Slade v. Mills

• Decision Date: 08 April 1936
• Docket Number: No. 377.,377.
• Citation: 184 S.E. 844,209 N.C. 823
• Parties: SLADE et al. v. WILLIS HOSIERY MILLS et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

184 S.E. 844

209 N.C. 823

SLADE et al.

v.WILLIS HOSIERY MILLS et al.

No. 377.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 8, 1936.

Appeal from Superior Court, Cabarrus County; Clement, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mrs. Jack Slade, claim ant, for the death of Jack Slade, employee, opposed by the Willis Hosiery Mills and others. From an order reversing an award by the Industrial Commission, claimant appeals. Affirmed.

Proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act (Code 1935, § 8081 (h) et seq.) to determine liability of defendants to next of kin of Jack Slade, deceased, employee.

The deceased was employed by Willis Hosiery Mills as general handy man around the mill. On June, 13, 1934, he was cleaning and scouring the dye machines with broom and hose, also the ditch under the machines. For this work he had special clothes, including rubber shoes. The machines were not in operation and the boilers were cold. The ditch under the machines is 2 feet deep, 5 or 6 feet wide, and" 25 or 30 feet long. The machines stand 4 or 5 feet above the ditch. The six windows and three doors in the dye house were open. The weather was not excessively hot, but "it was during the hot spell in June, and down behind these machines it is almost impossible for any one to get to you. It was an unusually hot day." Slade had been removing ashes from the furnaces and carrying them to a pile about 2 feet from the mill. He had to get in the sunshine to take the ashes out. He was doing his usual work, it was not heavy, though he had not washed the machines in this way in about eighteen months. It was hotter under the machines than anywhere else. The water was cold and Slade was wet.

The deceased was well when he went to work on the morning of the 13th. That night "he was deathly sick all night."

The doctor testified that he was called to see Slade on the morning of the 14th. "He was in bed and acutely sick. He had consolidated pneumonia. He died on the 20th. The pneumonia was due to sudden change of temperature, going from the hot room out into the open air. It produced a congestive chill."

The Industrial Commission awarded compensation. This was reversed on appeal to the superior court. From the latter ruling, plaintiff appeals, assigning error.

Waller D. Brown, of Concord, for appellant.

R. M. Robinson, of Greensboro, for appellees.

STACY, Chief Justice.

Did Jack Slade's death result from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment? We agree with the judge of the superior court the evidence is not such as to permit an affirmative inference.

By the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act, "death" means only death resulting from an injury, and "injury" means only "injury by accident" arising out of and in the course of the employment, and does not include a disease in any form, except where it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident. Code 1935, § 8081 (i). "Accident" as here used has been defined "as an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the person who suffers the injury." Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266, 268. And it was said in McNeely v. Carolina Asbestos Co., 206 N.C. 568, 174 S.E. 509, 513, that "injury by accident" has reference to "an injury produced without the design or expectation of the workman." See also, Thomas v. Lawrence, 189 N.C. 521, 127 S.E. 585, and 28 R.C.L. 787.

Death from injury by accident implies a result produced by a fortuitous cause. Scott v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 160, 179 S.E. 434. A compensable death, then, is one which results to an employee from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. There must be an accident followed by an injury by such accident which results in harm to the employee before it is compensable under our statute. Cabe v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, 202 N.C. 176, 162 S.E. 223; Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 128 A. 635, 44 A. L.R. 363. It was said in Johnson v. Hughes and Southern Dairies, 207 N.C. 544, 177 S.E. 632, that an injury resulting from the employer's negligence may be tantamount to an injury by accident. See, also, Pilley v. Greenville Cotton Mills, 201 N.C. 426, 160 S.E. 479. The act was intended to cover all accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of the employment which result in harm to the...