Skandha v. Commonwealth, 16-P-554
| Decision Date | 14 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | 16-P-554 |
| Citation | 83 N.E.3d 199 (Table),91 Mass.App.Ct. 1116 |
| Parties | Bodhisattva SKANDHA v. COMMONWEALTH & others. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
In 1960, plaintiff Bodhisattva Skandha (then known as Richard Seaver) stabbed his mother to death and hid her body in a closet. After he confessed to the crime and pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1973, Governor Francis Sargent commuted Skandha's sentence to a term of thirty years to life, which made him immediately eligible for parole. He was first released on parole on January 25, 1974. However, because of various parole violations, he was reincarcerated from time to time, and he continuously has been incarcerated since 1992. In 2014, Skandha brought an action in Superior Court to challenge his continued incarceration, seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. Before us now is his appeal of the judgment of dismissal in response to the defendants' motions to dismiss that action or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.3 We affirm.
1. Alleged procedural violations. Skandha argues that he in effect received a conditional pardon and that, based on this, the defendants have violated his procedural rights in various respects. For example, he argues that his return to custody could have been accomplished only through the procedures set forth in G. L. c. 127, §§ 155, 156. He additionally argues that once his sentence was commuted, it became one for "a term of years," and that therefore he is entitled to annual parole review pursuant to G. L. c. 127, § 133.
We discern no merit in such arguments. Skandha did not receive a pardon (conditional or otherwise); he received a commutation of his sentence. See Hicks v. Commissioner of Correction, 425 Mass. 1014, 1015 (1997).4 Moreover, his particular commutation did not change his status as someone "serving a sentence for life," G. L. c. 127, § 133A, as appearing in St. 2012, c. 192, § 37; it simply made him eligible for parole sooner. Hicks, supra at 1014 n.1. See 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 100.00 (2000) ().
2. Alleged waiver of parole board jurisdiction. Relying principally on our opinion in Zullo, petitioner, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 371 (1994), Skandha argues that the parole board (board) lost jurisdiction of him by unreasonably delaying the revocation of his parole. That opinion has no precedential value, because the Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review and issued an opinion of its own. Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. 872, 876-877 (1995). Before addressing the import of that case, we first lay out the following background facts, which appear to be uncontested.
After Skandha's first release on parole in January of 1974, the board instituted revocation proceedings based on violations such as unreported absences from the Commonwealth. Preliminary revocation hearings were held on June 27, 1974, and December 18, 1974; each resulted in a warning being issued. At some point, Skandha traveled to Florida where he was arrested and briefly incarcerated for larceny of a firearm. Based on his whereabouts being unknown, the board provisionally revoked his parole on April 12, 1976. According to Skandha, the board learned he was in Florida, but decided not to extradite him because of insufficient funds. Instead, the board withdrew the revocation warrant on August 24, 1976.
Skandha subsequently moved to California with the knowledge of the board, which transferred parole supervision of him to that State in 1977. In 1984, Skandha was arrested in California after he broke a window while intoxicated, and his parole was preliminarily revoked on September 10, 1984. The stated grounds were for "[i]rresponsible [c]onduct," including failing to inform his California parole officer of his whereabouts and for leaving California for more than twenty-four hours without permission. Skandha was returned to the custody of the Department of Correction on January 25, 1985, and his parole was revoked on March 14, 1985. He maintains that the board somehow waived jurisdiction over him by not effecting this parole revocation sooner. After that 1985 revocation, Skandha was paroled and reincarcerated twice more for a host of new parole violations.
We discern no merit to Skandha's argument.5 In fact, it appears that it may well be moot. See generally Robinson v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 62 Mass. App. Ct. 935, 937 (2005) (). Unlike the parolee in Zullo, petitioner, the terms of Skandha's sentence, even as modified by the commutation warrant, subjected him to parole for life.6 Under no reasonable interpretation of Zullo, petitioner would Skandha be relieved from his status as a lifetime parolee. As noted, Skandha was paroled twice after the 1985 revocation, and each time his parole was revoked for new violations. Therefore, even if Skandha could demonstrate that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial