Skillman v. Conner

• Decision Date: 23 July 1937
• Court: Delaware Superior Court
• Parties: ELLA V. SKILLMAN v. NETTIE CONNER

193 A. 563

38 Del. 402

ELLA V. SKILLMAN v. NETTIE CONNER

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County

July 23, 1937

Superior Court for New Castle County, Action on the Case for Negligence, No. 4, November Term, 1934.

Case heard on demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration.

The declaration demurred to contained five counts and each count was based on certain alleged negligent acts of the defendant while operating a motor vehicle on a public highway in Cecil County, Maryland, whereby the plaintiff was injured.

Each count alleged that when the plaintiff was injured by the negligent acts of the defendant relied on by her she was riding as a passenger in a car operated by the defendant and there was nothing to indicate that she was a paying passenger, or anything more than a mere guest.

None of the counts alleged that there was a so-called guest statute in Maryland similar to Chapter 26, Volume 38, Laws of Delaware, the provisions of which are quoted in the opinion of the court. In fact, it was conceded at the argument that there was no such statutory provision in that State.

The defendant demurred to the plaintiff's declaration specially:

1. Because it did not appear that the plaintiff was "a guest without payment for such transportation."

2. Because it did not appear that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the defendant by her "willful or wanton disregard of the rights of others," as is required by the Delaware statute (Section 1) governing such matters.

Demurrer overruled.

William H. Bennethum (of Marvel, Morford, Ward and Logan) for plaintiff.

William S. Potter and George G. Thouron (of Ward and Gray) for defendant.

HARRINGTON RICHARDS and SPEAKMAN, J. J., sitting.

OPINION

HARRINGTON, J.

It appears from the declaration that the alleged negligent acts relied on by the plaintiff were committed in the State of Maryland, and the question raised by the demurrer is whether, in view of the provisions of Chapter 26 of Volume 38, Laws of Delaware, her action can be brought in this State, though an action on the case for negligence is a transitory action. See Reynolds v. Day, 79 Wash. 499, 140 P. 681, L. R. A. 1916A, 432; Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.(2d) 63, 84 A. L. R. 1264. That statute, among other things, provides: "No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of such owner or operator or caused by his willful or wanton disregard of the rights of others." Section 1.

It is not claimed that the declaration alleges that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by any intentional act of the defendant, or by any willful or wanton disregard on her part of the rights of the plaintiff; on the contrary, it is claimed that such allegations are not necessary to permit the plaintiff to bring suit in this State.

The defendant claims, however:

1. That whatever the plaintiff's substantive rights may be, the statute above quoted has taken away any legal remedy that the plaintiff might have had against her at common law.

2. That, at any rate, because of that statute, it would be contrary to the declared public policy of this state to permit the plaintiff to recover in this action, though the cause of action arose in the State of Maryland.

As a general rule, though the suit is brought in another state, the substantive rights of the parties to an action, whether for negligence, or otherwise, are governed by the law of the state where the cause of action arose.

The remedy to enforce such rights is, however, governed by the law of the state where the suit is brought. 2 Beale's Conflict of Laws, 1287, 1290; 3 Beale's Conflict of Laws, 1600; Goodrich on the Conflict of Laws, § 81; Redfern v. Redfern, 212 Iowa 454, 236 N.W. 399; Eskovitz v. Berger, 276 Mich. 536, 268 N.W. 883; Hall v. Hamel, 244 Mass. 464, 138 N.E. 925.

This rule is aptly and concisely stated by Professor Beale in his Work on Conflict of Laws, (3 Beale's Conflict of Laws, 600). He says: "It has now become axiomatic that substantive matters are governed by the foreign law and that procedural, or, as it is more usually expressed, matters relating to the remedy, are governed by the law of the forum."

A somewhat different rule applies in England, but in considering the first of these principles, commented on by Professor Beale, the statement is, also, made in Conflict of Laws, Restatement, § 384, that "if a cause of action in tort is created at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other States." This statement is usually true, whether the right of action is based on common law principles, or on statute (Conflict of Laws, Restatement, § 385; Goodrich on Con. of Laws, § 96; Dennick v. Central R. Co., 103 U.S. 11, 26 L.Ed. 439; see, also, In re Petition of Shannahan, etc., Hardware Co., 2 W. W. Harr. (32 Del.) 37, 118 A. 599); and though both parties concerned are domiciled elsewhere. 2 Beale's Con. of Laws, 1287.

