Sizer v. Oshinnaiye
| Decision Date | 17 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. ELH-19-569 |
| Parties | VANESSA SIZER, Plaintiff, v. BAYO OSHINNAIYE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Self-represented plaintiff Vanessa Sizer filed suit on February 22, 2019, against defendants Bayo Oshinnaiye, Bertha Okere-Ford, Michele Michael, and Freedom Mortgage Corporation ("Freedom Mortgage"). ECF 1 (the "Complaint"). The suit concerns an alleged "fraudulent mortgage contract" with respect to her home in Hanover, Maryland. Id. at 7. Although the Complaint is largely unintelligible, plaintiff appears to allege intentional infliction of emotional distress, deficient disclosures, and violations of "the Consumer Protection Act," the "uniform commercial Code CFR 42. 1001.1101," "RICO Law 1341," and the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. ECF 1; see also ECF 1-8. Sizer also seeks to quiet title to her property. ECF 1 at 8. Plaintiff appended numerous exhibits to her suit, in excess of 250 pages. ECF 1-1 to ECF 1-9.
Subject matter jurisdiction appears to be predicated on diversity of citizenship. ECF 1 at 4. But, as noted, Sizer also asserts a constitutional claim and violations of several federal laws. Id. at 7; ECF 1-8 at 1.
Two of the three individual defendants responded to the suit. See ECF 17; ECF 18. They are self-represented.
Freedom Mortgage has moved to dismiss, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF 15. The motion is supported by a memorandum (ECF 15-1) (collectively, the "Motion") and several exhibits. ECF 15-3 to ECF 15-7. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. ECF 16; ECF 19 (collectively, the "Opposition"). Ms. Sizer also filed a submission docketed at ECF 30. Freedom Mortgage did not reply, and the time to do so has expired. See Docket.
The Court is mindful that plaintiff is self represented. Therefore, her submissions shall be liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)); see White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, liberal construction does not mean that a court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) ().
Indeed, "'even pro se litigants [must] state their claims in a[n] understandable and efficient manner.'" Plumhoff v. Central Mortgage Co., 286 F. Supp. 3d, 699, 702 (D. Md. 2017) (alterations in Plumhoff) (quoting Stone v. Warfield, 184 F.R.D. 553, 555 (D. Md. 1999)). A district court "is not obliged to ferret through a Complaint, searching for viable claims." Wynn-Bey v. Talley, RWT-12-3121, 2012 WL 5986967, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 28, 2012). Therefore, a court "may dismiss a complaint that is 'so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.'" Id. (quoting Salhuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir.1988)).
No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow. I shall grant the Motion. However, in view of plaintiff's pro se status, I shall afford her an opportunity to amend.
In November 2013 Sizer and Chicquette H. Myers executed the mortgage in issue for their home, located on Fairbanks Drive in Hanover. ECF 1 at 7; ECF 1-1 at 2-4. Plaintiff alleges that "all parties involved" acted "intentionally" to defraud her. Id. According to Sizer, the "Real Estate Broker," Oshinnaiye, "failed to disclose detailed information concerning Ms. Sizer's mortgage contract . . ." and "certain pages of the contract [were] not signed/notarized by all parties involved in this contract." Id. Claiming that all of the documents were not recorded together, Sizer alleges that the mortgage is "null and void." Id. She also complains that her "fraudulent contract" was sold to Freedom Mortgage, but she was not "told about the pooling and servicing agreement" or her rights under several federal statutes. Id. In addition, Sizer asserts that "the contract wasn't recorded right away until a few weeks later in April 2014. . ." Id. And, she states: "In 1933, the federal united sates [sic] hypothecated ALL of present and FUTURE PROPERTIES, assets and labor of their SUBJECTS 'the 14th amendment U.S. citizen to the Federal Reserve System." Id. at 8.
In the Complaint, Sizer identifies herself as a citizen of Maryland. ECF 1 at 4. She does not provide the citizenship of any of the defendants. But, according to plaintiff, all three individual defendants reside in Maryland.
Both plaintiff and Freedom Mortgage submitted a copy of the fee simple deed to the property in question, executed November 14, 2013. ECF 1-1 at 2-4; ECF 15-3. It is in the nameof Myers and Sizer, as tenants by the entirety. Id. The deed was signed by the grantors and a notary public. Id. at 2. Freedom Mortgage also submitted a copy of the promissory note executed by Sizer and Myers on November 20, 2013, in favor of Freedom Mortgage as lender, in the amount of $338,751.00, with interest at 4% per annum. ECF 15-4. In addition, Freedom Mortgage submitted the Deed of Trust, recorded in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, reflecting that Sizer and Myers borrowed the principal sum of $338,751.00 from Freedom Mortgage to fund the purchase of the property. ECF 15-5. It was signed by Sizer and Myers on November 20, 2013. Id. at 7-8.
Further, Freedom Mortgage submitted a second promissory note signed by Sizer and Myers, dated May 6, 2016. ECF 15-6. It reflects a reduced principal loan balance owed to Freedom Mortgage, in the sum of $328,824.00, as well as a reduced yearly interest rate of 3.25%. And, a corresponding Deed of Trust, signed by the borrowers, was recorded. ECF 15-7.
In her Opposition, Sizer launches a bevy of claims based on the statute of frauds and the Uniform Commercial Code. ECF 19, ¶¶ 4, 5, 10. She also reiterates her RICO claim. Id. ¶ 9.
Additional facts are included, infra.
A challenge to a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) raises the issue of "whether the court has the competence or authority to hear and decide the case." Davis v. Thompson, 367 F. Supp. 2d 792, 799 (D. Md. 2005); see generally Fort Bend Co. v. Davis, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2019) ( the term "jurisdiction"). Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. SeeDemetres v. East West Const., Inc., 776 F.3d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Durden v. United States, 736 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2013); Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).
A test of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may proceed "in one of two ways": either a facial challenge, asserting that the allegations pleaded in the complaint are insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction, or a factual challenge, asserting "'that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true.'" Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); accord Durden v. United States, 736 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2013).
In a facial challenge, "the facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true, and the motion must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction." Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192. On the other hand, in a factual challenge, "the district court is entitled to decide disputed issues of fact with respect to subject matter jurisdiction." Id. In that circumstance, the court "may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Velasco v. Gov't of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004); see also United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347-48 (4th Cir. 2009); Evans, 166 F.3d at 647.
Here, Freedom Mortgage makes a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. It argues that the facts in Sizer's Complaint are insufficient to support subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of either diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction.
A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4thCir. 2010), aff'd sub nom., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with "fair notice" of the claims and the "grounds" for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
To survive a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted) ("Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions' . . . ."); see also Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2019); Willner v. Dim...
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