Skipper v. The State Of Ga.

• Decision Date: 31 August 1877
• Citation: 59 Ga. 63
• Parties: Edward B. Skipper, plaintiff in error. v. The State of Georgia, defendant in error.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

59 Ga. 63

Edward B. Skipper, plaintiff in error. v. The State of Georgia, defendant in error.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

(August Term, 1877.)

Criminal law. Witness. Impeachment. Accessory. New trial. Before Judge Kiddoo. Randolph Superior Court. May Term, 1877.

Reported in the opinion.

B. S. & W. C. Worrill, for plaintiff in error.

James T. Flewellen, solicitor general, by John T. Clarke, for the state.

*BLECKLEY, Judge.

The larceny was of three cows. The corpus delicti was clearly proved. One cow had been recovered. The hides ofthe other two had been found and identified. All three of the animals had been driven into Alabama and sold. The prisoner\'s brother had sold them. He was jointly indicted with the prisoner for the larceny, and, at the time of the prisoner\'s trial had been convicted. He was a witness for the state on the prisoner\'s trial, and if his testimony was true, the prisoner was undoubtedly guilty as charged. There was some appearance of self-contradiction in a part of his evidence. Some of it was contradicted by another witness introduced by the state. Still, the main facts implicating the prisoner stood uncontradicted, and as to all of them that were essential, he was strongly corroborated by another witness, who testified to seeing the prisoner, with some other person, engaged in driving the cattle, near the place from whence they were stolen, and about the time the larceny was committed. This second witness was a female, who admitted that she had prosecuted the prisoner for stealing some of her property.

1. Request was made of the court to charge the jury that if they believed a witness "has sworn falsely in any one thing, or upon one point, " they were to conclude "that he has sworn falsely in the whole." Also, that if they believed, from the evidence, that the prisoner's brother, "as insisted upon, and admitted by counsel for the state, has been guilty of knowing and willful perjury in one particular, or upon one point, " they were "to conclude that he is false in the whole of his statements."

The court declined so to charge. One good reason for declining may be assigned, applicable alike to both propositions: It is, that no allowance is made for corroboration, and the record contains strong corroborating evidence. Indeed, the latter evidence was sufficient in itself to warrant a conviction. The true rule is, that if a witness swear willfully *and knowingly false, his testimony ought to be disregarded entirely, unless it is so corroborated by circumstances, or other evidence unimpeached, as to be irresistible. 23 Ga., 566; 13 Ib., 508. Besides this broad reason that goes to the rejection of both propositions, there is another well founded objection to each of them. The first proposition fails to distinguish between testimony that is false merely, and that which is knowingly and willfully false. See 23 Ga., 581; 7 Wheat., 283. The second proposition asserts that counsel for the state admitted and insisted upon the perjury; and the court was requested to instruct the jury that such was the fact. Perhaps it was not the fact; and the refusal of the request may have been due, in part or in whole, to that circumstance. The bill of exceptions does not inform us whether what the request assumes, was true or false.

2. Another request to charge, which was also refused by the court, was in these terms, ' If you believe from the evidence that either one or more of the witnesses has ill-will or unkind feelings to prisoner, that is one of the methods of impeaching awitness, and that weakens the testimony of the witness." Ill-will in a witness does not, ipso facto, work an impeachment, nor does it necessarily weaken the force of his testimony. It may weaken it, and is proper to be considered by the jury. Code, sec. 3876; 2 Phil. Ev., 729, 730; 9 Ga., 121. Compare what is said on relationship. 10 Ga., 356; 6 Ib., 349. No doubt, there are conscientious witnesses who are made the more cautious by the existence of any ill-will under which they labor. They guard themselves against being influenced by it, and in their apprehension of going beyond the truth under the lead of their feelings, they stop something short, to be on the safe side. Thus, their ill-will operates favorably, rather than unfavorably, to the party against whom they are called. Witnesses may be scarce who can do full justice to their enemies, but certainly there are some. For my own part, I think there are multitudes of people who...