Sisquoc Ranch Co. v. Roth, 11096.

• Decision Date: 28 January 1946
• Docket Number: No. 11096.,11096.
• Parties: SISQUOC RANCH CO. et al. v. ROTH, Lt. Col., Infantry, Army of United States.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

153 F.2d 437 (1946)

SISQUOC RANCH CO. et al. v. ROTH, Lt. Col., Infantry, Army of United States.

No. 11096.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

January 28, 1946.

L. K. Vermille, Carl J. Schuck, and Overton, Lyman, Plumb, Prince & Vermille, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

Charles H. Carr, U. S. Atty., James M. Carter and Robert E. Wright, Assts. U. S. Attys., and William Strong, Sp. Asst. to U. S. Atty., all of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

Before DENMAN, STEPHENS and BONE, Circuit Judges.

STEPHENS, Circuit Judge.

The Sisquoc Ranch Company, a corporation, made and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court upon its own behalf, and alleged that the petition was also made and filed upon the behalf of and at the request of Homer Sheldon Green, a registrant under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, sometimes herein referred to as the Act. 54 Stat. 885, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, §§ 301, 302 et seq. It is alleged in the petition that Green is being illegally held by respondent Lt. Col. Max Roth, Army of the United States, and it is prayed that the writ of habeas corpus shall issue and that the court order Green's release from such illegal restraint. Subsequently the petition was amended, but we shall refer to it as amended simply as the petition.

Upon reading the petition, the court issued a show cause order in the usual form, and respondent made his return as follows: That on April 6, 1945, the said Homer Sheldon Green reported at Ft. MacArthur Armed Forces Induction Station pursuant to an Order directing him so to do issued by Local Board No. 144, Santa Barbara County, California, under the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, took the oath for induction into the Army of the United States, and was then and there duly inducted into the Army of the United States and assigned serial number 39743195; that Green was detained only in accordance with the above statement and as a member of the Army of the United States; that he believes Green was inducted "in accordance with the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 and the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto." 54 Stat. 885, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 301 et seq.; Selective Service Regulations (C.C.H. Manpower Law Service, pp. 16041-16111).

Thereafter, upon the hearing of the motion to amend the original petition as aforesaid, counsel for respondent stated that there was no dispute with reference to the facts as alleged in the petition. Whereupon the court announced that there was no necessity for the taking of evidence at a hearing and stated: "It is the opinion of the Court that the petitioner, the employer of the registrant Green, has not claimed exemption and was not entitled to notice, and that the contractual relation of the Ranch Company and the registrant, H. S. Green, did not supersede the general welfare of the nation and did not give the Ranch Company, the employer, a standing contended for by the petitioner."

The court then denied the petition and dissolved the order requiring that Green be held within the jurisdiction of the court. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the following words: "* * * in its own behalf and on behalf of H. S. Green * * *."

It is seen that the court heard the show cause order, accepting as true all of the factual matters stated in the petition. One of the facts alleged is that the petition was filed on behalf of the registrant and at his request. It is not of great moment whether or not the petitioner, a corporation, has itself any standing to petition the district court for habeas corpus on the behalf half of any natural person. As will hereinafter appear, we think it had no standing to so petition in its own behalf. As appears from the stipulation as to facts the habeas corpus petition reached the district court upon the registrant's request and we feel that that is sufficient for its entertainment.¹ The trial court did not make formal findings of fact, probably because under the stipulation formal findings would be, in effect, a restatement of the facts as alleged in the petition, the truth of which had been agreed upon.

Since the facts are agreed upon, we must consider whether or not they show a denial of due process of law.

Green was nineteen or twenty years old when he registered under the Selective Training and Service Act and apparently was qualified in every way for active military duty but was deferred therefrom as an agricultural essential (II-C classification). Some time thereafter, and while so classified and while engaged in the duties for which he was deferred and without previous notice to him or to the Ranch Company, his employer, and without a hearing and without a replacement in his agricultural duties, he was reclassified as I-A, and his induction into the Army followed.

Appellant claims that such action was directly in the face of § 5(k) of the Selective Training and Service Act, commonly known as the Tydings Amendment, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 305(k). The section reads in part as follows: "Every registrant found by a selective service local board, subject to appeal in accordance with section 10(a) (2) 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 310 (a) (2), to be necessary to and regularly engaged in an agricultural occupation or endeavor essential to the war effort, shall be deferred from training and service in the land and naval forces so long as he remains so engaged and until such time as a satisfactory replacement can be obtained * *."

Before the passage of the amendment agricultural workers were given deferments of six months or less, but it is seen by the text of the amendment that the time limitation on the deferment was eliminated and instead the registrant was deferred for "so long as he remains so engaged in agricultural work and until such time as a satisfactory replacement can be obtained." (There are other conditions to the deferment not material here.)

To understand the amendment it must be read as an integral part of the complete Selective Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 301 et seq. and with § 10(a) (2) thereof in mind. The section reads in part 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 310(a) (2): "The President may prescribe rules and regulations to create and establish a Selective Service System, and shall provide for the classification of registrants * * *. There shall be created one or more local boards draft boards * * *. Such local boards, under rules and regulations prescribed by the President, shall have power * * * to hear and determine, subject to the right of appeal to the appeal boards herein authorized all questions or claims with respect to inclusion for, or exemption of deferment from, training and service under this Act of all individuals within the jurisdiction of such local boards. The decisions of such local boards shall be final except where an appeal is authorized and is taken in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe * * *."

The amendment, as we have said, must take its place in and as a part of the Act. It does not refer alone to reclassification but covers original classification as well. It is not a special provision of the Act commanding that once a registrant has been deferred for agricultural work the board is without power to take him out of such classification until the job is finished or a substitute is at hand. The power is still in the board to decide whether or not the agricultural work at any given time is essential. Unless it is clear that the board has not considered the problem of essentiality, it is subject to no court review of any kind. Thus it is seen that the procedure for reclassification is but the repetition of the procedure in the original classification. The problems for the board are the...