Slaughter v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 28 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 14-17-00050-CV,14-17-00050-CV |
| Parties | ROBERT LEE SLAUGHTER, SR., Appellant v. CARVEL JOHNSON, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
ROBERT LEE SLAUGHTER, SR., Appellant
v.
CARVEL JOHNSON, Appellee
NO. 14-17-00050-CV
State of Texas in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals
August 28, 2018
On Appeal from the 215th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2016-16942
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Robert Lee Slaughter, Sr. brought claims for trespass to try title, conversion, and declaratory judgment against Carvel Johnson. The trial court granted no-evidence summary judgment in favor of Johnson on all of Slaughter's claims. In three issues, Slaughter contends the trial court erred in disposing of his claims. We hold the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on Slaughter's claims for conversion and declaratory judgment. We therefore affirm in part and reverse and
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remand in part the trial court's order granting summary judgment.
Slaughter has lived next door to Johnson's family since 1968. In 2015, Johnson obtained a survey of his family's residential lot. The survey showed that a wrought iron fence and part of a driveway installed and used by Slaughter extended over the Johnsons' property line. A dispute arose over the section of land between the parties' properties.
In March 2016, Slaughter sued Johnson for trespass to try title under chapter 22 of the Texas Property Code and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 783 et seq. Slaughter's petition stated that the lawsuit concerned title to his real property: "Lot Twelve (12) BLK Five (5), Hillwood Addition, Section 5 of Harris County, Texas." Slaughter alleged that Johnson was "harassing [his family] to move, [sic] their fence, driveway and the eve of their storage shed because [Johnson] alleges they are encroaching on his property." Slaughter's petition included a request for a temporary restraining order and a temporary injunction prohibiting Johnson from (1) communicating with Slaughter in a "vulgar, profane, obscene [sic], or using indecent language or otherwise acting in an offensive manner," and (2) "digging up Mr. Slaughter's fence or driveway or interfering with his use and enjoyment of [his] fence and driveway." The trial court granted the requested temporary restraining order and later entered a temporary injunction prohibiting both parties from taking certain actions with respect to each other and the property.1
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In May 2016, Johnson, pro se, filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Slaughter responded that the motion was premature. Slaughter pointed out that the agreed docket control order in the case provided that (1) the discovery period would not close until October 28, 2016, and (2) "Rule 166a(i) motions may not be set before [July 8, 2016]." Slaughter also alleged there were defects in the form and substance of Johnson's motion. The trial court denied the motion.
In August 2016, Johnson filed a first amended no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Slaughter again responded that the motion was premature, filed two months before the close of the discovery period. Slaughter reiterated his argument that there were defects in the form and substance of Johnson's motion. The trial court denied the motion.
Slaughter amended his petition to add a conversion cause of action and a request for declaratory judgment.2 Slaughter's conversion cause of action was based on Johnson's alleged conversion of the fence between the properties. Slaughter alleged that on or about March 18, 20[16] (days before the temporary restraining order issued), Johnson "tore down the wrought iron fence put up by" Slaughter between the adjoining
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properties. Slaughter's request for declaratory judgment sought clarification of "Plaintiff's rights in connection with the fence and property it was installed on." Slaughter wanted a declaratory judgment to resolve the controversy over "who is the owner of the fence and who is the owner of the property the fence was installed on."
On October 21, 2016, Johnson filed a second amended no-evidence motion for summary judgment. The motion addressed Slaughter's claim for trespass to try title. The motion also asserted, "Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence supporting any valid claim against the defendant." However, the motion did not specifically address Slaughter's cause of action for conversion or his request for declaratory judgment. Slaughter did not respond to the motion.
The trial court granted Johnson's second amended no-evidence motion and dismissed with prejudice all Slaughter's claims against Johnson. The trial court also awarded Johnson damages, sanctions, and injunctive relief.
Slaughter timely appealed the trial court's order.
A. Finality of the judgment and jurisdiction
In support of his third issue, Slaughter contends that the trial court's order granting summary judgment is not a final judgment. Specifically, Slaughter asserts the order is not a final judgment because it does not conform to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301. Rule 301 provides, in part:
The judgment of the court shall conform to the pleadings, the nature of the case proved and the verdict, if any, and shall be so framed as to give the party all the relief to which he may be entitled either in law or equity.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 301. Slaughter argues the judgment does not conform to the pleadings because "it does not dispose of all issues[] and all parties."
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Because our jurisdiction over this appeal depends on a final judgment, we first determine whether the trial court's order constitutes a final judgment. As a general rule—with few, mostly statutory exceptions—a party may appeal only from a final judgment. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Under Lehmann, a judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal if it either (1) actually disposes of every pending claim and party, or (2) states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment. Id. at 205.
We determine whether a judicial decree is a final judgment from its language and the record. Id. at 195. In Lehmann, the Texas Supreme Court explained that the determination of whether of a judgment is final does not depend on whether the judgment contains the words "final" or "appealable." Id. at 205-06. Rather, a judgment is final when it dismisses all claims against all parties:
An order does not dispose of all claims and all parties merely because it is entitled "final", or because the word "final" appears elsewhere in the order, or even because it awards costs. Nor does an order completely dispose of a case merely because it states that it is appealable, since even interlocutory orders may sometimes be appealable. Rather, there must be some other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case. Language that the plaintiff take nothing by his claims in the case, or that the case is dismissed, shows finality if there are no other claims by other parties; but language that "plaintiff take nothing by his claims against X" when there is more than one defendant or other parties in the case does not indicate finality.
To determine whether an order disposes of all pending claims and parties, it may of course be necessary for the appellate court to look to the record in the case. Thus, in the example just given, if the record reveals that there is only one plaintiff and only one defendant, X, the order is final, but if the record reveals the existence of parties or claims not mentioned in the order, the order is not final. On the other hand, an order that expressly disposes of the entire case is not interlocutory merely because the record fails to show an adequate motion or other legal basis for the disposition. The record may help illumine whether an order is made final by its own language, so that an order that all parties appear to have treated as final
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may be final despite some vagueness in the order itself, while an order that some party should not reasonably have regarded as final may not be final despite language that might indicate otherwise.
Id.; see also In re Harris Cty. Hosp. Dist. Aux., Inc., 127 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (holding summary judgment order indicated finality where it ordered plaintiff's cause of action "hereby dismissed with prejudice and that Plaintiff take nothing by her suit"); Lopez v. Yates, No. 14-01-00649-CV, 2002 WL 31599472, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding trial court's summary judgment order final and appealable where "the trial court granted summary judgment as to all claims between the only existing parties"); Alashmawi v. IBP, Inc., 65 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. denied) (holding appellate court had jurisdiction where trial court's order stated "the Motions for Summary Judgment should be granted as to all claims asserted by Plaintiff").
The summary judgment order in this case purported to dismiss all claims against all parties in the case. This case concerns only one plaintiff and one defendant. Slaughter's contention that Johnson lacked standing or was "not the true owner" of the property at issue is without merit. Slaughter and Johnson were the only parties to the lawsuit, and the summary judgment order explicitly purported to dispose of all the claims between them. The order specifically stated, "ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that all of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Carvel Johnson are herein dismissed with prejudice."
Slaughter asserts the order was not final because it did not address his causes of action for conversion or declaratory judgment and the court could not grant a no-evidence motion for summary judgment on issues not raised in the motion. This argument does not affect our appellate jurisdiction. The law is well-settled that "an order that expressly disposes of the entire case is not interlocutory merely because the
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record fails to show an adequate motion or other...
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