to the lock-tenders required them to be at the locks alternately, each for 12 hours out of the 24, one coming on at 12 o'clock, noon, and remaining until 12 o'clock, midnight, when he was succeeded by the other lock-tender, there being two at each lock. The lock-tender, Van Keuren, remained at lock 65 on the night in question, until half-past 12, midnight, that being one-half hour longer than his duty required him to remain, and he then left. The other lock-tender did not appear at all to take his place.
It appears there were no boats on the canal at the time, nor had there been any for three or four days prior; that the canal was all frozen over and covered with ice three inches thick, and that boats could not pass with the canal in that condition. Notice had been given by the superintendent of public works that the canal would be formally closed on the seventh of December, and as there was no...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Sipple v. State
...claims should be affirmed.(All concur, except MILLER, J., who reads dissenting opinion, and DANFORTH, J., concurs.) See dissenting opinion, 3 N.E. 657. 1Right to Sue the State.1. STATE OR NATION AND GOVERNMENT DISTINGUISHED. Sovereignty, under God, inheres in the organic people, or the peop......
-
Ferdinand v. Agricultural Ins. Co. of Watertown, N. Y.
...v. Wilson, 70 N.Y. 177 (Ct.App.1877); Wohlfahrt v. Beckert, 92 N.Y. 490 (Ct.App.1883); Sipple v. State, 99 N.Y. 284, 1 N.E. 892, 3 N.E. 657 (Ct.App.1885); Joy v. Diefendorf, 130 N.Y. 6, 28 N.E. 602 (Ct.App.1891). But in Hull v. Littauer, supra, 162 N.Y. 569, 572, 57 N.E. 102 (Ct.App.1900), ......
-
Riddoch v. State
...the state assumes it by statute, which was the basis of the liability in that case. See, also, Sipple v. State, 99 N.Y. 284, 1 N.E. 892, 3 N.E. 657; Splittort v. State, 108 N.Y. 205, 15 N.E. There is no statute whereby this state has assumed a liability for the negligence or misfeasance of ......
-
Litchfield v. Bond
...law, it makes a new rule for itself. Instances of that kind are to be found in Sipple v. State of N. Y., 99 N. Y. 284, 1 N. E. 892,3 N. E. 657, where the Legislature enacted a statute making the state liable for the negligent operation of its canal locks, upon proof that would create a lega......