In determining whether there is a remedy where the suit is brought, it is, also, frequently stated that no action can be maintained on a cause of action created in another State, the enforcement of which is clearly repugnant to the settled public policy of the forum. Conflict of Laws, Restat., § 612; 2 Beale's Conflict of Laws, 1290; 3 Beale's Conflict of Laws, 1647; Goodrich on Con. of Laws, 11; Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, §§ 7, 96; Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N.W. 314, 868; Reynolds v. Day, 79 Wash. 499, 140 P. 681, L. R. A. 1916A, 432; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198.

It is true it has, also, been said that the public policy of a State may sometimes be declared by its constitution, sometimes by its statutes and sometimes by its judicial decisions. Clough v. Gardiner, 111 Misc. 244, 182 N.Y.S. 803; Poling v. Poling, 116 W.Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604; Skutt v. City of Grand Rapids, 275 Mich. 258, 266 N.W. 344; Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N.W. 314, 868.

But in Reynolds v. Day, 79 Wash. 499, 140 P. 681, 683, L. R. A. 1916A, 432, the court aptly said:

"To justify a court in refusing to enforce a right of action which accrued under the law of another state, because against the policy of our laws, it must appear that it is against good morals or natural justice, or that, for some other such reason, the enforcement of it would be prejudicial to the general interests of our own citizens."

In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198, 201, supra, the cause of action arose in Massachusetts, and was apparently based on a statute of that State, but the suit was in New York. Judge Cardozo, speaking for the court, also said: "If aid is to be withheld here [in the State of New York], it must be because the cause of action in its nature offends our sense of justice or menaces the public welfare." See, also, Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 11, 16 N.W. 413, 47 Am. Rep. 771; Eskovitz v. Berger, 276 Mich. 536, 268 N.W. 883; Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N.W. 314, 868; Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.(2d) 63, 84 A. L. R. 1264.

It, therefore, seems to be well settled that a mere difference between the laws of the two States, whether in its statutory provisions, or otherwise, will not necessarily render the enforcement of a cause of action arising in one State, contrary to the public policy of another State. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198; Reynolds v. Day, 79 Wash. 499, 140 P. 681, L. R. A. 1916A, 432; Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N.W. 314, 868; Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 11, 16 N.W. 413, 47 Am. Rep. 771; 3 Beale's Con. of Laws, 1651; Conflict of Laws, Restatement, 732; Goodrich on Con. of Laws, § 96.

In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198, 201, supra, in considering this question, the court, also, said: "Similarity of legislation has indeed this importance; its absence shows beyond question that the foreign statute does not offend the local policy. But its absence does not prove the contrary. It is not to be exalted into an indispensable condition. The misleading word 'comity' has been responsible for much of the trouble. It has been fertile in suggesting a discretion unregulated by general principles."

In that case the facts were different but similar principles were involved.

Moreover in the law of almost every jurisdiction there is "a strong policy in favor of recognizing and enforcing rights and duties validly created by a foreign law." 3 Beale's Conflict of Laws, 1651; see, also, Conflict of Laws, Restatement, § 612, p. 732; Goodrich on Conf. of Laws, §§ 7, 96; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198.

At any rate, the rule of policy above referred to would seem to apply with peculiar force between the various component States of the United States. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198; Reynolds v. Day, 79 Wash. 499, 140 P. 681, L. R. A. 1916A, 432; Eskovitz v. Berger, 276 Mich. 536, 268 N.W. 883; 2 Beale's Conflict of Laws, 1651; Conflict of Laws, Restatement, § 612, p. 732; Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, §§ 7, 96.

As is pointed out by the demurrant, while the cases are not in entire accord, the objection that a right of action, accruing in another State, cannot be enforced in some other jurisdiction because of the well settled public policy in that jurisdiction, has been urged in a great variety of cases (see 3 Beale's Conf. of Laws, 1647 etc.; see, also, Mertz v. Mertz, 158 Misc. 85, 284 N.Y.S. 83; Poling v. Poling, 116 W.Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604; ...