Skelly v. Skelly
| Decision Date | 10 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5D19-3780 |
| Citation | 300 So.3d 342 |
| Parties | Darin M. SKELLY, Appellant, v. Angelle SKELLY, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nadine Brown, of Law Office of Nadine A. Brown, P.A., Winter Springs, for Appellant.
Matthew A. Rygh, of Barrister Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
Darin Skelly ("Former Husband") appeals the second supplemental final judgment for modification rendered by the trial court following trial that orders him to pay ongoing child support for the parties' now-adult dependent daughter, as well as child support arrearages that accrued during the litigation. Former Husband raises three arguments for reversal. First, he contends that the trial court erred in determining that the appellee ("Former Wife") had standing to bring the second supplemental petition for modification of child support because their adult daughter is a legally-competent adult and, thus, was the necessary party to bring the action. Former Husband next argues that the second supplemental final judgment is facially deficient because the trial court failed to make any factual findings as to the parties' respective incomes. Third, Former Husband asserts that the trial court erred in failing to award him an $8937 credit against the total support arrearages found to have accrued during the instant litigation. For the following reasons, we affirm as to Former Husband's first issue, but reverse and remand on the second and third issues.
The parties were divorced in 2005. At the time, their three children of the marriage were all minors. Former Husband was ordered to pay monthly child support to Former Wife, continuing until the children reached age eighteen, with the caveat that if any of the children turned eighteen and had not yet graduated from high school, Former Husband's child support obligation would continue until the child's graduation from high school or age nineteen, whichever occurred first.
The daughter who is the subject of the present litigation turned eighteen on March 29, 2017. In February 2017, approximately five weeks before her daughter's birthday, Former Wife filed the subject second supplemental petition for modification of child support. Former Wife alleged that there had been a material, substantial, and permanent change in circumstances since the last court order of support in that the daughter had become physically disabled and unable to support herself. Former Wife averred that the daughter was still dependent on the parties and that she would require ongoing support beyond the age of majority.
Following Former Husband's unsuccessful motions to dismiss the supplemental petition based on Former Wife's alleged lack of standing to bring the action and the trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the case became at issue and proceeded to trial in July 2019. Approximately five months later, the trial court entered the second supplemental final judgment now before us.
In its final judgment, the court found that the parties' now-adult daughter became physically disabled and incapacitated, and thus dependent upon the parties for support, prior to reaching the age of majority. The court further found that this was a substantial, material, and permanent change in circumstances that was not contemplated or anticipated by the parties at the time of the prior judgment or support order. Former Husband was ordered to pay the sum of $2395 per month in ongoing support. The trial court also determined that Former Husband owed $74,245 in child support arrearages1 that had accrued during the litigation and ordered Former Husband to repay the arrearages at the rate of $2000 per month. Lastly, the court denied Former Husband's request that he be given credit against the arrearages for child support that Former Husband claimed to have paid after the daughter turned eighteen, finding that Former Husband "failed to offer any evidence that he is entitled to a credit for overpayment of support."
On appeal, Former Husband does not contest the trial court's findings that his daughter is dependent due to her physical disability or incapacity and that her physical incapacity and dependency began prior to reaching the age of eighteen. Nor does he challenge that his daughter has a continuing need to be supported beyond the age of majority. Former Husband's succinct first argument for reversal is that the trial court erred in concluding that Former Wife had standing to bring the action for support for their adult daughter because the daughter is legally competent and was not adjudicated dependent prior to her eighteenth birthday. We disagree.
In addressing this argument, we first observe that section 743.07(2), Florida Statutes (2016), provides that a court of competent jurisdiction may order support for a dependent person beyond the age of eighteen years when such dependency is because of a mental or physical incapacity that began prior to such person reaching majority. In Fagan v. Fagan , 381 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), we previously rejected one of the arguments that Former Husband brings here, namely, that a "dependent" child under this statute should be equated with an "incompetent" person. See also Smith v. Smith , 495 So. 2d 886, 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (). In Fagan , the former wife brought an action against the former husband both for post-majority ongoing support for the parties' dependent child and to collect support arrearages. 381 So. 2d at 279. At the time the former wife filed her petition, the child was over the age of majority. Id. We affirmed the final judgment entered in favor of the former wife; and, significant here, we rejected the former husband's argument that the former wife was not the proper party to enforce the support judgment for the adult dependent child. Id.
As to Former Husband's contention that for Former Wife to have standing, his daughter needed to have been adjudicated dependent prior to her eighteenth birthday, our court very recently reiterated that section 743.07(2), Florida Statutes, does not require that a child be adjudicated dependent before he or she reaches majority for the trial court to order extended support. See Phagan o/b/o L.D.P. v. McDuffee , 296 So.3d 957 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020). In Phagan , the mother's supplemental petition to modify and extend the father's child support obligation of the parties' child alleging that the child's incapacity and dependency began prior to the child reaching...
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