Slaughter v. Land

Decision Date13 June 1940
Docket Number13307
PartiesSLAUGHTER v. LAND et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Swift Pease, Davidson & Swinson and W. M. Page, all of Columbus, for plaintiff in error.

Ed Wohlwender and Ernest C. Britton, both of Columbus, for defendants in error.

The members of a church filed a petition for injunction, alleging that they held title by adverse possession for church purposes for more than twenty years of a five-acre tract of land, containing a spring and pool. The land was described as: '5 acres * * * more or less, in the southeast corner of land lot No. 80 in the 8th district of Muscogee County, Georgia, * * * for baptismal purposes a large spring and pool located on the northwest portion of said land * * * on which plaintiffs' church is located * * * said 5 acres, more or less, having the east line of said lot and the south line of said lot for its eastern and southern boundary lines.' It was alleged that, because of the location of a public road on the north side of the property, the absence of a fence to enclose the same, and the presence of the spring and large trees, people would drive automobiles on the grounds at night, throw bottles, and make disagreeable trash; and therefore, about five years ago, the plaintiffs 'permitted defendant to run a temporary fence across that portion of same so as to prevent these parties from using said spring and the woods,' although it does not appear as to why the defendant desired to erect the fence; that the defendant had actual and constructive notice of plaintiffs' title and their 'being in possession of said 5 acres,' although he had previously, in 1931 received a deed conveying the entire land lot without excepting such tract; that 'after granting defendant permission to put up [said] temporary fence * * * for the purposes aforesaid, defendant now denies plaintiffs * * * the right to go upon that portion of said five acres now cut off by [said] fence, and to use the spring and grounds for church purposes as aforesaid; thereby causing plaintiffs irreparable injury and damage;' that ' should defendant, in his exercising ownership over that portion of said five acres now owned by [plaintiffs] which is now cut off by said fence, decide to cut the growing trees and cultivate or to sell said land, [it] would cause irreparable injury and damage to plaintiffs;' and that plaintiffs have no remedy at law. They pray that defendant be enjoined from interfering with plaintiffs in the possession, custody, or control of that part of the said 5 acres which is now cut off by said fence; and from cutting any trees on, cultivating, or selling said part so cut off by said fence; that complete justice be determined between the parties; and that plaintiffs have such further equitable relief as may be meet and proper. The defendant excepted to the overruling of his demurrers. The general demurrer attacked the petition as insufficient in law and equity, as failing to show title, as showing too indefinite a description of the property to frame a decree and on the ground that plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. Special grounds of demurrer attacked the petition as having no proper plaintiffs, and particular paragraphs as irrelevant and showing no threatened injury.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

JENKINS Justice.

1. While the rule is well established in this State that the cutting of timber may be enjoined, though the defendant be solvent, where there are frequent acts of trespass accompanied with threats to continue, or the circumstances indicate that the trespasses will recur from day to day (Kimbrell v. Thomas, 139 Ga. 146[1], 147, 76 S.E. 1024, and cit.; Moore & Co. v. Dougherty, Allen & Co., 146 Ga. 176[2], 179, 91 S.E. 14; Couey v. Talalah Estates Corp., 183 Ga. 442, 445, 188 S.E. 822, and cit.; Kirkland v. Odum, 156 Ga. 131, 135, 118 S.E. 706; Elliott v. Adams, 173 Ga. 312, 313[7], 323, 160 S.E. 336; Code, § 55-104), yet a mere apprehension...

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  • Attorney General v. Dime Sav. Bank of New York, FSB
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • July 27, 1992
    ...Cir.1937); Perry v. Warnock, 246 Ala. 470, 20 So.2d 867 (1945); Welbrot v. Levenberg, 98 Conn. 217, 118 A. 911 (1922); Slaughter v. Land, 190 Ga. 491, 9 S.E.2d 754 (1940); Kertesz v. Falgiano, 140 W.Va. 469, 84 S.E.2d 744 (1954). "[P]laintiffs in such cases [were required to] resort to the ......
  • Hall v. Browning
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • February 11, 1943
    ...55 S.E. 240; Loudermilk v. Martin, 130 Ga. 525(1, c), 61 S.E. 122; Wall v. Mercer, 119 Ga. 346(2, 3), 349, 46 S.E. 420; Slaughter v. Land, 190 Ga. 491, 9 S.E.2d 754, cit. 4. The petitioners here alleged, that they were users of a described private road through land of the defendant; that th......
  • Hall v. Browning
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • February 11, 1943
    ...S.E. 240; Loudermilk v. Martin, 130 Ga. 525 (l, c), 61 S.E. 122; Wall v. Mercer, 119 Ga. 346 (2, 3), 349, 46 S.E. 420; Slaughter v. Land, 190 Ga. 491, 9 S.E.2d 754, and cit. 4. The petitioners here alleged, that they were users of a described private road through land of the defendant; that......
  • Pearl Optical, Inc. v. Pearle Optical of Ga., Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • March 7, 1963
    ...acts are alleged. Numerous cases are cited to the effect that an injunction will not be granted on mere apprehension (see Slaughter v. Land, 190 Ga. 491, 9 S.E.2d 754), and that where there are no allegations of an overt act committed which injuriously affects the plaintiff's person or prop......
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