Sisk v. White
| Decision Date | 18 June 1937 |
| Docket Number | Civil 3697 |
| Citation | 69 P.2d 242,50 Ariz. 103 |
| Parties | H. R. SISK, Appellant, v. Y. C. WHITE, as Superintendent of Banks of the State of Arizona and Receiver of NOGALES BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, an Insolvent Building and Loan Association, Appellee |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Santa Cruz. Chas. L. Hardy, Judge. Judgment affirmed.
Mr James V. Robins, for Appellant.
Mr. Joe Conway, Attorney General and Mr. Edward P. Cline, his Assistant, for Appellee.
This is an action for a declaratory judgment by H. R. Sisk hereinafter called plaintiff, against Y. C. White hereinafter called defendant, as Superintendent of Banks of the State of Arizona, and ex officio receiver of Nogales Building & Loan Association, an insolvent building and loan association. A general demurrer was interposed to the complaint and sustained by the court, and the plaintiff having elected to stand upon his complaint, judgment was rendered in favor of defendant, whereupon this appeal was taken.
The only question before us is the sufficiency of the complaint. In considering this, we must, of course, assume that all the material facts well pleaded in the complaint are, for the purpose of the demurrer, conceded to be true. We state them as follows: The Nogales Building & Loan Association, hereinafter called the company, was a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Arizona. On May 23, 1934, it was adjudged insolvent by the superior court, and Y. C. White, Superintendent of Banks of the state, was appointed its receiver, and continued to act as such during all the times involved in this proceeding. During the course of the receivership, the creditors were paid in full, and at the time of the commencement of this action, the only unpaid claimants against the assets of the company were the stockholders, who had at that time received 15 per cent. of the amount of their respective claims. Plaintiff was one of the stockholders, holding a claim as such in the amount of $8,891.27 against the company, upon which the 15 per cent. had been paid, there remaining due him something over $7,500. On May 25, 1935, he made an offer to defendant to purchase lots 6, 7, and 8, in block 6 of the North Morley Avenue addition to the city of Nogales, they being assets of the company, for the sum of $1,850.79, payment of said sum to be made by deducting from his unpaid claim against the company the purchase price of the lots.
The defendant answered, stating in substance that the price offered was a fully adequate one for the property, but that he was of the opinion he was prohibited by law from accepting the offer, for the reason that it was, in effect, a trading of assets for a claim, and that the transaction might result in an improper preference of one claimant against other of the same class. He, therefore, refused to accept the proposition, or to report it to the superior court for consideration.
The other allegations of the complaint are, in substance, that the price which plaintiff offered was more than the property was worth, and that the company would have benefited by the transaction in that the claims against it would be reduced by the purchase of the lots, so that the other stockholders would get a larger percentage on their claims than if the offer was rejected. The complaint, however, did not in any manner indicate whether, as a result of the transaction, plaintiff would or would not receive a greater percentage of his claim than other claimants of the same class.
The question before us is whether, under the circumstances above set forth, the receiver had the legal power to trade the assets of the company for claims against it. If he had, we think it was his duty to report the offer to the superior court so that it might be...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Radalj v. Union Savings & Loan Ass'n
...with those who are situated as plaintiff is. 45 Am. Jur. 186; 19 C. J. S. 1291; Fletcher, supra, vol. 16, pp. 279, 589; Sisk vs. White, 50 Ariz. 103; 69 P.2d 242. would have been true also, without taking such legal steps, under the rule in force in most of the jurisdictions, in which it is......
-
Academy Life Ins. Co. v. Odiorne
...Supreme Court has stated, however, that a receiver must consider the respective rights as between claimants. Sisk v. White, 50 Ariz. 103, 106, 69 P.2d 242, 244 (1937). A.R.S. § 20-628(D) gives interested parties the right to object to claims the receiver recommends for payment. We believe t......
-
Hiatt v. Shah
...must consider not only the rights of claimants as against the receivership estate, but also as among themselves. Sisk v. White, 50 Ariz. 103, 106, 69 P.2d 242 (1937). We find that the Receiver met this standard.¶ 16 The Hiatts' claim rights were documented in Receivership Certificate No. 2,......
-
State ex rel. Kingry v. Landmarc Capital Partners, LLC
...rights of the claimants as between them and the corporation, but their respective rights as between themselves." Sisk v. White, 50 Ariz. 103, 106, 69 P.2d 242, 244 (1937). Thus, the Receiver had an obligation not only to notify the Oxford Investors, butalso Partners, of the LCI-Westgate Ope......