Sirratt v. State, 5147

• Decision Date: 17 January 1966
• Docket Number: No. 5147,5147
• Citation: 240 Ark. 47,398 S.W.2d 63
• Parties: James SIRRATT, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 63

398 S.W.2d 63

240 Ark. 47

James SIRRATT, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. 5147.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Jan. 17, 1966.

Joe W. McCoy, Malvern, for appellant.

Bruce Bennett, Atty. Gen., by Beryl F. Anthony, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

HARRIS, Chief Justice.

Appellant, James Sirratt, was charged with the crime of murder in the second degree, the Information alleging that Sirratt feloniously, and with malice aforethought, killed and murdered his wife, Geraldine Sirratt. The trial commenced in Hot Spring County on January 18, 1965, and ended on the 20th day of January, 1965. Sometime in the afternoon, on January 19, an altercation took place in the corridor outside the courtroom. The court ordered the courtroom cleared of all spectators, appellant objecting on the basis that he was being deprived of a public trial. The next morning, when the trial resumed, the court again cleared the courtroom. Later in the day, the jury retired and reached its verdict, finding Sirratt guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and fixing his punishment at five years imprisonment in the State Penitentiary. From the judgment so entered, appellant brings this appeal. While appellant lists five points for reversal, all relate to the same issue, which is, 'Was Sirratt denied a public trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 2, Section 10, of the Arkansas Constitution?' ¹ That, then, is the sole issue before us.

Pertinent facts relating to this issue are as follows:

On January 19, while appellant was being cross-examined, the court suddenly called a recess, and retired to chambers where the following proceedings took place:

'The Court: It has come to the attention of the Court there has been a disturbance outside the courtroom. The Court has no way of knowing who was involved, or who started it. In the interest of decorum and in the interest of the courtroom, I believe it will be wise to clear the courtroom. The attorneys may designate the people they feel it is necessary for them to have in the courtroom. The defendant's attorney may designate the ones necessary for his defense.

Mr. McCoy: I object to the courtroom being cleared. I think we are entitled to open court.

The Court: It has been open so long as the trial could be kept under circumstances that did not interrupt the decorum. Because there was a fight immediately outside the courtroom, with a number of persons involved, I have no way to separate all of those who must go and who must stay. The simplest way is to clear the courtroom.

Mr. McCoy: You have about four deputy sheriffs who could be put in the halls to preserve peace, and it hasn't been tried.

Thereupon, proceedings in chambers concluded.

In open court, the Court directed the sheriff to clear the courtroom of spectators, which was immediately done.

Mr. McCoy: Save my exceptions.'

Following this action, a rather lengthy cross-examination of appellant was conducted by the Prosecuting Attorney, after which there was a re-direct examination, following which another witness testified. The court then recessed until 9:00 o'clock the next morning. At that time, in open court, the court stated:

'In light of the difficulty we had yesterday, I am going to have to ask that the courtroom be cleared and ask you not to congregate in the courthouse or on the courthouse grounds. I want to tell you jurors, this is unusual. The events yesterday were unusual. We don't want any trouble, and this is the best way to avoid it.'

Another witness then testified, after which instructions were given, and the case submitted to the jury.

We are aware of only two Arkansas cases on this subject. The first is Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931. There, appellant was tried and convicted of raping a ten-year-old girl, and was sentenced to death by electrocution. Among other assignments of error, the appellant urged that the trial court erred in excluding the public from the courtroom, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to a public trial. This court said:

'* * * Appellant objected to the exclusion of the public from the courtroom on the ground that he was entitled to a public trial under the above constitutional provisions, and that the order of the court clearing the courtroom was an invasion of his constitutional right to a public trial. This objection was overruled, and an exception was taken. The prosecuting witness was then recalled and further examined and gave very damaging testimony against appellant. We cannot agree that he was deprived of a public trial within the meaning of said constitutional provisions. It was apparent to the court and to every one else in the courtroom, and is apparent to us from a reading of her testimony given on the previous day, that she was terribly frightened and embarrassed to have to go upon the witness stand in the presence of a courtroom crowded with people and give testimony that must have been embarrassing and humiliating to her in a high degree. Under this situation she failed to give testimony which the court felt she could give if the embarrassment of the large audience in the courtroom were removed. * * *'

The court then quoted 16 C.J., Page 807, Paragraph 2052, which, in part, states:

'* * * It has also been held under some constitutional or statutory provisions, that in cases where the evidence is of a peculiarly indecent and vulgar character, the court may, in the interest of public morality and decency, exclude from the courtroom all persons except the jurors, witnesses, and others connected with the case, although there are decisions to the contrary.'

The court then quoted from State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7, 104 A.L.R. 430.

'The order was effective only during the testimony of the prosecutrix. ² In view of the nature of the case and the age of the prosecutrix, her embarrassment and disturbance are readily understandable. Under all of the circumstances here appearing, we do not think the court abused its discretion or committed prejudicial error by its ruling, or deprived appellant of a public trial within the meaning of the constitutional provision.'

The other Arkansas case § Payne v. State, 226 Ark. 910, 295 S.W.2d 312. There, appellant complained that he was not allowed a public trial because several Negroes were not allowed to enter the courtroom. Appellant's attorney objected, and the trial judge stated that he saw no vacant seats, and overruled the objection. We held that no error was committed.

But the situations that existed at these trials were considerably different from the situation here presented. In Hogan, a little girl, ten years of age, embarrassed at testifying to revolting and lewd facts before a crowded courtroom, was frightened to the extent that she was a most unsatisfactory witness. As a matter of calming down the child, the trial judge cleared the courtroom for ten minutes. As stated in Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038, 4 L.Ed.2d 989; Page 2139 of 4 L.Ed.2d:

'There is considerable support for the proposition that in prosecutins for sex offenses the circumstances presented may be such as to make exclusion of the public from the trial proper.'

As to Payne, the general rule is found in 21 Am.Jur.2d 301, Section 263:

'The requirement that trials be public is satisfied by admitting those who can conveniently be accommodated in the courtroom, where the law requires such trials to be held, without interrupting the calm and orderly course of justice. The right of a defendant is not infringed by the fact that the courtroom is not large enough to accomodate all who wish to attend.'

It is apparent that in ordering a courtroom cleared for a short period of time to hear evidence of a vile nature, and in prohibiting people from entering a courtroom when where are no vacant seats, a court does not violate a defendant's right to a public trial, but, of course, these situations have no application to the facts of this case.

The purpose of a public trial is succinctly expressed in 21 Am.Jur.2d 298, Section 258, where it is...