Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2015–181–Appeal.,2015–181–Appeal.
• Citation: 140 A.3d 124
• Parties: Bennie SISTO, as the Trustee of Goat Island Realty Trust v. AMERICA CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

140 A.3d 124

Bennie SISTO, as the Trustee of Goat Island Realty Trust

v.AMERICA CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.

No. 2015–181–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 29, 2016.

Robert D. Wieck, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiff.

Robert C. Shindell, Esq., C. Alexander Chiulli, Esq., Providence, and Edmund A. Allcock, Esq., for Defendants.

Present: GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice INDEGLIA

, for the Court.

The saga continues between the plaintiff, Bennie Sisto (Sisto or plaintiff), and the defendants, America Condominium Association, Inc., and the members of its executive board, (collectively, defendants). This time, the plaintiff appeals the Superior Court's award of $8,924.60 to the defendants for their attorney's fees incurred in defending the plaintiff's claim on appeal pursuant to Rhode Island's strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) statute, G.L. 1956 chapter 33 of title 9. This matter came before the Supreme Court on February 25, 2016, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised should not be summarily decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the memoranda submitted on behalf of the parties, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown. Accordingly, we shall decide the matters at this time without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

Setting the various nuances and nitty-gritty details of this seemingly never-ending case aside, the facts essential to the instant appeal are as follows.¹ The plaintiff owns a condominium unit within the Goat Island South (GIS) condominium community. In 2006, he filed an application with the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) seeking to expand his unit. The defendants filed an objection to his proposal, asserting, inter alia, that plaintiff did not own the property upon which he sought to expand his unit and that his proposal failed to comply with certain CRMC requirements. As a result of this objection and other correspondence with defendants, the CRMC questioned whether plaintiff owned the land he sought to expand upon and denied his application.

In March 2008, plaintiff took his grievances to the courthouse and filed a complaint in Newport County Superior Court alleging slander of title and breach of contract and seeking a declaratory judgment that he had the right to file an application with the CRMC to expand his unit. Not to be outdone, defendants moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that our anti-SLAPP statute protected them from any liability for questioning plaintiff's ownership of the land in their communications with the CRMC. The trial justice granted defendants' partial summary judgment motion; and, in accordance with § 9–33–2(d) of the anti-SLAPP statute, awarded defendants $9,685.31 in attorney's fees. The plaintiff appealed to this Court, and we affirmed the Superior Court's grant of the partial summary judgment motion in favor of defendants on the anti-SLAPP claim.²

Sisto v. America Condominium Association, Inc., 68 A.3d 603, 617 (R.I.2013)

. Following that opinion, defendants filed an amended motion for an assessment of attorney's fees in Superior Court seeking to recover $29,748.65 incurred in defending the anti-SLAPP judgment on appeal.³

In that proceeding, the hearing justice first issued a decision in which he determined that the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear defendants' motion, rejecting plaintiff's myriad contentions to the contrary. The hearing justice then issued a subsequent decision awarding defendants $8,924.60 in attorney's fees in connection with the appeal. Final judgment was entered on April 30, 2015. The plaintiff filed a timely appeal.⁴

IIIssues on Appeal

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the hearing justice erred when he determined that the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendants' motion for assessment for attorney's fees. He also posits that the fees awarded to defendants were unreasonable. We discuss the specifics of his quarrels below.

IIIDiscussion

To begin, we sketch a brief overview of attorney's fees as they relate to the anti-SLAPP statute. Section 9–33–2(d)

provides: “If the court grants the motion asserting the immunity established by this section, * * * the court shall award the prevailing party costs and reasonable attorney's fees, including those incurred for the motion and any related discovery matters.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, in Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743, 757 (R.I.2004), we held that when a party prevails under the anti-SLAPP statute, “an award of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees [is] mandatory.” We have also stated that the statutorily mandated fees include those in connection with an appeal “for the defense of [such] judgment.” Karousos v. Pardee, 992 A.2d 263, 273 (R.I.2010). This statutory authority results in a deviation from our otherwise “staunch adherence to the ‘American rule’ that requires each litigant to pay its own attorney's fees * * *.” Moore v. Ballard, 914 A.2d 487, 489 (R.I.2007) (citing Eleazer v. Ted Reed Thermal, Inc., 576 A.2d 1217, 1221 (R.I.1990) ).

