Skillings v. Allen

• Decision Date: 18 July 1919
• Docket Number: No. 21361.,21361.
• Citation: 173 N.W. 663,143 Minn. 323
• Parties: SKILLINGS v. ALLEN.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

143 Minn. 323

173 N.W. 663

SKILLINGS

v.ALLEN.

No. 21361.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 18, 1919.

Appeal from District Court, Crow Wing County; W. S. McClenahan, Judge.

Action by Bert L. Skillings against V. A. Allen. From an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint, defendant appeals. Order affirmed.

1. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS k18(4)-NEGLIGENT CARE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE-CAUSE OF ACTION.

A complaint states a cause of action when it is alleged therein that defendant, a physician, was employed by plaintiff to attend his minor daughter professionally while she was sick; that, knowing that the child's disease was scarlet fever, he negligently advised plaintiff's wife, who inquired in his behalf as well as in her own, that it was safe to visit the child, then in a hospital and under defendant's care; that he also advised her that it was safe to remove the child from the hospital to plaintiff's home, and that there was no danger that the disease would be communicated, although it was then at a stage when great danger of infection existed; and that plaintiff and his wife did not know of the infectious nature of the disease and relied on defendant's advice, and accordingly visited their child at the hospital and removed her to their home, and plaintiff thereby contracted scarlet fever to his damage.

2. NEGLIGENCE k2-DUTY TO USE CARE.

Generally speaking, one is responsible for the direct consequences of his negligent acts whenever he is placed in such a position with regard to another that it is obvious that if he does not use due care in his own conduct he will cause injury to that person. This principle is applicable to the facts stated, and the court properly overruled a demurrer to the complaint.

Syllabus by the Court

A complaint states a cause of action when it is alleged therein that defendant, a physician, was employed by plaintiff to attend his minor daughter professionally while she was sick; that, knowing that the child's disease was scarlet fever, he negligently advised plaintiff's wife, who inquired in his behalf as well as in her own, that it was safe to visit the child, then in a hospital and under defendant's care; that he also advised her that it was safe to remove the child from the hospital to plaintiff's home, and that there was no danger that the disease would be communicated, although it was then at a stage when great danger of infection existed; and that plaintiff and his wife did not know of the infectious nature of the disease and relied on defendant's advice, and accordingly visited their child at the hospital and removed her to their home, and plaintiff thereby contracted scarlet fever to his damage.

Generally speaking, one is responsible for the direct consequences of his negligent acts whenever he is placed in such a position with regard to another that it is obvious that if he does not use due care in his own conduct he will cause injury to that person. This principle is applicable to the facts stated, and the court properly overruled a demurrer to the complaint. C. D. & R. D. O'Brien, of St. Paul, for appellant.

A. D. Polk and L. B. Kinder, both of Brainerd, for respondent.

LEES, C.

This is an appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint interposed on the ground that no cause of action was stated. The court certified that the question raised was important and doubtful.

In substance, the complaint alleged that defendant was a practicing physician, employed by plaintiff and his wife to treat their minor daughter, who was ill. The defendant knew that the disease from which the child was suffering was scarlet fever and that it was infectious. Plaintiff's wife, acting in his and her own behalf, consulted defendant as to the nature of the disease and the danger of infection. Defendant wrongfully and negligently advised her that they might safely visit their child, who was then at a hospital under his care. He negligently permitted them to visit the child at the hospital, and later on wrongfully and negligently advised plaintiff's wife that she could be safely removed from the hospital to her home, and that there was no danger that the disease would be communicated, although it was then at the ‘peeling off’ stage, when the greatest danger of infection exists. In reliance upon defendant's advice, the child was removed to her home. Neither plaintiff nor his wife knew of the infectious nature of the disease. Both relied on defendant's advice in visiting their child while sick at the hospital and in taking her from the hospital to her home. By reason of their contact with her, both contracted scarlet fever, and plaintiff suffered pain and was kept from his work for many weeks, to his damage in the sum of $1,000.

[1][2] The case is a novel one. Counsel for defendant assert that none like it has heretofore been presented to any court so far as they have been able to ascertain. They contend that a cause of action is not stated because there were no contractual relations between plaintiff and defendant. The statement in the complaint, that the child was under defendant's care ‘pursuant to solicitation and employment by plaintiff and his wife,’ amounts, we think, to an allegation that there were such relations. True, the child was defendant's patient, but can it be said that therefore he owed no contractual duty to her parents by whom he was employed? The child would have a cause of action against defendant for the consequences of any failure on his part to treat her with ordinary professional skill and care, though she did not employ him. Plaintiff might also have a cause of action entirely separate and apart from that of his child for the loss of her services, due to the same failure to exercise ordinary professional care which gave rise to the child's cause of action. 21 R. C. L. 398.

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