Skinner v. OGALLALA PUBLIC SCH. DIST. NO. 1
| Decision Date | 10 August 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. S-99-1287.,S-99-1287. |
| Citation | 631 N.W.2d 510,262 Neb. 387 |
| Parties | C. Patricia SKINNER, Appellee, v. OGALLALA PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Terrance O. Waite and Keith A. Harvat, of Murphy, Pederson, Waite & McWha, North Platte, for appellant.
James J. Paloucek, of Norman, Paloucek & Herman Law Offices, Curtis, for appellee.
This is a negligence action brought under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-901 et seq. (Reissue 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1994). Appellee, C. Patricia Skinner, sued appellant, Ogallala Public School District No. 1 (District), for injuries she suffered when she fell through a trapdoor in the floor that had been left open at the school. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment on the workers' compensation issue, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Skinner on the issue of whether the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act applies. After trial on the merits, the trial court entered a judgment for Skinner in the amount of $194,910.50. The District appeals on various grounds.
Skinner has been teaching special education at the school since 1983 and has served as the special education coordinator since 1987, a position she held at the time of the hearing. During the summer of 1996, the District had undertaken a project to string computer cable throughout the school. Occasionally, this meant opening various trapdoors around the school that led to tunnels underneath the building.
Sometime between 7:30 and 8 p.m. on July 16, 1996, Skinner and her husband, who is the band director at the school, went to the school to return some computer equipment he had borrowed that belonged in the band room office. Skinner's husband opened the band room door, and Skinner walked inside carrying a printer and some envelopes. There were no lights on in the room.
Skinner proceeded to the middle of the band room where she turned on the bank of lights that lighted the middle part of the main band room. She then walked to her husband's office in the opposite corner of the band room.
When Skinner entered the office, she set the box of envelopes down on her husband's desk. She then took one step toward the cabinet where the printer usually sits, holding the printer under her left arm. On her second step, however, she fell down through an open trapdoor into a 4-foot-deep tunnel below. She landed feet first and then fell backward. Skinner was stunned at first and did not realize she was hurt until she tried to get up and out of the hole. Her knee was bent, and she could not straighten her leg. The trapdoor apparently had been left open in order to dry out the tunnel below as part of the project to string computer cable throughout the building.
On prior occasions when Skinner had been in her husband's office, a shelved cart had been placed over the trapdoor. On this occasion, however, the lid to the trapdoor was leaning against the wall. Skinner and her husband testified that no warnings had been posted by the opening in the floor, although Skinner said she was aware at the time that a cabling crew was stringing cable during that summer.
As a result of the fall, Skinner broke her leg and required extensive medical treatment. Skinner worked from home through the month of August 1996. During that time, she was able to hold meetings in her house. She missed 1 day of inservice meetings and partial days for physical therapy and doctors' appointments. Skinner started physical therapy soon after the injury and continued her therapy until April 1997. She said she experienced severe pain as a result of the injury and took pain medication daily.
The District assigns, restated, the following errors:
In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. City State Bank v. Holstine, 260 Neb. 578, 618 N.W.2d 704 (2000). Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
When adverse parties have each moved for summary judgment and the trial court has sustained one of the motions, the reviewing court obtains jurisdiction over both motions and may determine the controversy which is the subject of those motions or make an order specifying the facts which appear without substantial controversy and direct such further proceedings as the court deems just. Doe v. Zedek, 255 Neb. 963, 587 N.W.2d 885 (1999). After trial, the merits should be judged in relation to the fully developed record, not whether a different judgment may have been warranted on the record at summary judgment. Id.
Where there is no factual dispute, the question of whether the injury arose out of and in the course of employment is clearly one of law, in connection with which a reviewing court has an obligation to reach its own conclusions independent of those reached by the inferior courts. Johnson v. Holdrege Med. Clinic, 249 Neb. 77, 541 N.W.2d 399 (1996).
In regard to the trial court's judgment upon trial, the determination as to whether a plaintiff is an invitee or licensee is a question of fact. McIntosh v. Omaha Public Schools, 249 Neb. 529, 544 N.W.2d 502 (1996). Likewise, the question of whether contributory negligence is present in a particular case is a question for the trier of fact. Moore v. State, 245 Neb. 735, 515 N.W.2d 423 (1994).
In actions brought pursuant to the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly wrong, and when determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment, it must be considered in the light most favorable to the successful party.... Every controverted fact must be resolved in favor of such party, and it is entitled to the benefit of every inference that can reasonably be deduced from the evidence.
(Citation omitted.) Mclntosh, 249 Neb. at 531, 544 N.W.2d at 504-05.
The District first assigns as error the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment for Skinner on the issue of whether the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act applied.
The District first argues that Skinner's exclusive remedy against the District is under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act and that under the act, the District has been released from all claims arising from Skinner's injury. For this argument, the District cites Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-148 (Reissue 1998), which states:
If any employee ... of any employer subject to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act files any claim with, or accepts any payment from such employer, or from any insurance company carrying such risk, on account of personal injury, or makes any agreement, or submits any question to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court under such act, such action shall constitute a release to such employer of all claims or demands at law, if any, arising from such injury.
The District argues that because Skinner submitted an "Employee's Report" to the District's insurance company, and because she received and cashed four out of five workers' compensation checks from the insurer, the District is released under § 48-148 and that Skinner therefore cannot proceed in tort against the District.
Indeed, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act is an employee's exclusive remedy against an employer for an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Levander v. Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, 257 Neb. 283, 596 N.W.2d 705 (1999). An employee cannot normally maintain a negligence suit against his or her employer regarding an injury arising out of and in the course of employment; his or her sole remedy is a claim for workers' compensation. Id. However, the District's argument begs the question whether the act applies at all. The language in § 48-148, in specifying an employee who is "subject to the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act files any claim," means that the statute covers only claims arising out of and in the course of employment, i.e., claims to which the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act applies. See Marlow v. Maple Manor Apartments, 193 Neb. 654, 228 N.W.2d 303 (1975) (). Thus,...
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