Slater v. State
| Decision Date | 16 March 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. DD-462,DD-462 |
| Parties | Donnell SLATER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Ernest D. Jackson, Sr., of Jackson & Micks, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Michael H. Davidson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
A jury found appellant guilty of conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine. He now appeals the adjudication of guilt based upon the jury verdict.
There is nothing in the record to support appellant's first two points on appeal. As to those points we accordingly affirm.
By his third point appellant urges that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an agreement between two co-conspirators to purchase and deliver cocaine, the agreement having been made in the absence of appellant.
In establishing a conspiracy the state may adduce evidence of related transactions between or among other co-conspirators not withstanding that all alleged conspirators were not privy to that transaction if it is established that that transaction is part of the overall conspiracy. (Though distinguishable, see Epps v. State, 354 So.2d 441 (Fla.App. 1st 1978), and cases therein cited.) As an example, two parties may agree to commit an illegal act: If, thereafter, a third party joins in the agreement, the original agreement may be proved in the trial of the third party notwithstanding that he was not a party to the initial agreement. Further, the order of proof, in an appropriate case, may be reversed and evidence admitted of declarations or acts of co-conspirators prior to proof of the conspiracy itself. (See Honchell v. State, 257 So.2d 889 (Fla.1971)) Such reversal of sequence is, of course, conditioned on the state subsequently furnishing adequate proof of the conspiracy. (Honchell v. State, supra, and cases there cited)
Appellant's fourth point is essentially the same as the third and our ruling is the same.
By his fifth point appellant contends that the trial judge committed reversible error when permitting a police officer, over the objection of the defendant, to be qualified as an expert witness regarding street language in the drug culture and permitting the officer to explain to the jury his interpretation of words used by the alleged conspirators in intercepted conversations, the tapes of which were played to the jury. During those conversations the speakers used the terms "C"; "white girl"; "lady"; "snow"; "party pack"; "rock and roll"; "boy"; "white boy"; "doogee"; "kattie" and the expression "three, but I know a duece smoking." The words were used in contexts wherein their normal lexicographical meanings would be illogical and meaningless. They would make no sense at all to the...
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Daniels v. State
...testimony. 6 Appellant Daniels' fourth point 7 has been resolved contrary to his contentions by this court's opinion in Slater v. State, 356 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) wherein we " * * * (A)ppellant contends that the trial judge committed reversible error when permitting a police officer,......
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Smith v. State
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Clark v. State
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