The plaintiff does not dispute that defendants “prevailed” under the anti-SLAPP statute, both in the Superior Court and on appeal. Thus, under our case law, an award of reasonable attorney's fees in defendants' favor—including those incurred in connection with defending the judgment on appeal—is mandatory. The plaintiff nevertheless attacks the award both as to its propriety and reasonableness.

A. Propriety of the Award of Attorney's Fees

Whether the issue of attorney's fees was properly before the Superior Court is a threshold matter in this appeal, so we address this issue first.

i. The Mandate Rule

The plaintiff's most tenable argument is that the Superior Court improperly deviated from our mandate in Sisto, 68 A.3d at 617

, by awarding defendants attorney's fees because the mandate provided no such direction.

“The ‘mandate rule’ can be summarized as follows:

‘When a case has been once decided by this court on appeal, and remanded to the [Superior Court], whatever was before this court, and disposed of by its decree, is considered as finally settled. The [Superior Court] is bound by the decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution according to the mandate. That court cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose than execution; or give any other or further relief; or review it, even for apparent error, upon any matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded. * * * But the [Superior Court] may consider and decide any matters left open by the mandate of this court.’ ” Pleasant Management, LLC v. Carrasco, 960 A.2d 216, 223 (R.I.2008)

(quoting United States v. Thrasher, 483 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir.2007) ).

Our mandate in Sisto , 68 A.3d at 617

, stated, in relevant part, “we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court * * * with respect to Sisto's standing to file the application for expansion with the CRMC, as well as with respect to the anti-SLAPP issue. * * * The papers may be remanded to the Superior Court.” The mandate makes no mention of attorney's fees in connection with that appeal because that issue was not before us. Nevertheless, the fact that we did not explicitly mention attorney's fees in the mandate did not preclude the Superior Court from subsequently awarding defendants attorney's fees incurred in defending the judgment on appeal. See

Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California , 399 U.S. 222, 223, 90 S.Ct. 1989, 26 L.Ed.2d 534 (1970). Indeed, the assessment of attorney's fees is best handled by the Superior Court. See

Keystone Elevator Co. v. Johnson & Wales University, 850 A.2d 912, 920 (R.I.2004) (noting that “[t]he trial justice is in the unique position of observing the attorneys requesting the fees and is better able to judge the merits of a particular request.”). Because it was silent with regard to attorney's fees—which, we reiterate, are mandatory under § 9–33–2(d) —our mandate left the determination of the proper award of fees to the Superior Court. See

Perkins, 399 U.S. at 223, 90 S.Ct. 1989. Therefore, the Superior Court did not vary from our mandate when it considered defendants' motion for appellate attorney's fees.⁵

ii. Res Judicata

Battling on, plaintiff also argues that the doctrine of res judicata barred the Superior Court from entertaining defendants' motion for attorney's fees. However, res judicata is not applicable to the case at hand because that doctrine bars the relitigation of issues in a second cause of action.

Torrado Architects v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 102 A.3d 655, 658 (R.I.2014)

. Here, no second cause of action has been filed. Rather, the original cause of action remains ongoing. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata is inapposite.⁶

B. Reasonableness of the Fees

The plaintiff next argues that the Superior Court erroneously awarded defendants attorney's fees because they failed to submit sufficient documentation to substantiate their request. Specifically, he contends that the records submitted by defendants did not identify the hours expended on the anti-SLAPP claim versus the other issues on appeal and may have been duplicative. Thus, plaintiff contends that the hearing justice abused his discretion by arbitrarily awarding defendants $8,924.60 in fees.

This Court reviews an award of attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion. Pearson v. Pearson, 11 A.3d 103, 108 (R.I.2011)

(citing Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island v. Najarian, 911 A.2d 706, 709 (R.I.2006) ). “It is well within the authority of the trial justice to make an attorneys' fee award determination after considering the circumstances of the case.” Keystone Elevator Co. v. Johnson & Wales University, 850 A.2d 912, 920 (R.I.2004) (citing Schroff, Inc. v....