Skaggs v. State, 55777
| Citation | 476 S.W.2d 524 |
| Decision Date | 22 February 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 55777,No. 1,55777,1 |
| Parties | Abraham W. SKAGGS, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Coleman, Ross & Cekovsky, Jack H. Ross, Clayton, for movant-appellant.
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Gene E. Voigts, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
On November 2, 1960, movant (hereinafter referred to as defendant) pleaded guilty to the crime of murder in the first degree. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. On April 14, 1970, he filed a motion pursuant to S.Ct. Rules 27.25 and 27.26, V.A.M.R., to withdraw the plea of guilty and to set aside the judgment. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, made findings of fact, and overruled the motion. Defendant has appealed.
By the time the motion was filed the court reporter who took the proceedings when the plea was entered had died and hence no transcript thereof is available. Also, James J. Rankin, who was defendant's attorney, was deceased and there was no way the State could directly rebut certain testimony of defendant concerning his representation. The only testimony offered was that of the defendant, although the State did offer two exhibits which were admitted without objection.
The grounds alleged in defendant's motion are as follows:
Defendant testified that he was 17 years of age when his plea was entered, and he has since learned that at that time his IQ was between 80 and 85; that at that time he had reached the 5th grade but that after giving him an entrance examination at the prison school they started him in the first grade; that he is now about to complete the 8th grade; that the only time he saw his lawyer was in court the day he pleaded guilty; that he informed his lawyer that he was not guilty and did not want to plead guilty; that he did plead guilty however because his lawyer told him if he took it to a jury trial they would give him the death penalty and he believed that; that he was confused and didn't understand all that was going on; that the court at that time asked him if he was pleading guilty and he said that he was. Defendant further testified as follows: 'The Court: Who coerced you into pleading guilty? A. My lawyer, Mr. Rankin. The Court: How did he do that? A. By telling me if I didn't plead guilty a jury would find me guilty and then I would go to the gas chamber. * * * The Court: And I told you at the time that the range of punishment in this case was up to life or death if found guilty. A. I think so. The Court: And only the jury could discharge you. You were entitled to a jury trial. A. I don't know much about the law, I didn't know much about the law then. The Court: You didn't indicate to the Court you wanted a jury trial? A. I was leaving that up to Mr. Rankin.
Q. (by Mr. White). You said that Mr. Rankin told you that if you stood trial in front of a jury the jury would, or could, give you death? A. Would. Q. That was his opinion as your attorney? A. Yes, sir. Q. Because he told you that, you decided to plead guilty? A. I was going along with him. * * * Q. He got across he thought you would get that from the jury? A. Yes, sir. Q. So you had better plead guilty? A. Yes, sir. Q. And take life? A. Yes, sir. Q. So when they asked you if you pleaded guilty, you said yes to the Court? A. Yes, sir, that is what I said.'
Upon motion of Mr. Rankin defendant was sent to Malcolm Bliss Mental Health Center for a psychiatric examination. The report therefrom was admitted in evidence. Portions of it are as follows:
The court made the following findings: 'The Court finds as a fact that counsel, Mr. James Rankin, was employed by the defendant and entered his appearance on August 11, 1960; that defendant had adequate time to confer with counsel; that a plea of guilty was entered on November 2, 1960, after conferring with counsel; that the plea of guilty was voluntarily and intelligently made; that the sentence and judgment was in accord with and appropriate to the facts of the case, and that no manifest injustice resulted from said plea of guilty and imposition of sentence.'
At the outset of our consideration of this appeal it should be mentioned that 'under the provisions of S.Ct. Rule 27.26(j) the burden of proving the grounds for relief is upon the movant and that upon appeal our review is 'limited to a determination of whether the findings, conclusions and judgment of the trial court are clearly erroneous,' and that after sentence, according to Rule 27.25, the court may set aside the judgment and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty only if such is necessary in order to correct manifest injustice.' Russell v. State, Mo.Sup., 446 S.W.2d 782, 785--786. We also think the following is applicable to our review: ...
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