Skidmore v. First Bank of Minneapolis
| Decision Date | 03 November 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 85CA1640,85CA1640 |
| Citation | 773 P.2d 587 |
| Parties | James E. SKIDMORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Merrill J. Anderson; First Bank of Minneapolis, Personal Representative of the Estate of Donna D. Anderson; Wallace L. Hall a/k/a Wallace Hall; Gerald W. Feil and Sally S. Feil; George W. Callan and Mary Ann Callan; Communities Foundation of Texas; Hall Associates, Ltd.; La Plata Abstract Company, Trustee, a Colorado corporation; and the Public Trustee of the County of Archuleta, State of Colorado, and All Unknown Persons Who Claim any Interest in the Subject Matter of this Action, Defendants-Appellees. . III |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Karsh & Fulton, P.C., Alan E. Karsh, Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.
Shand, McLachlan & Malick, P.C., Keith Newbold, Durango, for defendant-appellee First Bank of Minneapolis.
R. Martin Rhodes, II, Durango, for defendant-appellee Wallace L. Hall.
McDaniel and McDaniel, L.W. McDaniel, Durango, for defendants-appellees Feil, Callan, and La Plata Abstract Co.
The plaintiff, James E. Skidmore, appeals a ruling on his motion for partial summary judgment that his roadway easement was non-exclusive. He also appeals the judgment entered following trial to the court denying his claim for injunctive relief and awarding attorney fees to some of the defendants. We affirm in part, and reverse in part.
In 1973, Skidmore bought a large tract of mountain property in Archuleta County. No roadway existed to the tract. Only old homestead trails and pioneer type roadways allowed access. A dispute arose concerning access and resulted in the filing of an action in the United States District Court.
As a result of that action an agreement was reached under which the owners of adjoining lots promised to deliver to Skidmore a quitclaim deed granting a roadway easement across their property. That agreement provided that the easement would be "limited to the owners of the James E. Skidmore tract, their heirs, successors, assigns, invitees and permitees." The agreement also stated that "cost of construction and maintenance of the roadway easement shall be borne solely by James E. Skidmore." The quitclaim deed granting the roadway easement contained standard language, and was delivered to Skidmore, but neither of the quoted provisions of the agreement was contained therein.
In 1982, Skidmore discovered the roadway had been damaged as a result of construction activities on one of the lots burdened by the easement. He thereupon filed the instant action requesting the court to enjoin defendants, the persons with existing interests in the servient estates, from using the roadway. On the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled that the language of the written agreement was insufficient to establish an exclusive easement. The court also concluded that the written agreement merged with the quitclaim deed, thereby extinguishing the provision in the written agreement limiting use of the easement to Skidmore, his heirs, assigns, and invitees. The court therefore granted defendants' motion and dismissed Skidmore's claim for injunctive relief.
Skidmore then amended his complaint to include a claim for damages and a request that the court allocate the roadway maintenance costs among the parties. After a bench trial, the court found that any damage to the roadway had been adequately repaired. The court also concluded that the doctrine of merger did not extinguish the language in the written agreement designating Skidmore as solely responsible for maintaining the roadway. The court therefore entered judgment in favor of defendants and against Skidmore. This appeal followed.
Skidmore contends that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of defendants on the issue whether he was granted an exclusive easement. He argues that the language of the written agreement clearly established his right to exclude all others, including the owners of the servient estates, from using the roadway. Skidmore does not directly challenge the trial court's conclusion that the doctrine of merger negates the provision in the written agreement limiting use of the roadway to him. Rather, he argues that if the merger doctrine operated to extinguish any claim of exclusive use of the roadway, it also extinguishes the provision in the written agreement making plaintiff solely responsible for maintenance and repair of the roadway. While this argument has a look of logic, we disagree with it.
An easement is an interest in property which confers upon its holder an enforceable right to use the property of another for specific purposes. Wright v. Horse Creek Ranches, 697 P.2d 384 (Colo.1985). Barnard v. Gaumer, 146 Colo. 409, 361 P.2d 778 (1961). Only where the grant conveying the easement specifically characterizes it as "exclusive" does the grantor lose its rights to use the easement in common with the grantee. Barnard v. Gaumer, supra; Bergen Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Barnes, 683 P.2d 365 (Colo.App.1984).
As in Barnard and Bergen Ditch, the deed conveying the easement here did not contain...
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