City of Aztec v. Gurule, Docket No. 31,480 (N.M. 1/25/2010)
| Decision Date | 25 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 31,480. |
| Parties | CITY OF AZTEC, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANTHONY GURULE, Defendant-Petitioner. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, Adrianne R. Turner, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM. for Petitioner,
Thrower Law Firm, P.C., Larry T. Thrower, Farmington, NM, for Respondent.
{1} This case permits us to reconsider a long-standing procedural requirement that has lost its usefulness in the twenty-first century. We hold that municipal ordinances are properly considered law, and thus need no longer be proven as facts necessary for a prima facie case, and we apply this rule to affirm Anthony Gurule's ("Defendant") conviction of aggravated driving while intoxicated ("DWI"), contrary to the City Code of Aztec, New Mexico. Aztec, N.M., City Code § 24-21.1 (2007) (), http://www.aztecnm.gov/citycode/chapter24-traffic.pdf.1
{2} Defendant was found guilty of aggravated DWI in the City of Aztec Municipal Court. He appealed to the Eleventh Judicial District Court, and again was found guilty after a trial de novo. At the close of evidence in the trial de novo, Defendant objected that the city had not met its evidentiary burden, as it failed to introduce the relevant ordinance into evidence. The City of Aztec ("City") admitted that it had not introduced the ordinance, but argued that the ordinance was presented by reference because Aztec adopted the state statute, to which the judge had ready access. The City acknowledged that it could not rely on the record for an element of proof. The district court did not rule on the objection. No mention was made on the record as to whether or not the district court did, or could, take judicial notice of the city ordinance. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss after the trial, renewing the argument that the City did not prove its case because it failed to introduce the relevant ordinance. The motion was denied.
{3} The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction in a Memorandum Opinion by concluding the district court took judicial notice of the city ordinance under which Defendant was convicted, thereby finding the City proved the prima facie elements of its case. City of Aztec v. Gurule, No. 28,705, memo. op. at 4 (Dec. 2, 2008). We now affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals on grounds other than those set forth in the Memorandum Opinion and write to clarify the purpose and method of taking judicial notice of a municipal ordinance, which we now recognize as law.
{4} Judicial notice is familiar to the legal community as a tool of evidence. We often neglect to recognize, however, that courts take notice of law on a daily basis; indeed, we could not succeed in our work if we were not free to consult the great body of local, state, national, and international law that exists and, thanks to modern research techniques, is accessible to legal researchers in any locale. We take this opportunity first to review judicial notice of adjudicative facts, then to discuss judicial notice of law and why municipal ordinances henceforth will be treated as law.
{5} This case requires us to rule on an issue of law, and therefore our review is de novo. See Boradiansky v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2007-NMSC-015, ¶ 5, 141 N.M. 387 156 P.3d 25.
{6} Our rules of evidence permit trial courts to take judicial notice of "adjudicative facts," Rule 11-201(A) NMRA, which are "simply the facts of the particular case." Fed. R. Evid. 201(1972 Advisory Committee note to subdivision (a)). Judicial notice of fact alleviates the evidentiary burden on a party and is taken pursuant to the rules of evidence. See Personnel Dep't, Inc. v. Prof'l Staff Leasing Corp., 297 Fed. Appx. 773, 785 n.10 (10th Cir. 2008). Our rules of evidence permit courts to take judicial notice of facts "not subject to reasonable dispute," including facts that are "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Rule 11-201(B)(2). A court has discretion to take judicial notice sua sponte, Rule 11-201(C), but must take judicial notice if requested by a party and that party has furnished the court with the information necessary. Rule 11-201(D). Judicial notice may be taken at any time during the proceeding. Rule 11-201(F).
