Sizemore v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 17 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:19-cv-555 |
| Parties | LESLIE SIZEMORE, Plaintiff, v. EDGEWOOD BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Amy Ashcraft, Beth Benjamin, Gary Gabbard, Jim Wirtley, Tom York (the "Board Members"), David Slamer ("Principal Slamer"), and the Edgewood Board of Education's (the "Board") Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. ("Partial Motion," Doc. 24). (These Defendants are collectively referred to as the "School Defendants," and the subset of the School Defendants consisting of the individual Board Members and the Principal are collectively referred to as the "Individual School Defendants."). The only other Defendant, Daniel Benjamin, previously answered (see Doc. 23) and does not join this Partial Motion. This Court heard oral arguments on this Partial Motion, at Plaintiff's request, on March 4, 2020. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Partial Motion.
The allegations in this case, taken from the Second Amended Complaint, stem from the alleged sexual harassment that Leslie Sizemore ("Sizemore"), a janitor at Edgewood Middle School, suffered at the hands of Daniel Benjamin ("Benjamin"), a fellow janitor. (. Sizemore alleges that, throughout her employment, from May 24, 2016, through August 10, 2018, Benjamin would frequently text her lewd, offensive, and threatening messages and make obscene gestures in her direction. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 21-22, 41, #204, 207). She claims that, starting "[i]n or about September of 2017 and continuing throughout her employment," she reported this conduct to her supervisor, Teresa Lewis, who is not named in this action. (Id. at ¶ 26, #205). Sizemore also alleges that she "repeatedly informed Defendant Board and Teresa Lewis that she did not want to work with Mr. Benjamin," but, unlike her allegation as to Lewis, she does not allege that she told the Board (or any of its members) of Benjamin's purported misconduct. (Id. at ¶ 38, #206-07). That is, she does not allege that she told any Board member why she did not want to work with Benjamin.
Sizemore also alleges that, sometime around "Nov [sic] of 2017," she received a report from Student B about potential misconduct by Benjamin, specifically that he took a photo of Student A with his cell phone and made a "comment ... to be of a sexual nature based on its intonation." (SAC at ¶¶ 30-31, #205-06). She reported thistoo, to Teresa Lewis, Principal Slamer, and Assistant Principal Ruether. (Id. at ¶ 32, #206). Shortly thereafter, all the parties met, along with Student B's parents. (Id. at ¶ 33). Ultimately, Sizemore learned that the parents declined to pursue the matter. (Id. at ¶ 37). Sizemore also alleges, with no supporting facts, that school officials "failed to inform the Police or Sheriff" about any of this. (Id. at ¶ 36).
In addition to the conduct described above that allegedly occurred "throughout her employment," Sizemore further alleges that, on one occasion in July 2018, Benjamin sexually assaulted her in a supply closet while the two were getting cleaning supplies. (SAC at ¶¶ 38-39, #206-07). Sizemore asserts that, on August 10, 2018, she notified "Defendant's Human Resource [sic] Department" of that incident of sexual harassment. (Id. at ¶ 42, #207). After informing Human Resources, Sizemore left the school building and she never returned to work. (Id. at ¶ 43). Instead, she sued the Board, the Board Members (solely in their official capacities), Principal Slamer (solely in his official capacity), and Benjamin.
After Sizemore filed her initial Complaint (Doc. 1), she amended it (Doc. 2), and the School Defendants responded by filing their first Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11). Sizemore amended her Complaint again, this time with leave of court. (Doc. 21). Based on the same core facts, but with a few additions,2 Sizemore reasserted the same three claims as before, which are the claims relevant to the instant Motion.
First, in Count I of her Second Amended Complaint, Sizemore alleges Title VII and Ohio Revised Code Chapter 41 violations against the School Defendants, i.e., the Board, the Board Members (in their official capacities), and Principal Slamer (in his official capacity), asserting discrimination based on sex and sexual harassment. (SAC at ¶¶ 52-54, #208-09). Then, for Count II, she alleges another Title VII and Ohio Revised Code Chapter 41 violation, against those same defendants (in those same capacities), for retaliation and "constructive discharge." (Id. at ¶¶ 55-58, #209). Last, in Count III, Sizemore asserts that "Defendant Edgewood Schools," acting under color of state law, violated her constitutional rights, for which she seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at ¶¶ 59-71, #210-11).3
The School Defendants responded to the Second Amended Complaint by filing a second Partial Motion to Dismiss. (Defs.' Second Partial Mot. ( ), Doc. 24. In it, the individuals who are part of this group make six arguments: (1) Title VII does not impose individual official-capacity liability on them (an argument that they raise both as to the sex discrimination claim (Count I) and the retaliation claim (Count II)); (2) they are not liable as individuals in their official capacities for discrimination under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 41; (3) the Title VII retaliation claim against them fails on the merits; (4) the state law retaliation claim against them fails on the merits; (5) naming them in the § 1983 claim in their officialcapacity was duplicative of the claim against the Board, and thus should be dismissed; and (6) the § 1983 official-capacity claim against them should be dismissed. (Id. at #238-39). They further argue that Sizemore's failure to respond to arguments one, two, and four in her response (Defs.' Reply, Doc. 18), to the initial motion to dismiss (Doc. 11), means she has not met her burden as to those arguments. (Defs.' Partial Mot. at #239). For its part, the remaining School Defendant, i.e., the Board, separately argues that three of the claims against it should be dismissed, namely: (1) the Title VII retaliation/constructive discharge claim (Count II), (2) the state law retaliation/constructive discharge claim (the remaining aspect of Count II), and (3) the § 1983 claim. (Id.).4
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a cause of action for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Such a motion "is a test of the plaintiff's cause of action as stated in the complaint, not a challenge to the plaintiff's factual allegations." Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 958-59 (6th Cir. 2005). Therefore, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). But a pleading must offer more than mere "labels and conclusions," because "'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Jones v. Montgomery Cty. Dep't of Jobs & Family Servs., No. 3:18-cv-37, 2020 WL 529297 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2020).
Instead, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); White v. Coventry Health & Life Ins. Co., 680 F. App'x 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2017). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level" into the "realm of plausible liability." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In the discrimination context, a plaintiff is not required to prove a prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss. See Swierkiewciz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (); Jackson v. Crosset Co., 33 F. App'x 761, 762 (6th Cir. 2002) (). In fact, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a Title VII complaint is subject to any kind of heightened pleading standard, because this would "too narrowly constric[t] the role of the pleadings." Swierkiewciz, 534 U.S. at 511 (quotation omitted). Instead,"the ordinary rules for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint apply." Id. This does not mean the pleading rules are lessened, though, either. See Smith v. Wrigley Mfg. Co., LLC, 749 F. App'x 446, 449 (6th Cir. 2018) (). While true that Sizemore's Second Amended Complaint "need not present detailed factual allegations, it must allege sufficient factual content from which a court, informed by its judicial experience and common sense, could draw the reasonable inference that [the defendants] discriminated against [Sizemore] with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of her ... sex[.]" See Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609-10 (6th Cir. 2012) (quotations and citations omitted).
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