Skelton v. Skelton

• Decision Date: 16 November 1983
• Docket Number: No. 40039,40039
• Citation: 251 Ga. 631,308 S.E.2d 838
• Parties: John SKELTON v. Paul SKELTON, et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 838

308 S.E.2d 838

251 Ga. 631

John SKELTON v. Paul SKELTON, et al.

No. 40039.

Supreme Court of Georgia Nov. 16, 1983.

Jacque H. Wilkes, Jefferson, for John Skelton.

Nathaniel David Wages, Winder, Jerry Gray, Gray & Brown, Gary W. Brown, Jefferson, Don Moore, Commerce, for Paul Skelton, et al.

GREGORY, Justice.

Following an adverse decision in the probate court, the appellant, propounder of the will of J.U. Skelton, appeals from a judgment of the superior court, based upon a jury's verdict, which denied probate.

1. In his first enumeration, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying the Propounder's motion to dismiss those paragraphs of the caveat alleging undue influence and mistake on the ground that Caveators failed to plead said paragraphs with particularity as required by OCGA § 9-11-9(b) (Code Ann. § 81A-109) ¹. Propounder's oral motion was made at the outset of the trial and after the jury had been empanelled.

At the outset we note that OCGA § 9-11-9(b) (Code Ann. § 81A-109) is subject to the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-8(f) (Code Ann. § 81A-108) that pleadings be construed so as to do substantial justice. McDonough Constr. Co. v. McLendon Electric Co., 242 Ga. 510, 512, 250 S.E.2d 424 (1978). Under the CPA, a pleading should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the pleader can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. In Cochran v. McCollum, et al., 233 Ga. 104, 210 S.E.2d 13 (1974), we held this principle applicable to all pleadings including special matters (fraud mistake and conditions precedent) under OCGA § 9-11-9 (Code Ann. § 81A-109). There, the same issue was before the court as in the case sub judice. We held the trial court erred in dismissing the caveat for failure to state facts relied upon to prove undue influence, fraud or mistake. ² In Cochran, supra, we said the proper remedy for seeking more particularity is by a motion for more definite statement (OCGA § 9-11-12(e) (Code Ann. § 81A-112)) at the pleading stage or by the rules of discovery thereafter. ³ We find no error in the trial court's denial of Propounder's motion to dismiss.

2. Appellant's next enumeration contends the trial court erred in allowing the Caveators to admit a prima facie case as to testamentary capacity then allowing Caveators to attack the will on grounds that the testator lacked the testamentary capacity necessary to make a will.

"Upon the trial of an issue arising upon the propounding of a will and a caveat thereto, the burden, in the first instance, is upon the propounder of the alleged will to make out a prima facie case, by showing the factum of the will, and that at the time of its execution the testator apparently had sufficient mental capacity to make it, and, in making it, acted freely and voluntarily. When this is done, the burden of proof shifts to the caveator. [cits.]" Langan v. Cheshire, 208 Ga. 107, 110, 65 S.E.2d 415 (1951); Cornelius v. Crosby, 243 Ga. 26, 27, 252 S.E.2d 455 (1979). (Emphasis supplied) In the instant case, by admitting a prima facie case, Caveators admitted only the execution with due formality of a paper purporting to be a will by a person apparently of sound mind at the time of the execution of the paper. Therefore, Caveators assumed the burden of going forward with evidence to overcome the rebuttable presumption that the testator had the requisite capacity. We find no merit in appellant's contention that by admitting a prima facie case, Caveators somehow stipulated testamentary capacity and were precluded from offering evidence to the contrary.

3. In his third enumeration appellant argues the trial court erred in allowing Caveators to open and close final arguments. Appellant concedes that by admitting a prima facie case the Caveators had the right to open and close final arguments but argues they do not retain this right if they present evidence on testamentary capacity. In support of this contention, appellant directs us to the cases of McGee v. Loftin, 228 Ga. 142, 184 S.E.2d 578 (1971) and Oxford v. Oxford, 136 Ga. 589, 71 S.E. 883 (1911), but we find these cases inapposite to the case sub judice. In neither case did the caveators admit a prima facie case for the propounder and assume the burden of proof.

Normally in a probate proceeding, the burden of proof is on the Propounder and thus he has the opening and concluding arguments. Lavender v. Wilkins, 237 Ga. 510, 516, 228 S.E.2d 888 (1976). "It is permissible in a will contest for the caveators to admit a prima facie case for the propounder of the will, and thereupon to take the opening and conclusion." Wood v. Davis, 161 Ga. 690, 131 S.E. 885 (1925); Tilley v. King, 190 Ga. 421, 427, 9 S.E.2d 670 (1940). Johnson v. Sullivan, 247 Ga. 663, 666, 278 S.E.2d 640 (1981). As we discussed in Division 2, Caveators in the instant case assumed the burden of proof on the issues being tried by admitting a prima facie case and thus had the right to make opening and concluding arguments.

4. The next enumeration complains the trial court erred in denying Propounder's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of mistake as to the conduct of an heir. Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence as to mistaken conduct to create an issue for jury determination.

OCGA § 9-11-50(a) (Code Ann. § 81A-150) provides in pertinent part that "[i]f there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict, such verdict shall be directed." In determining whether any conflict in the evidence exists, the court must construe the evidence most favorably to the party opposing the motion for directed verdict. Folsom v. Vangilder, 159 Ga.App. 844, 285 S.E.2d 583 (1981). The standard used to review the grant or denial of a directed verdict is the "any evidence" test. Georgia Department of Human Resources v. Montgomery, 248 Ga. 465, 284 S.E.2d 263 (1981).

Although the evidence in the instant case is conflicting, there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that the testator labored under a mistake of fact as to the conduct of his heirs. There was testimony that the testator believed the Caveators had all borrowed money from him and refused to pay it back when in fact only one of the Caveators, Paul, had borrowed from the testator and did repay him. Appellant testified that the testator stated to him that he made the will leaving everything to appellant because "the rest of them done got their part." There was also testimony that the testator mistakenly believed that his son and daughter were trying to kill him with poisoned food. This and other testimony was sufficient to create a jury question on the issue mistake as to the conduct of an heir. It was therefore not error for the trial court to deny appellant's motion for a directed verdict.

5. Appellant also contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the issue of undue influence. As we noted in Division 4, the trial court's ruling must be sustained if there was any evidence to create an issue for resolution by the jury.

"An attack on a will as having been obtained by undue influence may be supported by a wide range of testimony, since such influence can seldom be shown except by circumstantial evidence. Thus, a confidential relation between the parties, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the disposition of the testator's estate, old age, or disease affecting the strength of the mind, tending to support any other direct testimony or any other proved fact or circumstance going to show the exercise of undue influence on the mind and will of the testator, are relevant. While the quantity of influence varies with the circumstances of each case, according to the relations existing between the parties and the strength or weakness of mind of the testator, the amount of influence necessary to dominate a mind impaired by age or disease may be decidedly less than that required to control a strong mind. [cits.]." Fowler v. Fowler, 197 Ga. 53(2), 28 S.E.2d 458 (1943); Perkins v. Edwards, 228 Ga. 470, 475, 186 S.E.2d 109 (1971).

In the present case, a great deal of circumstantial evidence was produced on the issue of undue influence. There was evidence that a confidential relationship existed between the testator and appellant; that appellant allowed his father to think that his son and daughter-in-law were trying to poison him; that the will was made after appellant had discussed its contents with the attorney; that appellant was present when the will was made; that appella...