Slaten v. State
| Decision Date | 19 December 1978 |
| Docket Number | 6 Div. 831 |
| Citation | 367 So.2d 562 |
| Parties | Dwight SLATEN v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Charles W. Gorham, Birmingham, for appellant.
William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen. and David W. Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen. for the State, appellee.
Appellant was tried on an indictment that charged, inter alia, that he "did unlawfully take or attempt to take immoral, improper or indecent liberties with . . . a female child under the age of sixteen years . . ." The omission herein of other language contained in the indictment, including the name of the alleged victim, is of no detriment to appellant, we think, and may be a contribution to the victim's future welfare. The indictment charged a crime defined and denounced by Code of Ala.Recomp.1958, Tit. 14, Chap. 51B, § 326(2) and Code 1975, § 13-1-113. In accordance with the maximum punishment fixed by law, the court sentenced him to imprisonment for five years. Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, and we see no reasonable basis for such challenge. A recital of essential evidence as to the details of the crime would serve no useful purpose.
Defendant, in a written statement signed by him, almost a year after the alleged crime, confessed to it and to another incident like it with the same victim, and expressed a sense of nausea and remorse by reason of his conduct.
The confession of defendant became a target of his defense in a pre-trial motion to suppress. The motion was not heard until the State called and identified, as a witness for the State, Mr. Larry Waldrop, a criminal investigator for the Cullman County Sheriff's office, to whom defendant made the confession. As soon as Mr. Waldrop was identified and it became apparent that the State planned to offer the confession or other statements by defendant in evidence, the jury was excused, and the State proceeded with Mr. Waldrop to lay a predicate for the admission in evidence of the conversation between Mr. Waldrop and defendant, and the written confession made by him. In lengthy testimony, the witness said that before any statement was made by defendant, defendant was not offered any reward or hope of reward or any inducement to make a statement. He showed that before making a statement, defendant had been advised fully as to his right to remain silent, as well as his right to a lawyer at the expense of the State. He fully covered the field of the requirements set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and all of the pre-Miranda requirements preliminary to the admission of a confession or incriminating statement. He further showed that defendant, in effect, acknowledged orally and in writing that he had been fully apprised of his rights, that his statements and confession were voluntary and made of defendant's "own free will without promise or hope of reward, without fear or threat of physical harm, without coercion, favor or offer of favor, without leniency or offer of leniency, by any person or persons whomsoever."
Appellant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to show the voluntariness of the confession other than as stated in his brief as follows:
Appellant does not argue his first point. It could well be that relation by consanguinity or affinity between a defendant and an officer to whom a confession is made would have a bearing on the question of voluntariness and other requisites for the admission into evidence of a confession, but if voluntariness and all of the other requirements are shown, the relation between the two as shown here is not of itself an obstacle to the admission in evidence of the confession. As appellant does not amplify in any way the first point as quoted above, we think it appropriate for us not to amplify what we say on the point.
As to appellant's second point, we quote from portions of the testimony of Detective Waldrop relied upon by appellant:
On redirect examination of the witness, he testified as follows:
Then on recross-examination, the witness testified:
It is contended by appellee in its brief:
"Appellee submits that the offer of mental treatment was a mere collateral benefit and not one to produce in the mind of the Defendant any hope of favor."
If by this appellee means that the offer of a collateral benefit is never sufficient to constitute such an offer of benefit that would invalidate as involuntary the confession of an accused, we cannot agree. Any such thought should be dispelled by what was recently said by the Alabama Supreme Court in Holt v. State, Ala., --- So.2d ----, rev'g Holt v. State, Ala.Cr.App., --- So.2d ---- (1978). The Supreme Court held that the admissibility of a confession is not to be determined by any distinction between the offer or promise of a "collateral" benefit and the offer or promise of a "direct" benefit. Any confession Induced by the promise or offer of a "collateral" benefit lacks voluntariness as much as a confession Induced by the offer or promise of a "direct" benefit.
We must take all of the circumstances as to the confession into consideration. The testimony of the officer may have lacked, to some extent, desirable precision and positiveness, particularly when made in answer to double-barrel questions, not conducive to a meeting of the minds of the questioner and the answerer. Even so, we are favorably impressed with the forthrightness of the witness, with his obvious efforts to state the unvarnished facts. We are convinced from his testimony as a whole, which is the only testimony for or against appellant on the point under consideration, that the only thing said by him that could be construed as an offer or promise to help pertained to his statement to the effect that he would ask or tell Mr. Bill Thornton of the Mental Health Department to confer with defendant. We are convinced that his statement to defendant did not constitute any offer or promise conditioned upon the incriminating statement or confession. We have no reason to...
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State v. Beck
...Commonwealth, 214 Va. 683, 204 S.E.2d 269 (1974); contra, Tatum v. State, 585 S.W.2d 957 (Ark.1979). The recent case of Slaten v. State, 367 So.2d 562 (Ala.Cr.App.1978), writ denied, 367 So.2d 569 (Ala.1979), is precisely on point. At 367 So.2d 565-66, the court (T)he only thing said by (th......
- Coon v. State, 4 Div. 348
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