Skinner v. Sheriff, Clark County, 9636
| Decision Date | 29 June 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 9636,9636 |
| Citation | 93 Nev. 340,566 P.2d 80 |
| Parties | Amelia SKINNER, Appellant, v. SHERIFF, CLARK COUNTY, Nevada, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Following a preliminary examination, Amelia Skinner was ordered to stand trial for robbery, a felony under NRS 200.380. Thereafter, she filed a pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus contending there was insufficient evidence produced at the preliminary examination to establish probable cause to believe she committed the charged offense. The district judge denied habeas, and, in this appeal, Skinner advances the same contention.
Our review shows that on August 2, 1976, Lucinda Heckard was accosted by Vernell Williams on a Las Vegas sidewalk. The two women combatted during this encounter and then parted company. A short time later, Williams returned to the scene in a car driven by the Appellant, Amelia Skinner. After Skinner asked Heckard why she and Williams had been fighting, the record reflects that Williams again attacked Heckard. During the second encounter, Skinner allegedly scattered the contents of Heckard's purse on the sidewalk and took some money and keys.
The essence of Skinner's argument is that she did not accomplish the taking of the money and keys by means of force or violence; therefore, an essential element of the crime of robbery is lacking and the charge must be dismissed. 1 We agree.
In order for the recited conduct to achieve the magnitude of robbery, it was incumbent on the prosecution to present evidence to show that Skinner and Vernell Williams acted in concert in the battering of Heckard; thereupon, Williams' use of force against the victim could then be imputed to Skinner. State v. Gerhardt, 97 Idaho 603, 549 P.2d 262 (1976). Here, the record contains no evidence from which we could infer that Skinner participated with Williams in a common scheme or plan to batter the victim. In the absence of facts or conduct showing or inferring such an agreement, Skinner's mere presence "would not render (her) guilty of robbery, however reprehensible (her) conduct may have been in subsequently taking (the victim's) property." James v. State, 144 Tex.Cr.R. 126, 161 S.W.2d 285 (1942), aff'd on rehearing, ...
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Labastida v. State
...healed. It has long been established that mere presence at the scene of a crime is not enough to establish guilt. Skinner v. Sheriff, 93 Nev. 340, 341, 566 P.2d 80, 81 (1977). In Skinner, the defendant was charged with robbery, and even though the defendant had stolen some property after so......
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Merritte v. State
...P.2d 443, 447 (1999) (mere presence, without more, is insufficient to support conviction as aider and abettor); Skinner v. Sheriff, 93 Nev. 340, 341, 566 P.2d 80, 81 (1977) (mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to establish guilt). Therefore, we reverse Merritte's convictio......
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Labastida v. State
...373, 376, 784 P.2d 942, 943-44 (1989) (reversing convictions of involuntary manslaughter of a child); see also Skinner v. Sheriff, 93 Nev. 340, 341, 566 P.2d 80, 81 (1977) (mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to establish guilt). As the jury was instructed, the evidence mu......
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Ikie v. State, 21170
...abetting so as to afford the defendant adequate notice to prepare his defense. Id. at 668, 669 P.2d at 729. See also Skinner v. Sheriff, 93 Nev. 340, 566 P.2d 80 (1977) (mere presence does not render defendant guilty of the crime, however reprehensible her conduct was subsequent to the In t......