Slaughter v. State

• Decision Date: 21 February 2023
• Docket Number: A22A1162
• Parties: SLAUGHTER v. THE STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

SLAUGHTER v. THE STATE.

No. A22A1162

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Fifth Division

February 21, 2023

MCFADDEN, P. J., GOBEIL and LAND, JJ.

Land Judge.

After a jury trial, Wayne Tyler Slaughter was convicted of home invasion in the first degree, aggravated assault, and influencing a witness. He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to certain testimony and failing to request a jury instruction on burglary as a lesser included offense of home invasion. For the following reasons, we affirm.

On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict and the defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence; moreover, an appellate court determines evidence sufficiency and does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Williams v State, 333 Ga.App. 879, 879 (777 S.E.2d 711) (2015).

So viewed, the record shows that Slaughter and Contessia Woods had dated for more than four years. At 4:00 a.m. on June 1 2020, Woods and her friend, Andrew Holmes, were at her house when Slaughter showed up outside the house and yelled through the locked door to be let inside. When Woods did not let him in, Slaughter began kicking and hitting the front door and then went to the back door to try to gain entry. Woods called 911 and reported that someone was trying to break into her home. Slaughter then forced his way into the house, pushed past Woods and attacked Holmes. Woods then called 911 again and ran outside.

When law enforcement officers responded to the scene, they located Holmes lying unconscious in a closet with wounds suggesting that he had been struck on his neck and head. Woods told the responding officers that Slaughter entered the home with a black handgun that appeared to be fake and that she saw him hold the handgun against Holmes's face. Holmes testified that Slaughter attacked him and hit him in the head with a black handgun that he believed to be real. Holmes stated that after the attack, Slaughter "went outside after [Woods]."

Law enforcement later found Slaughter in an RV at a friend's home. Slaughter refused to leave the RV and threatened to kill himself by stabbing his throat or causing an explosion with a propane tank if any officers tried to get him. Slaughter asked the officers what kind of sentence he would be facing as a result of his actions and said that he "didn't mean to hurt anyone but only wanted to scare" Holmes. When the officers' attempts to negotiate failed, officers shot tear gas into the RV. Slaughter then came out of the RV and was arrested.

While the case was pending, Slaughter made several calls to Woods from jail. During these calls, he asked her to speak with the detective in his case and requested that the charges against him be dropped. Their conversation included a discussion about law enforcement officers' belief that Slaughter had a gun during the incident, a request that Woods tell law enforcement that Slaughter did not have a gun, and comments by Slaughter that he loved Woods and her daughter and wanted to marry her. Slaughter also told Woods what penalties he was facing if convicted and asked Woods if she would be willing to "get probation" instead. After these phone calls, Woods spoke to the detective in the case a second time and wrote a second statement which contradicted her first in several respects.

In several related enumerations of error, Slaughter contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, Slaughter must prove "both that his lawyer's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance." Williams v. State, 304 Ga. 455, 457 (2) (818 S.E.2d 653) (2018), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984). To prove that his lawyer's performance was deficient, Slaughter must show that the lawyer "performed his duties at trial in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances, and in the light of prevailing professional norms." Williams, 304 Ga. at 457 (2). And to prove that he was prejudiced by his lawyer's deficient performance, Slaughter must show a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (III) (B). A claim for ineffective assistance is a "mixed question of law and fact, and we accept the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous but independently apply the law to those facts." (Footnote omitted.) Tucker v. State, 362 Ga.App. 489, 496 (2) (869 S.E.2d 142) (2022). The defendant bears the burden of proof of both prongs of an ineffective assistance claim, and if he fails to establish either prong, the reviewing court need not examine the other. Id. We turn to each of Slaughter's arguments in turn.

1. Slaughter argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to request a jury charge on burglary as a lesser-included offense of a home invasion because there was evidence that Slaughter was holding a replica of a handgun during the incident instead of a real handgun. We find no error.

Contrary to Slaughter's argument, the language of the home invasion statute (OCGA § 16-7-5) and his indictment do not require proof that the firearm used in the incident was a functioning pistol. OCGA § 16-7-5 (b) provides that "[a] person commits the offense of home invasion in the first degree when, without authority and with intent to commit a forcible felony therein and while in possession of a deadly weapon or instrument, which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury," he enters the dwelling house of another while it is occupied by any person with authority to be present. "It is the possession of a weapon at the time of an unauthorized entry into a dwelling that distinguishes the crime of home invasion from the crime of burglary. Burglary in the first degree requires only an unauthorized entry into an occupied or unoccupied residence with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein." Mahone v. State, 348 Ga.App. 491, 494 (2), n. 1 (823 S.E.2d 813) (2019), citing OCGA § 6-7-1 (b) (burglary). The indictment alleges that Slaughter committed the offense of first degree home invasion (OCGA § 16-7-5) in that he "with intent to commit aggravated assault, a forcible felony, therein and while in possession of a pistol, an instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury, enter the dwelling house" of Woods . . . while [it] was occupied".

Here, the indictment did not allege that Slaughter had a functioning firearm, but rather that the pistol was "likely to or actually [did] result in serious bodily injury." The evidence presented at trial shows that Slaughter entered the home while holding a weapon that appeared to be a pistol and used that weapon as a bludgeon to strike Holmes on the head, that it rendered him unconscious and that he had a bleeding wound on his head. Because pistol was used as a weapon to cause serious bodily injury, the jury was authorized to convict Slaughter of the crime of home invasion under the indictment whether or not they believed the object was a functioning firearm. See e. g. Butts v. State, 153 Ga.App. 464 (265 S.E.2d 370) (1980) (a replica of a gun "can be an offensive or deadly weapon under certain circumstances"). Compare Mahone, 348 Ga.App. at 494 (2) (defendant did not commit the crime of home invasion in the first degree when he did not possess the iron that he used to attack the victim at the time he entered the home, but instead found the iron after he made the unlawful entry). Here, even if Slaughter's trial counsel had requested a jury charge on burglary as a lesser-included offense of first-degree home invasion, the trial court would not have been required to comply. See Campbell v. State, 359 Ga.App. 391, 398-399 (4) (c) (858 S.E.2d 83) (2021) (trial court did not err in denying defendant's written request for a jury charge on criminal trespass as a lesser-included offense to first-degree home invasion when there was no evidence to support defendant's theory that he committed the assault in some way other than with a firearm).

Further trial counsel testified during the motion for new trial hearing that his decision not to request burglary as a lesser-included offense to home invasion was strategic. Trial counsel explained that he feared that if Slaughter was convicted of burglary and the other charges that he was facing, and if the sentences were to run consecutively, then the total length of the sentence would have been similar to that which he would receive under a conviction for home invasion. Trial counsel further explained that his defense strategy was to argue that the State failed to prove the elements of home invasion because there was no deadly weapon, and therefore he requested the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass (a misdemeanor) rather than burglary. "Decisions as to which charges will be requested generally fall within the realm of trial tactics and strategy[, and] strategic decisions provide no grounds for reversal unless such tactical decisions are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ingram v. State, 317 Ga.App. 606, 608 (2) (732 S.E.2d 456) (2012). Accord McKenzie v. State, 284 Ga....