Skyy v. State
| Decision Date | 07 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 02-17-00038-CR,02-17-00038-CR |
| Parties | MICHELLE SKYY APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION1Appellant Michelle Skyy appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence in the prosecution against her for possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.102(6) (West Supp. 2017) (), § 481.115(d) (West 2017) (). We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on April 29, 2015, Skyy called 911 and told the dispatcher that her husband, Sean Valdez,2 was threatening her with an AR-15 in their home. Arlington police began to coordinate a SWAT team response and officers arrived on the scene. Shortly after they arrived, Valdez exited the home without the weapon and police arrested him. Once police had secured Valdez and placed him in a patrol car, Officer Jesse Manning and two additional officers conducted a protective sweep of the home.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Manning testified that they performed the protective sweep "to make sure . . . that there[ was] no one else injured or . . . inside the house that could be potentially part of the problem." He specifically denied that the purpose of the sweep was to search for evidence. During the sweep, the officers discovered in the master bedroom what Officer Manning described as "a very tall wardrobe closet, like a portable wardrobe closet [that] was 6-foot tall." Concerned that a person could be in the wardrobe closet, OfficerManning looked inside and found what appeared to be "fairly substantial" marijuana plants that were "pretty tall[ and] significant."
After the protective sweep, which Officer Manning testified lasted "[m]aybe two minutes," the officers exited the home and informed detectives on the scene of the discovery of marijuana plants in the master bedroom. The officers then secured the house and decided to apply for a search warrant to look for the AR-15 allegedly used to threaten Skyy.
According to Officer Jack Jenkins, once Valdez was taken to jail, he told another detective during an interview that the AR-15 was located in a storage ottoman in the master bedroom. Using this information, Officer Jenkins applied for and obtained a search warrant to look for the AR-15 ("the gun warrant").
Detective William Bill, a narcotics detective, assisted Officer Jenkins in executing the gun warrant. While executing the gun warrant, Detective Bill observed the wardrobe closet containing the marijuana plants and removed the plants from the house. Based on his observations during the execution of the gun warrant, Detective Bill applied for and obtained a second warrant to search the home for additional marijuana and items used to distribute marijuana ("the drug warrant"). According to Officer Bill's police report, which was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing, when he executed the drug warrant he found methamphetamine and additional marijuana inside a safe in the garage.
At some point in the afternoon, in addition to the marijuana plants found inside the home, Officer Bill discovered more marijuana and "a large amount of cash" inside Skyy's vehicle.
Skyy was charged with one count of possession of four or more but less than 200 grams of methamphetamine and one count of possession of four or more but less than 200 grams of methamphetamine with an intent to deliver. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.102(6), 481.115(d). Before trial, Skyy moved to suppress any and all evidence obtained by the State without reasonable suspicion or a search warrant. The motion did not identify the evidence Skyy wished to suppress, but at the suppression hearing the above-recited evidence was introduced and Skyy's counsel argued three-fold: that the protective sweep was unlawful, that Officer Jenkins's search warrant was an illegal search warrant because it was based on information obtained through the illegal protective sweep, and that the drug warrant was "critically defective."
After the trial court denied Skyy's motion, she pleaded no contest and was placed on deferred adjudication pending a two-year period of community supervision.
Discussion
Skyy brings two issues on appeal, both relating to the motion to suppress. In her first issue, Skyy argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to suppress. In her second issue, Skyy argues that the trial courtabused its discretion when it failed to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law. We overrule both and affirm the trial court's judgment.
A. Standard of review and applicable law
Generally, we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We give almost total deference to a trial court's rulings on questions of historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, but we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
But where, as in this case, we must review a magistrate's probable cause determination, we apply the deferential standard of review set out by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983). Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Under that standard, we uphold the magistrate's probable cause determination "so long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing." Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 2331 (internal citations omitted); see also State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d268, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Flores v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
In performing our review, we interpret the affidavit supporting the warrant McClain, 337 S.W.3d at 271. "The focus is not on what other facts could or should have been included in the affidavit; the focus is on the combined logical force of facts that are in the affidavit." State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 349, 354-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
B. Preservation
To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request, objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Douds v. State, 472 S.W.3d 670, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1461 (2016). Further, the trial court must have ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the complaining party must have objected to the trial court's refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Everitt v. State, 407 S.W.3d 259, 262-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). A reviewing court should not address the merits of an issue that has not been preserved for appeal. Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Preservation of error is a systemicrequirement that this court should review on its own motion. Darcy v. State, 488 S.W.3d 325, 327-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
Skyy's motion to suppress sought the suppression of "any and all evidence seized or obtained as a result of illegal detention," "evidence that will be offered by the State," "[a]ny statements and acts allegedly made by [Skyy] . . . , and any tangible or other evidence seized or acquired then, or at any later time as a result of said statements or acts." She did not clarify at the hearing what evidence she sought to suppress, nor did she clarify this in her brief on appeal. We cannot discern which items of evidence she wanted to suppress. Accordingly, Skyy has failed to preserve any error. See Johnson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 700, 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (); see also Amador v. State (Amador II), 275 S.W.3d 872, 874 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) .
C. The protective sweep and the independent source doctrine
Even if we were to hold that Skyy preserved her argument that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress, her arguments fail because of the application of the independent source doctrine. The foundation of Skyy's argument is her contention that the protective sweep was illegal and its illegality tainted the gun and drug warrants in such a way to render them unsupported byprobable cause. The State counters that, under the independent source doctrine, even if the protective sweep was unjustified and therefore illegal, any illegality did not taint the gun and drug warrants. We agree.
Simply put, the independent source doctrine provides that facts do not become "'sacred and inaccessible' simply because they are first discovered unlawfully; rather, '[i]f knowledge of [facts] is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others[.]'" Wehrenberg v. State (Wehrenberg II), 416 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013...
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