{7} When a court takes judicial notice of a fact, it must be done on the record. There are two main reasons trial courts should make a clear record when taking judicial notice of a fact: (1) to facilitate appellate review, see Frost v. Markham, 86 N.M. 261, 263, 522 P.2d 808, 810 (1974), and (2) to provide notice, as required by due process, to the opposing party. See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 173 (1961). Our trial courts should be explicit when taking judicial notice, for the benefit of the parties and the reviewing courts.
{8} At the time of Defendant's trial de novo, our law treated a municipal ordinance that was the applicable law as a fact which had to be pled and proven as part of a party's prima facie case . Muller v. City of Albuquerque, 92 N.M. 264, 265, 587 P.2d 42, 43 (1978). The reason for the rule requiring proof of municipal ordinances dates to a time when discovering the content of an ordinance was difficult, if not impossible, for any court not located in that municipality. See Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc. v. Capital Terminal Co., 391 F.3d 312, 3232-4 (1st Cir. 2004) (Lipez, J., concurring) (). Municipal ordinances historically have been treated in the same manner as foreign law, and thus were part of that body of law treated as fact to be proven by the parties. See 2 George E. Dix, et al., McCormick on Evidence § 328 (6th ed. 2006) (); 1 Clifford S. Fishman, Jones on Evidence § 2.85 (7th ed. 1992) ().
{9} A magistrate judge may take judicial notice of an ordinance from the same municipality in which the magistrate sits. See 9A Eugene McQuillan, McQuillan: The Law of Municipal Corporations § 27:51 (3d ed. 2007). This is for the same reason that our state courts may take judicial notice of state statutes: it is presumed magistrate courts have ready access to a current copy of the local ordinances. See Town of Forks v. Fletcher, 652 P.2d 16, 17 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) ().
{10} Likewise, we permit a district court conducting a trial de novo to take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance that controls the case. City of Albuquerque v. Leatherman, 74 N.M. 780, 781, 399 P.2d 108, 109 (1965). This rule, known as the Leatherman exception, exists because the district court hearing a case de novo may "take notice of whatever facts the [municipal court] could have noticed judicially[.]" Id. at 782, 399 P.2d at 110 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While we agree with the Court of Appeals that the district court was permitted to take judicial notice of the municipal ordinance under the Leatherman exception, because of our holding today, we need not rule whether judicial notice was properly taken by the district court in this case.2
{11} Our appellate courts do not take judicial notice of municipal ordinances. See Muller, 92 N.M. at 265, 587 P.2d at 43 (); Coe v. City of Albuquerque, 81 N.M. 361, 364, 467 P.2d 27, 30 (1970); Gen. Servs. Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Bernalillo County, 75 N.M. 550, 552, 408 P.2d 51, 52 (1965). This is because we have treated municipal ordinances as facts, and we do not consider new facts when conducting appellate review. See Gen. Servs. Corp., 75 N.M. at 552, 408 P.2d at 53, 408 P.2d at 53 ().
{12} "Judicial notice of fact is distinct from judicial notice of law." Personnel Dep't, 297 Fed. Appx. at 785 n.10. Judicial notice of fact is simply an "evidentiary shortcut," while judicial notice of law is "the commonsense doctrine that the rules of evidence governing admissibility and proof of documents generally do not make sense to apply to statutes or judicial opinions — which are technically documents — because they are presented to the court as law, not to the jury as evidence." Getty Petroleum, 391 F.3d at 321-22. Although we do not do so explicitly, "courts take judicial notice of law every time they cite a statute or judicial decision." Id. at 324. It is permissible, indeed required, therefore, for our trial and appellate courts to take judicial notice of the law necessary for the resolution of all cases in front of the courts.
{13} The rule requiring proof of municipal ordinances as fact is not consistent with the role of courts with respect to law and fact. "[D]etermination of the applicable law is an issue of law, not of fact." City of Cedar Rapids v. Cach, 299 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Iowa 1980). We agree that
[a]s all law has become increasingly accessible and judges have tended to assume the duty to rule on the tenor of all law, the notion that [the...
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