Skinner v. State
| Decision Date | 07 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D09-2359.,1D09-2359. |
| Citation | 31 So.3d 940 |
| Parties | Stephen P. SKINNER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
David M. Robbins and Susan Z. Cohen, of Epstein & Robbins, Jacksonville, for Petitioner.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General; and Thomas D. Winokur and Ian M. Cotner, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
The petitioner, Stephen P. Skinner, seeks a writ of certiorari to review a decision of the circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity. The circuit court affirmed petitioner's county court judgment of guilt for driving under the influence (DUI). Because the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law, we grant the writ and quash the circuit court's decision.
In the county court, petitioner moved to suppress critical evidence on the grounds the initial detention and arrest were unlawful, so that any evidence obtained during and after the detention and arrest— including any testimony that petitioner had operated a motor vehicle involved in the two-vehicle crash under investigation— should be suppressed. See Curry v. State, 576 So.2d 890, 892 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (), aff'd, 621 So.2d 410 (Fla.1993). At the suppression hearing, Trooper James Brooker testified he had answered a dispatch reporting a traffic collision. By the time Brooker got to the crash site, one victim from the other vehicle was already on the way to the hospital. Brooker observed two remaining "civilians," the petitioner and another man, Charles. Both men were standing outside one of the vehicles, leaning against the passenger side. Brooker did not see either man inside a vehicle. The hearing transcript does not disclose the presence of any other non-law enforcement persons at the scene while Brooker was on-site.
In response to a series of questions from the prosecutor, Brooker testified "Mr. Skinner's vehicle," a four-wheel-drive pickup truck, made a left turn on a green light. Defense counsel objected to this line of questions because the State had not laid a predicate indicating the source of the information. The trial judge "clarified" the State's intended question as "What did you observe when you arrived at the scene?" and sustained the objection. After additional questioning of Brooker by the State, defense counsel objected on the ground the witness' characterization of the truck as petitioner's vehicle was based solely on privileged information.
When asked what he had observed when he first contacted "the victim"—whom, from the context of the questioning, we take as the petitioner—Brooker testified petitioner was leaning against the vehicle, with a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, bloodshot eyes, and slurred speech. Brooker conducted a traffic crash investigation and had petitioner remain at the scene. Petitioner averted direct eye contact and looked down while the trooper questioned him. Brooker had to ask several times what happened before petitioner responded. On the basis of his observations and investigation, Brooker arrested petitioner for DUI with damage to a person or property and took him to the county jail for testing.
The State asked whether Trooper Brooker had interviewed Charles, and Brooker answered affirmatively. When the prosecutor asked whether Brooker had identified petitioner as the driver, defense counsel immediately objected based on the lack of foundation regarding the source of this information during the investigation. After extensive argument of counsel, the county court sustained the objection based on the "accident or crash report" privilege in section 316.066(7), Florida Statutes (2007), and instructed the prosecutor to proceed to the next question. The State not only failed to challenge this ruling; it never proffered on the record what testimony, if any, the trooper would have given on this critical issue.
At the close of evidence, defense counsel relied on the accident report privilege to argue that, absent any admissible evidence that petitioner was the driver, Brooker lacked a legal basis to detain and arrest him for DUI. The prosecutor suggested petitioner's proximity to the vehicle and indicators of impairment constituted circumstantial evidence he "was involved in the accident." Concluding from the record that no competent substantial evidence demonstrated petitioner was driving or in actual physical control of the vehicle, the county court granted the motion to suppress. As shown below this order should have ended the matter, but did not.
The State moved for rehearing alleging the prosecution had presented evidence the trooper interviewed "the Defendant's passenger," who purportedly witnessed the accident and "identified the Defendant as the driver of the vehicle." At a hearing several weeks later, the prosecutor mistakenly recalled and stated that in the earlier proceeding, the unobjectionable testimony of Brooker established he had interviewed Charles—the purported passenger and the only other eyewitness who remained at the crash site—whose "statement" identified petitioner as the driver. The attorneys agreed the State had not subpoenaed or called Charles to testify at the suppression hearing. At a subsequent hearing, one of the prosecutors said "I'm going on the assumption that the officer said this witness told me the defendant was driving, because I do not have a transcript." The county court announced it would consider the trooper's testimony "as to the statement of identification of the defendant, Mr. Skinner," as the driver as coming from a declarant whose privilege against self-incrimination was not violated. Accepting the State's recollection that Charles had made such a statement, and rejecting defense counsel's consistent argument that no competent substantial evidence showed who was the driver, the judge granted rehearing, reversed his prior ruling, and denied the motion to suppress. Skinner entered a plea of no contest to the DUI charge, specifically reserving his right to appeal the dispositive suppression issue.
In the circuit court appeal, petitioner argued that no evidence in the record established either probable cause or even a reasonable suspicion petitioner was the driver or was in actual physical control of a vehicle involved in the accident. In its answer brief, the State pointed to Brooker's testimony, once again relying upon Charles' alleged statements, and also on the trooper's observation of the petitioner and Charles leaning against the pickup truck.
The circuit court affirmed the county court's ultimate ruling. In support of affirmance, the circuit court relied on Brooker's recall of petitioner (and Charles) standing beside one of the vehicles, and the purported statement of "a person involved in the crash" that petitioner was the driver. Petitioner now invokes our discretionary certiorari jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 4(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution; and rules 9.030(b)(2)(B) and 9.100(a), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, to challenge the circuit court's final appellate order. See Wood v. State, 775 So.2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
On certiorari review of the circuit court's appellate order, we determine only whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law. See Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995); Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Trimble, 821 So.2d 1084,...
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