Slatcoff v. Dezen
| Decision Date | 20 July 1954 |
| Citation | 74 So.2d 59 |
| Parties | SLATCOFF v. DEZEN et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Ginsberg & Pelle, Miami, for petitioner.
Englander & Hoffman, Miami Beach, for respondents.
Chester Bedell, Jacksonville, for the Florida Bar, amicus curiae.
The facts in this controversy may be stated in one sentence: When the issues were formed, the plaintiff requested the chancellor to set the cause for trial but the chancellor, despite the objections of the plaintiff, appointed on his own motion a special master in chancery and directed the master to take the testimony and 'report his findings of fact and conclusions of law * * * with his recommendations.' From this procedure arises the question whether a chancellor has the power to refer a case to a master with instructions to hear the witnesses and make findings of fact based on the testimony, and to report his findings as well as his conclusions relative to the applicable law if a party-litigant objects.
At the outset we should state with candor that the importance of the problem is emphasized by the opinion of this Court in Harmon v. Marmon, Fla., 40 So.2d 209, because we there gave considerable dignity to a master's findings of fact, holding that inasmuch as he had observed the witnesses when they testified, his deductions and determinations could not be upset unless he had clearly made a mistake. To state it otherwise the master had in such circumstances an advantage as an accredited agent of the court and his findings of fact should not be set aside except for 'good cause.' As we had held that the presumption of correctness of a chancellor's findings was one of degree, being stronger where he had heard the testimony, so we translated the principle to findings of a master who had heard the testimony. By such reasoning we reached the conclusion that the weight of the findings of a master based upon testimony he had heard should be the same before the chancellor as the weight of a chancellor's findings based upon testimony he had heard would be before this Court.
Nothing was written in the case of Harmon v. Harmon, supra, that would warrant the interpretation that reference to a master constituted a delegation of power to him to decide the whole case. Since that decision, the Court has held that even in the absence of exceptions to the special master's report it is 'the duty of the court to examine and carefully consider the evidence and determine whether under the law and the facts the court is justified in entering the decree recommended by the Master.' Lyon v. Lyon, Fla., 54 So.2d 679, 680. At the time this decision was rendered Equity Rule No. 65 provided that if no exceptions to the master's report were taken, the report should be confirmed by order or decree. Effective 1 June 1954 this part of the rule was changed to provide that in the absence of exceptions 'the court shall take such action on the report as may be appropriate.' Rule 3.14(l) 1954, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Harmon v. Harmon, supra, we recognized, and did not recede from, the rule announced in McAdow v. Smith, 127 Fla. 29, 172 So. 448, and Kent v. Knowles, 101 Fla. 1375, 133 So. 315, that where a matter is submitted to a special master by agreement of the parties, the master's findings could not be set aside at the bare discretion of the Court but had the weight of the verdict of a jury. In the case of Kent v. Knowles, supra [101 Fla. 1375, 133 So. 316], the Court referred to the decision in Croom v. Ocala Plumbing & Electric Co., 62 Fla. 460, 57 So. 243, where it was written that the "rule is well settled that when the parties consent to the reference of a case to a master or other officer to hear and decide all the issues therein, both of fact and law, and such reference is entered as a rule of court, it is a submission of the controversy to a special tribunal, selected by the parties * * * and its determinations are not subject to be set aside and disregarded at the bare discretion of the court". (Italics supplied.)
It is clear from an examination of the original record in Croom v. Ocala Plumbing & Electric Co., supra, that the attorneys consented to a reference to a master, but it is not clear that the master named was especially endorsed by them although the order of reference is subject to that interpretation. In Harmon v. Harmon, supra, the original record discloses no consent to the appointment of a master or protest against that course. In McAdow v. Smith and Kent v. Knowles, supra, the parties agreed to the appointment of a particular person as special master and the chancellor's action in making the appointment was not challenged here.
The practical situation of the Harmon case has little resemblance to the matter before us for there, in the absence of any objection, the matter was referred to a competent attorney who proceeded to hear testimony that, when transcribed, filled over six hundred pages. For his services the master received $1,500. The reasonableness of the compensation was not questioned but what we said, and now reiterate, is that when a party to a chancery suit asks for the appointment of a master and the case is referred without objection and the amount of work done by a competent attorney is measured by the allowance just stated, the task he assumed and the authority delegated to him, give his conclusions of fact, based on the testimony he himself heard, such importance and significance that they may not be overridden unless clearly wrong.
Of course, we realize the weight of the findings should not depend on the size of the master's fee, and that in many instances the chancellors must, to expedite litigation, appoint masters for certain services, but the fact remains that despite the policy of the State to administer justice primarily at the State's expense, when a master is appointed the cost of his services falls on the litigants.
