People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery
| Decision Date | 04 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | 518336. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of The State of New York ex rel. The NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC., on Behalf of Tommy, Appellant, v. Patrick C. LAVERY, Individually and as an Officer of Circle L Trailer Sales, Inc., et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Elizabeth Stein, New Hyde Park, and Steven M. Wise, admitted pro hac vice, Coral Springs, Florida, for appellant.
Before: PETERS, P.J., LAHTINEN, GARRY, ROSE and LYNCH, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (J. Sise, J.), entered December 18, 2013 in Fulton County, which denied petitioner's application for an order to show cause to commence a CPLR article 70 proceeding.
The subject of this litigation is a chimpanzee, known as Tommy, that is presently being kept by respondents on their property in the City of Gloversville, Fulton County. On behalf of Tommy, petitioner sought an order to show cause to commence a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 on the ground that Tommy was being unlawfully detained by respondents. In support, petitioner submitted the affidavits of several experts in an effort to establish that, in general, chimpanzees have attributes sufficient to consider them “persons” for the purposes of their interest in personal autonomy and freedom from unlawful detention. Collectively, these submissions maintain that chimpanzees exhibit highly complex cognitive functions—such as autonomy, self-awareness and self-determination, among others—similar to those possessed by human beings. Following an ex parte hearing, Supreme Court found that the term “person” under CPLR article 70 did not include chimpanzees and issued a judgment refusing to sign an order to show cause. Petitioner appeals.1 2
This appeal presents the novel question of whether a chimpanzee is a “person” entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus. Notably, we have not been asked to evaluate the quality of Tommy's current living conditions in an effort to improve his welfare. In fact, petitioner's counsel stated at oral argument that it does not allege that respondents are in violation of any state or federal statutes respecting the domestic possession of wild animals (see e.g.ECL 11–0512 ). According to petitioner, while respondents are in compliance with state and federal statutes, the statutes themselves are inappropriate. Yet, rather than challenging any such statutes, petitioner requests that this Court enlarge the common-law definition of “person” in order to afford legal rights to an animal. We decline to do so, and conclude that a chimpanzee is not a “person” entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus.
The common law writ of habeas corpus, as codified by CPLR article 70, provides a summary procedure by which a “person” who has been illegally imprisoned or otherwise restrained in his or her liberty can challenge the legality of the detention (CPLR 7002[a] ). The statute does not purport to define the term “person,” and for good reason. The “Legislature did not intend to change the instances in which the writ was available,” which has been determined by “the slow process of decisional accretion” (People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 18 N.Y.2d 257, 263, 273 N.Y.S.2d 897, 220 N.E.2d 653 [1966] ) [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). Thus, we must look to the common law surrounding the historic writ of habeas corpus to ascertain the breadth of the writ's reach.
Not surprisingly, animals have never been considered persons for the purposes of habeas corpus relief, nor have they been explicitly considered as persons or entities capable of asserting rights for the purpose of state or federal law (see e.g. Lewis v. Burger King, 344 Fed.Appx. 470, 472 [10th Cir.2009], cert. denied 558 U.S. 1125, 130 S.Ct. 1083, 175 L.Ed.2d 907 [2010] ; Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1178 [9th Cir.2004] ; Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entertainment, Inc., 842 F.Supp.2d 1259, 1263 [S.D.Cal.2012] ; Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium, 836 F.Supp. 45, 49–50 [D.Mass 1993] ). Petitioner does not cite any precedent-and there appears to be none-in state law, or under English common law, that an animal could be considered a “person” for the purposes of common-law habeas corpus relief. In fact, habeas corpus relief has never been provided to any nonhuman entity (see e.g. United States v. Mett, 65 F.3d 1531, 1534 [9th Cir.1995], cert. denied 519 U.S. 870, 117 S.Ct. 185, 136 L.Ed.2d 124 [1996] ; Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138, 139–140 [7th Cir.1980], cert. denied 449 U.S. 1060, 101 S.Ct. 782, 66 L.Ed.2d 603 [1980] ; Sisquoc Ranch Co. v. Roth, 153 F.2d 437, 441 [9th Cir.1946] ; Graham v. State of New York, 25 A.D.2d 693, 693, 267 N.Y.S.2d 1009 [1966] ).
The lack of precedent for treating animals as persons for habeas corpus purposes does not, however, end the inquiry, as the writ has over time gained increasing use given its “great flexibility and vague scope” (People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 18 N.Y.2d at 263, 273 N.Y.S.2d 897, 220 N.E.2d 653 ) [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). While petitioner proffers various justifications for affording chimpanzees, such as Tommy, the liberty rights protected by such writ, the ascription of rights has historically been connected with the imposition of societal obligations and duties. Reciprocity between rights and responsibilities stems from principles of social contract, which inspired the ideals of freedom and democracy at the core of our system of government (see Richard L. Cupp Jr., Children, Chimps, and Rights: Arguments From “Marginal” Cases, 45 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 12–14 [2013] ; Richard L. Cupp Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A Legal/ Contractualist Critique, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 27, 69–70 [2009] ; see also Matter of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20–21, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 [1967] ; United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1093–1094 [9th Cir.1995], cert. denied 516 U.S. 1092, 116 S.Ct. 813, 133 L.Ed.2d 759 [1996] ). Under this view, society extends rights in exchange for an express or implied agreement from its members to submit to social responsibilities. In other words, “ rights [are] connected to moral agency and the ability to accept societal responsibility in exchange for [those] rights” (Richard L. Cupp Jr., Children, Chimps, and Rights: Arguments From “Marginal” Cases, 45 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 13 [2013] ; see Richard L. Cupp Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A Legal/Contractualist Critique, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 27, 69 [2009] ).
Further, although the dispositive inquiry is whether chimpanzees are entitled to the right to be free from bodily restraint such that they may be deemed “persons” subject to the benefits of habeas corpus, legal personhood has consistently been defined in terms of both rights and duties. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term “person” as “[a] human being” or, as relevant here, “[a]n entity (such as a corporation) that is recognized by law as having the rights and duties [of] a human being” (emphasis added). It then goes on to provide:
(Black's Law Dictionary [7th ed. 1999], citing John Salmond, Jurisprudence 318 [10th ed. 1947]; see John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law [2d ed.], ch. II, at 27 [] ).
Case law has always recognized the correlative rights and duties that attach to legal personhood (see e.g. Smith v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 2013 Ark. 502, 431 S.W.3d 200, 203–204 [Ark.2013], citing Calaway v. Practice Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2010 Ark. 432, *4 [2010] []; Wartelle v. Women's & Children's Hosp., 704 So.2d 778, 780 [La.1997] [...
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