Skaggs Chiropractic, L.L.C. v. Ford
Decision Date | 05 June 2018 |
Docket Number | No. SD 35234,SD 35234 |
Parties | SKAGGS CHIROPRACTIC, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rose FORD, Defendant-Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
DAVID F. BARRETT, Jefferson City, Mo, for Appellant.
SHELLY C. DREYER, Joplin, Mo, for Respondent.
Skaggs Chiropractic, L.L.C. ("Provider") appeals the judgment entered after a trial de novo of a small-claims case. The judgment was "rendered in favor of" Rose Ford ("Patient") in regard to Provider’s claim for $5,135.56 in chiropractic services that Provider rendered to Patient for injuries she suffered in a motor vehicle collision.
In the judgment, the trial court found that Provider’s trial exhibit 3 (titled "ASSIGNMENT, LIEN, AND AUTHORIZATION [,]" ("the UCC lien") ) was "superseded by the medical lien statute, [s]ection 430.225" as another judge had previously ruled in Patient’s separate personal injury suit against the driver of the other vehicle ("the personal injury case").1 When that previous ruling was made, Provider attempted to appeal it. We dismissed the appeal on the ground "that the ‘judgment’ " from May 2016 in the personal injury case was "not a final, appealable judgment" because "the judgment appear[ed] to dispose only of [Patient’s] ‘Motion for Determination of Liens ["lien determination motion"].’ " Ford v. Bridwell , No. SD34442 (Mo. App. S.D. Jan. 9, 2017).2
In the instant case, although the trial court found that Provider’s "care was necessary, ... the amount billed was fair and reasonable[,]" and "the medical lien is less than the amount billed[,]" it nonetheless "decline[d] to" enter any judgment for Provider because it would "be inconsistent with the result in the [personal injury] case." Provider’s first point asserts that "[t]he trial court erred in declining to grant judgment for the full amount of [Provider’s] bill, because the services rendered were necessary and the bill was fair and reasonable[.]" Provider’s second point claims the trial court erred "in determining that the decision in another case was binding in this matter, because the decision in that case is not a final judgment[.]"
Finding merit in Provider’s claim that the interlocutory "judgment" in the personal injury case did not require the outcome here, we reverse and remand the case with instructions to stay or dismiss the instant case without prejudice.
We will affirm the judgment in a bench-tried case "unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law." Rowan v. Coves N. Homes Ass'n , 426 S.W.3d 725, 727 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014).
As relevant to the circumstances of this case, the medical lien statute provides that a " ‘[c ]laim ’ ... [is] a claim of a patient for: (a) Damages from a tort-feasor; or (b) Benefits from an insurance carrier[.]" Section 430.225.1(1). A " ‘[p ]atient ’ ... [is] any person to whom a[n] ... other institution delivers treatment, care or maintenance for sickness or injury caused by a tort-feasor from whom such person seeks damages or any insurance carrier which has insured such tort-feasor." Section 430.225.1(6). The term " ‘[o ]ther institution ’ " means "a legal entity existing pursuant to the laws of this state which delivers treatment, care, or maintenance to patients who are sick or injured[.]" Section 430.225.1(5).
Section 430.225.3. The final paragraph of the medical lien statute provides: "Any health care provider electing to receive benefits hereunder releases the claimant from further liability on the cost of the services and treatment provided to that point in time." Section 430.225.5.
Provider filed the instant case in June 2017. The petition averred that Patient owed $5,135.56 for chiropractic care and "the cost of [Patient’s] care is covered by a UCC Lien[.]" The relief sought was "the cost of [Patient’s] care to the maximum under Missouri law governing small-claims actions, plus court cost." The associate circuit judge hearing the matter sustained Patient’s subsequent motion to dismiss the case, and Provider timely sought a trial de novo. See section 482.365 and Rule 151.01. When the case was assigned to the circuit court, Patient again moved to dismiss Provider’s petition on the ground that the personal injury case was "currently ... pending[,]" the personal injury court had ruled "that the lien amount due to [Provider] is $2083.66[,]" Provider filed the instant action "to attempt to circumvent the [personal injury] court’s prior ruling[,]" and Provider’s claim was "barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel[.]"
At the October 2017 trial de novo , the parties' attorneys agreed that: (1) Patient suffered injuries as a result of a motor vehicle accident; (2) Provider rendered chiropractic services to Patient to treat those injuries; (3) Provider had not been paid by Patient; and (4) the personal injury case was still pending. Provider’s "account statement" was admitted into evidence, and it reflected $4,032.56 in charges and $9.56 in sales tax. Patient’s counsel agreed that Provider had not formally intervened as a party in the personal injury case; Provider "appear[ed] ... voluntarily."
Our judicial notice of the records from Provider’s unsuccessful attempt to appeal the lien determination ruling in the personal injury case indicates that Patient named the alleged tort-feasor as the sole defendant in that case. In February 2016, Patient filed the lien determination motion, which claimed that three entities (including Provider) had rendered medical services to Patient and that Provider’s "pro rata share of the settlement [of the personal injury case] for satisfaction of [Provider’s] lien is $2083.66" under the medical lien statute. A hearing was set on the lien determination motion, and counsel for Provider entered an appearance in the personal injury case.
At that hearing, Patient pointed out that she was under the medical lien law. One of the things Patient "want[ed] to prevent" in the personal injury case was
Provider contested efforts "to apply the limits of the healthcare lien law" and argued that "there’s been no request by [Provider] for the benefits of hospital lien law[.]" Provider asserted that if the medical lien was found to apply under such circumstances, then "it would violate Article 1, Section 13 of the Missouri Constitution by impairing [Provider’s] contract with [Patient]."
The personal injury court inquired about Provider’s actions concerning a lien in the following exchange.
Patient’s counsel argued:
[T]he law is clear that the exclusive remedy under Missouri law if you want a lien for medical providers is the Missouri lien statute.... So, a UCC lien is not valid. I'm not clear are they saying there is a lien or there’s not a lien? They can't have it both ways.
The personal injury court found "that this case does not differ from the case of [ Huey v. Meek , 419 S.W.3d 875, 876 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013),]" and ruled that "the lien amount due to [Provider] is in the amount of $2,083.66."
At the trial de novo in the instant case, Patient’s counsel informed the trial court that she thought the lien issues had been resolved in the personal injury case but acknowledged that a final judgment had not been rendered in that case. P...
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