Skains v. Lake Cent. Sch. Corp.
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-394 |
| Decision Date | 03 August 2023 |
| Parties | JUSTIN and ADRIANA SKAINS, on behalf of two minor children, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LAKE CENTRAL SCHOOL CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 36] filed by the defendants on March 30, 2023. For the following reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
The plaintiffs are parents of students who attended Lake Central School Corporation (LCSC) during the inception of the COVID-19 pandemic. On November 24, 2021, the plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit in state court on behalf of their minor children against the LCSC, its superintendent Larry Veracco, and several administrators (collectively, LCSC in this Order). The case was timely removed to federal court on December 21, 2021. In their Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the LCSC's policies following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic were unlawful and unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the LCSC's policies related to masking, contact tracing, and quarantining violated various provisions of the Indiana State Constitution, Indiana Quarantine Laws, as well as their First and Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution.
On March 30, 2023, the LCSC filed the instant motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs responded in opposition on June 9 2023, and LCSC filed its reply on June 29, 2023.
The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment. As a result, this court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
The plaintiffs are all parents of students who attended schools within the Lake Central School Corporation during the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic. DE 20, ¶¶ 1-7. Like many schools throughout the nation, the LCSC implemented and maintained remote learning during the 2019-2020 school year. In August 2020, the LCSC decided to re-opened schools for in-person learning after receiving negative feedback from families and staff regarding their remote learning experience. Veracco Dep. 25:14-17, Sept. 12, 2022. As part of the re-opening process, the State of Indiana mandated that the LCSC report positive cases of COVID-19, as well as perform contact tracing and implement quarantine procedures to students who tested positive. Veracco Dep. 26:4-20. During the 2020-2021 school year, the LCSC complied with the state mandates and took the added precaution of requiring students to wear masks. Veracco Dep. 26:19.
On August 2, 2021, the LCSC held a public-school board meeting and, in part, discussed whether masks should be mandatory for the 2021-2022 school year. Veracco Dep. 32:1-15. During the meeting, the LCSC board voted against the motion to make masks mandatory and voted for optional masking. Plf.'s Ex. 3 at 3. On August 4, 2021, LCSC Superintendent Larry Veracco posted notice of a special meeting to be held on August 6, 2021. Veracco Dep. 35:4-9. At the special meeting on August 6, 2021, the LCSC board again addressed the masking requirements and decided to reverse course, voting for mandatory masking for all students and staff, regardless of vaccination eligibility. See Plf.'s Ex. 6. The public did not have any input during the special meeting on August 6, 2021. Malchow Dep. 31:16-19, Sept. 14, 2022.
In determining that masks would be mandatory during the 2021-2022 school year, the LCSC reviewed the executive orders from the Governor of Indiana, as well as data from the American Pediatrics Association, the Indiana Department of Health, the Center for Disease Control (CDC), as well as local medical facilities. Sues Dep. 47: 3-15, Sept. 27, 2022. The plaintiffs assert that the LCSC's policies related to masking, contact tracing, and quarantine procedures violated their Due Process under the Indiana Constitution; violated Indiana Quarantine Laws; constituted an illegal search and seizure under the Indiana Constitution; violated the Equal Privileges and Immunities provision under the Indiana Constitution; violated their Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution; violated their rights to peaceably assemble under the First Amendment; and the Amended Complaint asserts federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. DE 20.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) summary judgment is proper only if the movant has shown that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 322-23 (1986); Garofalo v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 754 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 2014); Kidwell v Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2012); Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009). A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. The burden is upon the moving party to establish that no material facts are in genuine dispute, and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970); Stephens, 569 F.3d at 786.
When the movant has met its burden, the opposing party cannot rely solely on the allegations in the pleadings but must “point to evidence that can be put in admissible form at trial, and that, if believed by the fact-finder, could support judgment in [her] favor.” Marr v. Bank of Am., N.A., 662 F.3d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) ()). The non-moving party cannot rely on conclusory allegations. Smith v. Shawnee Libr. Sys., 60 F.3d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1995). Failure to prove an essential element of the alleged activity will render other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Filippo v. Lee Publications, Inc., 485 F.Supp.2d 969, 972 (N.D. Ind. 2007) ().
In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); McDowell v. Vill. of Lansing, 763 F.3d 762, 764-65 (7th Cir. 2014). The trial court must determine whether the evidence presented by the party opposed to the summary judgment is such that a reasonable jury might find in favor of that party after a trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
The LCSC argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on all of the plaintiffs' claims. Essentially, the LCSC argues that there is no private cause of action to pursue damages for alleged violations of the Indiana Constitution or Indiana Quarantine Law. According to the LCSC, to the extent that the plaintiffs' claims are seeking equitable relief, the claims are moot because the restrictions and mandates at issue were terminated as of February 2022. As for the plaintiffs' federal claims, the LCSC contends that the mask mandates, contact tracing, and quarantine procedures implemented to curb the spread of COVID-19 did not constitute an unlawful search or seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment. The LCSC also contends that the quarantine procedures did not infringe on the plaintiffs' First Amendment right to peaceably assemble. Thus, the LCSC asserts that the plaintiffs cannot bring a viable claim under Section 1983 since there was no violation of a federally protected right.
In response, the plaintiffs failed to directly address any of the arguments raised by the LCSC. Instead, the plaintiffs' response symbolizes an opinion piece, devoid of any pertinent case law supporting their claims. The plaintiffs' response predominantly concerns the special meeting held by the LCSC on August 6, 2021, which they contend violated Indiana's Open Door Law. In the same vein, the plaintiffs argue that denying the public the opportunity to speak at the special meeting violated their First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs also allude to a violation of Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In any event, the First Amendment freedom of speech, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, Rehabilitation Act, and Indiana Open Door Law claims are not listed as causes of action in the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. Thus, those claims are not properly before this court.
The plaintiffs contend that the LCSC's mask mandates, contact tracing, and quarantine requirements violated the following provisions of the Indiana Constitution:
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