Skinner v. Garnett Gold-Min. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 September 1899
• Docket Number: 12,551.
• Citation: 96 F. 735
• Parties: SKINNER v. GARNETT GOLD-MIN. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

96 F. 735

SKINNER v. GARNETT GOLD-MIN. CO.

No. 12,551.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. California.

September 6, 1899

F. D Soward and Whitworth & Shurtleff, for plaintiff.

Grove L. Johnson, Linforth & Whitaker, and W. W. Watson, for defendant.

MORROW Circuit Judge.

This is an action at law to recover from the corporation defendant for labor performed by plaintiff, and on assigned claims for labor performed by others. The defendant corporation is organized and exists under the laws of West Virginia. The action was originally brought in the superior court of the county of Sierra, state of California, and was transferred to this court upon the petition of the defendant. For cause of action plaintiff alleges that the defendant is a corporation existing under the laws of West Virginia, possessing property and doing business in the state of California; that defendant is indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $163.78 on account of work performed by plaintiff by the month as a laborer upon defendant's mine, the Niagara Consolidated or Garnett mine, at Hepsidan, Sierra county, Cal., between January 1 and December 14, 1897; that no part of this indebtedness has been paid; that defendant is indebted to 46 other persons in various sums on account of work performed by them on defendant's mine between January 1 and December 14, 1897 that these various sums have all been assigned by these persons to plaintiff, and that no part of them has ever been paid; that the amounts due to the plaintiff and his assignors are due to them from the defendant Garnett Gold-Mining Company for wages earned by them as laborers for said defendant between January 1 and December 14, 1897, in working upon the Niagara Consolidated or Garnett mine under an agreement by which they became due and were payable monthly that defendant promised to pay them monthly, bud did not do so, and during the whole period it had no regular pay day, and no day selected therefor, within the meaning of an act of the legislature of California entitled 'An act requiring every corporation doing business in this state to pay their employes and each of them at least once in each and every month the wages earned by such employe,' etc. St. Cal. 1897, p. 231. Plaintiff demands judgment for the sum of $3,981.50, with legal interest thereon (7 per cent.) from December 14, 1897, and costs of suit, that an attachment issue against defendant, that plaintiff be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee of $500, and that the whole be adjudged a first lien upon the property of defendant. An attachment was issued and levied upon the property of defendant in the county of Sierra, in this state, and a lis pendens was recorded in the office of the county recorder. Thereafter the case was transferred to this court on the ground that defendant, being a foreign corporation, was a nonresident of this state. Defendant denies, generally and specifically, the allegations in the several counts of the complaint, and alleges that plaintiff and his assignors were employed by defendant under an agreement whereby they each and all agreed that they would take their pay from the proceeds of defendant's mine, which was being worked by them; that they would not ask or receive or expect that their wages would be paid monthly or regularly, or upon any day selected for that purpose, and that they would not ask or receive or expect any pay for their work done until February, 1898, and that they would not bring suit to recover pay for their work until February, 1898; denies that plaintiff is entitled to any sum as attorney's fee; and alleges that, if plaintiff is entitled to any attorney's fee for the prosecution of this action, $200 would be a reasonable attorney's fee. The amount claimed by plaintiff, namely, $3,981.50, is owed by defendant. The defendant, however, claims that as to all unpaid wages earned prior to August 23, 1897, an agreement was entered into between plaintiff and his assignors and defendant on or about October 9, 1897, by which plaintiff and his assignors agreed to wait for six months after August 23, 1897, for such unpaid wages. It is agreed that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for all wages earned subsequent to August 23, 1897, amounting to $2,167.02, together with the legal interest thereon. With regard to the remaining sum of $1,814.48, due for wages earned prior to August 23, 1897, called 'back pay,' defendant claims that the action has been prematurely brought. Defendant's further contends that the statute involved (St. Cal. 1897, p. 231) is unconstitutional. The title of the act the benefit of which has been claimed by plaintiff, and the constitutionality of which defendant contests, reads:

'An act requiring every corporation doing business in this state to pay their employes and each of them at least once in each and every month, the wages earned by such employe; to limit the defenses which may be set up by such corporation to assignments of wages, set-off or counterclaims or the absence of such employes at the time of making payment, and in case of such absence the wages are payable upon demand; to prohibit assignments of wages for the purpose of evading the provisions of this act, and agreements to accept wages at longer periods than as herein provided as a condition of employment; to fix a penalty for this violation of the provisions of this act by such corporation, and to provide for the disposition of any fines recovered from corporations violating the same.'

The purpose of the act is expressed in section 1, which provides that:

'Every corporation doing business in this state shall pay at least once a month each and every employe employed by such corporation in transacting or carrying on its business, or in the performance of labor for it, the wages earned by such employe during the preceding month: provided, however, that if at the time of payment any employe shall be absent, or not engaged in his usual employment, he shall be entitled to said payment at any time thereafter upon demand.'

The provisions of all the sections of this act, with the exception of sections 2 and 6, are referred to in the title as quoted above. Section 2 provides:

'A violation of any of the provisions of section 1 of this act shall entitle each of the said employes to a lien on all the property of said corporation for the amount of their wages, which lien shall take preference over all other liens, except duly recorded mortgages or deeds of trust; and in any action to recover the amount of such wages, or to enforce said lien, the plaintiff shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, and which shall form part of the judgment in said action, and shall also be entitled to an attachment against said property. An unrecorded deed shall be no defense to such actions.'

Section 6 is as follows:

'All wages earned by any employes engaged in the service of any corporation in this state, shall be paid in lawful moneys of the United States or in checks negotiable at face value on demand.'

The constitution of California (section 24, art. 4) declares that 'every act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be expressed in its title. ' Defendant contends that, since the provisions of sections 2 and 6 of the above act are not specifically referred to in its title, these two sections are unconstitutional. The unconstitutionality of these two sections, even if established, does not invalidate the entire act, but merely the sections involved. Section 24, art. 4, of the constitution of California, also provides:

'But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in its title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title.'

In connection with which constitutional provision, see, also, Robinson v. Bidwell, 22 Cal. 379, 387; People v. Perry, 79 Cal. 105, 114, 21 P. 423.

It will be observed that we are not concerned with section 6 in the present controversy, and it may therefore be omitted from consideration. The subject of the act is comprised in section 1, which enacts that corporations shall pay their employes regularly each month. The other sections contain provisions designed to secure compliance with section 1, and section 2 provides a penalty for the violation of this section. Two sections in this act (sections 2 and 7) provide against violation of its provisions. Section 2 declares that 'a violation of any of the provisions of section 1 of this act shall entitle each of the said employes to a lien on the property of said corporation for the amount of their wages,' etc. Section 7 enacts that 'any corporation violating any of the provisions of this act shall be subject to a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or less than fifty dollars, for each violation. ' It is evident that these sections are intended to enforce compliance with the regulations of the act regarding its subject comprised in section 1, and there is, consequently, no reason why their provisions should have found expression in the title of the act.

In Ex parte Kohler, 74 Cal. 38, 41, 15 P. 436, 437, Justice Paterson, delivering the opinion of the supreme court, said:

'However numerous the provisions of an act may be, if they can fairly be considered as falling within the subject-matter of legislation, or as proper method for the attainment of the end sought by the act, there is no conflict with the constitutional provision above quoted (Const. Cal. art. 4, Sec. 24). In any event, it is only where there is a clear violation of the constitution that this court is justified in declaring it unconstitutional. * * * Manifestly, the provisions of the act all fall within the subject named in its title, and are necessary and

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