So if the ruling in the Harmon case had been the opposite, the parties, or some of them, would have borne the substantial fee only to have the case retried by the chancellor who had not meanwhile seen any of the witnesses. In such event the professional skill of the master would have come to naught.
The petitioner concedes that a special master may be appointed to perform a ministerial service even over the objection of one of the parties, but she insists that the appointment of one to make findings of the facts of the whole case which would have the weight of a jury verdict under one of the cases cited, which could not be lightly overruled under another case cited, and which could not be overridden under the Harmon case, unless clearly erroneous, violates her constitutional rights if done over her protest.
There are provisions in the F.S.A. Constitution for the performance of judicial functions by persons other than judges of courts. Under Section 14 of Article V the circuit judge may appoint court commissioners with the limited power to issue writs of injunction and habeas corpus in the absence of the circuit judge from the county, but the orders of such commissioners are subject to review by the circuit judge who may confirm, qualify or vacate them. Further, under Section 19 of Article V, a judge ad litem may try a case if the judge is disqualified and under Section 20 of the same Article, a referee may try a case upon order of the judge, but references to judges ad litem and referees depend upon the agreement of the parties.
Although there is no reference in the Constitution to masters, we have no difficulty in deciding that courts of chancery may appoint them to assist in the disposition of litigation, nor do we underestimate the need of their services in many instances. We are only concerned with the extent of the authority which may be conferred upon them and the effect upon that authority of the consent, acquiescence or objection of the immediate parties.
Under an Act of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Florida, approved 15 March 1844, testimony in chancery cases was authorized to be taken in open court, or before the judge in vacation or before an examiner appointed by the court. The examiner could take the testimony orally or upon written interrogatories in such manner as might be prescribed by the rules of practice of the court.
In the first general assembly after the admission of Florida into the Union, an Act, Chapter 51, 1845, was passed 'regulating the appointment of Masters in Chancery, and defining their duties.' Here again it was specified that after their appointment, in writing, and qualification, by taking an oath, the masters should 'perform, under the direction of the Court, all the duties which, according to the practice in Chancery, appertain to the office.' (Italics supplied.)
In spite of the reference to the duties conforming to the practice, the Act contained detailed provisions about procedure before the master, from the time of reference to the filing of his report. There was express provision that masters should 'have all the powers conferred on Masters in Chancery by the rules of practice prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States, for the Chancery Courts of the United States, now in force in this State.' Sec. 18, Chap. 51, 1845.
In Bush's Digest of the Statute Law of Florida, (1872) which contains the Code of Procedure, we find that although the Constitution then fixed jurisdiction in all cases in equity, as well as certain cases at law, in the circuit courts, the Code provided that 'The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity' be abolished. Sec. 49, Title I, Part Second. Aside from historic interest the provision does introduce the manner then inaugurated of taking testimony by someone other than the judge, or chancellor, and the weight given findings based on that testimony. The Code, under the caption 'Trial by Referees,' carried the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
De Clements v. De Clements, 93-2599
...period. 10 Likewise, the Florida court system began employing Masters to aid judges as early as the mid-nineteenth century. See Slatcoff, 74 So.2d at 62; 21 Fla.L.Prac. Reference Sec. 21 (1964). We cannot deny that Masters, when properly utilized, have been extremely useful in aiding our tr......
-
AMEND. TO RULES OF APP. PROC., CIV. PROC., SC04-1139.
...for any reference to a special master. Special masters may be used as provided by statute even with the rule change. See Slatcoff v. Dezen, 74 So.2d 59 (Fla.1954). RULE 3.111. PROVIDING COUNSEL TO (a) When Counsel Provided. A person entitled to appointment of counsel as provided herein shal......
-
Suntogs of Miami, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.
...settled that a master cannot hear the entire case over the objection of a party. Powell v. Weger, 97 So.2d 617 (Fla.1957); Slatcoff v. Dezen, 74 So.2d 59 (Fla.1954); see Data Lease Financial Corp. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc., 325 So.2d 475, 477-78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Thus, th......
-
McAnespie v. McAnespie
...Banking Co., CCA Fla.1932, 56 F.2d 792; Spencer v. Young, Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 334; Moncrief v. Hall, Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 640; Slatcoff v. Dezen, Fla.1954, 74 So.2d 59; Ozgowicz v. Leighton, Fla.App.1963, 151 So.2d 21; Applefield v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., Fla.App.1965, 176 So.2d 366; Gu......
-
Title procedure before general magistrates and child support enforcement hearing officers.
...2d 668, 670 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 2007); FLA. R. FAM. P. 12.490(b)(2), 12.490(b)(3); FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.257(b)(3). (14) See Slatcoff v. Dezen, 74 So. 2d 59, 64 (Fla. 1954) (en banc) (superseded by 1972 amendment to FLA. Const. art. V); 45 Fla. Jur. 2d, References [section] 19 (2006). See also Powe......